Financial Markets
The 14th Five-Year Plan has more strategic importance than in the past decade. Spending on national defense, technological self-sufficiency, public welfare and green energy will likely see substantial increases under the guidelines of a strong central government. The Proposal from the Five-Year Plan does not change our cyclical view on Chinese assets. Beyond mid-2021, the differences in sectoral performance will widen. We will likely begin to trim our position in China’s “old economy” stocks in the first half of 2021.
Highlights A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade. The US is the most susceptible to social unrest of all the developed markets. Europe is stable relative to the US, but political risks are rising as new lockdowns go into effect. Emerging markets are also susceptible to social unrest – even those that look best on paper. Chile and Thailand have more downside due to politics, despite underlying advantages. Turkey and Nigeria are among those at risk of major unrest in a post-COVID world. Book gains on EUR-GBP volatility, Indian pharma, and rare earths. Cut losses. Feature This week saw a long-awaited risk-off move in global financial markets. A new wave of COVID lockdowns plus the US failure to pass a fiscal package finally registered with investors. Over the past two months we have argued that rising COVID cases without stimulus would produce a pre-election selloff that would drive the final nail in President Trump’s re-election bid. That should still be the case (Chart 1). While we are sticking with our view that Biden will win, we have upgraded Trump’s odds from 35% to 45%. We are focused on Trump’s momentum – not alleged polling errors – in Florida and Pennsylvania, and Biden’s loss of altitude in Arizona, as these trends open a clear Electoral College path to another Trump victory (Chart 2). Nevertheless Biden is tied with Trump among men and leads by 17 percentage points among women. He is also in a statistical tie among the elderly. Chart 1COVID Rising + Stimulus Falling = Red Ink Chart 2Trump's Momentum In Swing States Even assuming Trump’s comeback proves too little, too late, it could produce a contested election in which Trump has constitutional advantages, or a Republican Senate. Either of these two scenarios would extend the election season volatility for one-to-three months. Our updated US election probabilities are shown in Table 1 alongside the odds from the popular online betting site PredictIt.org. Table 1There Is A 72% Chance The Post-Election Policy Setting Will Favor Reflation A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) is the only deflationary scenario in the near term, since fiscal stimulus will be reduced in size and uncertain in timing. However, assuming financial market pressure forces senators to agree, this is actually the best outcome over the full two-year Senate election period, since neither tariffs nor corporate taxes would rise. Notably Treasury yields have risen regardless of election scenario, but there is little doubt that this scenario poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade (Chart 3). Why does this election matter? Trump’s re-election would prolong US political polarization and “maximum pressure” foreign and trade policy. Trump must win through the constitutional system, not the popular vote, so a win would push polarization up. Polarization at home, including Democratic opposition in the House of Representatives, would drive him abroad. By contrast, a Biden win would include a popular majority and might include a united Democratic Congress, which would result in a clear popular mandate and would concentrate Biden's administration on an ambitious domestic agenda. A Biden victory with a Republican Senate (28% odds) poses the greatest risk to the global reflation trade. Hence Trump’s election would bolster the USD and US equity outperformance, along with global policy uncertainty relative to the United States (Chart 4). Whereas Biden’s election, if it also brings a Democratic Senate, would bolster global equity outperformance, cyclical equities, and US policy uncertainty relative to global. Chart 3Republican Senate Less Reflationary Chart 4Trump Would Boost US Equity Outperformance The election will have a geopolitical fallout. First, Trump is still president through January 20 regardless of outcome and could take aggressive actions to seal his legacy and lock the Biden administration into conflict with China or Iran. Second, a contested election would create a power vacuum in which other nations could seek to take advantage of American distraction. Third, a Trump victory spells strategic conflict with Iran and China, and either could try to seize the advantage by acting first. Fourth, a Biden win spells confrontation with Russia and ultimately China, and both countries would test his resolve early in his administration. Diagram 1 summarizes these key market takeaways of the US election scenarios. This week we provide our monthly GeoRisk Update with a special focus on our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index and implications for select developed, emerging, and frontier markets. Diagram 1Scenarios For US Election Outcomes And Market Impacts The United States The market can get hit by negative surprises after the US election just as easily as before.1 The US is a powder keg of social and political angst, ranking the worst among developed markets in our COVID-19 Social Unrest Index (Table 2). The lower a country ranks on the list, the less stable it is and the more susceptible to unrest. Social unrest becomes market-relevant if it weighs on consumer or business sentiment, or if it causes a major change in government or policy. Table 2The US Is The Developed Market Most Susceptible To Social Unrest The first US risk is a contested election. By rallying in the swing states in the final weeks of the election, Trump has increased the likelihood of a disputed outcome. Armies of lawyers will descend upon the swing state election boards. The Supreme Court’s intervention in Florida in 2000 has incentivized political parties to seek a judicial intervention, especially if they think they are losing the popular vote narrowly. Mail-in counts, recounts, and other disputes could push up against the December 14 Electoral College voting date. Worse, if the Electoral College is hung, the House of Representatives would have to decide the outcome in January. Volatility and risk-off sentiment would predominate. Emerging markets are showing the first signs of upheaval in the wake of this year’s crisis. The second risk is resistance to the election results. If Trump wins on a constitutional technicality, the country faces widespread unrest. This would be relevant to investors if it paralyzes major cities, exacerbates the COVID outbreak, or snowballs into something big enough to suppress consumer confidence. If Biden wins on a technicality, the country faces not widespread unrest but isolated pockets of potentially armed resistance or domestic terrorist attacks. The FBI, DHS, and recent news events have confirmed the presence of armed or violent extremist groups of various ideological stripes that pose a rising threat in the current climate of pandemic, unemployment, and polarization.2 They could strike any time after the election. Europe And Brexit Chart 5European Lockdowns Push Up Political Risk Europe and Canada have reinstated lockdowns in response to their rise in COVID-19 cases. The surge in political risk is evident from our GeoRisk Indicators (Chart 5). These lockdowns will not be as draconian as earlier this year as the death rate has been found to be lower than once feared. While most governments have time on the political clock to take a hardline approach today, at the start of what could be a nasty winter season, they do not have so much leeway in 2021. Greece, Spain, Italy, the UK, and France are next in line for social unrest, after the US, in our index, Table 2 above. These countries are also vulnerable because fiscal support is not as robust as elsewhere, as can be seen by our global fiscal stimulus tracker (Chart 6). France is in better shape than the others and marks the dividing line – the 2017 election was a turning point in which the political establishment unified to defeat a right-wing populist challenge. President Emmanuel Macron’s popularity is holding up decently and it will now be buttressed by his tough stance against a spate of radical Islamist terrorist attacks. Extremist incidents will continue to be a problem, given the lockdowns and economic slump. Macron will focus on economic reflation in 2021 leading up to an election for which he is clearly favored in spring of 2022. Anything that derails his political trajectory before that time is of great importance for Europe’s political future, since Macron will be the de facto leader once Angela Merkel steps down in October 2022. Italy and Spain will be ongoing sources of political risk. Italy was the first major European hotspot of the pandemic, and euroskeptic attitudes are quietly ticking back up, but the ruling coalition and especially Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte have received popular backing for their handling of the crisis. Spain, on the other hand, has seen Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez lose support, while conservative parties tick up in popular opinion. These two countries are candidates for early elections when the hens come home to roost for the pandemic and recession (Chart 7). Chart 6More Stimulus Needed In Europe Chart 7Europe’s Leaders Fare Better Than Others The other major countries with looming elections in 2021-22 are seeing relatively positive outcomes in popular opinion (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany). The exception is the UK, which is on the lower end of the social unrest index and is in the midst of internal disruption due to Brexit. Our assessment remains that Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the Tories will have to accept a trade deal with the EU over the next month (Chart 8). They can afford to leave on paper, but the economy would suffer and Scotland’s nationalists would be empowered to attempt secession. Our European Strategist Dhaval Joshi believes a Biden win in the US will hasten Johnson’s capitulation. We don’t expect much more upside in our GBP-EUR volatility trade after the US election result is known (Chart 9). Chart 8Go Long Sterling Chart 9Close EUR-GBP Volatility Trade Chart 10Trump Would Weigh On Euro Trump’s re-election would be negative for the European Union’s economic and political stability (Chart 10). It would portend a greater trade war, Middle Eastern instability and refugees, Russian aggression, or European populism. By contrast, Biden will not use sweeping tariffs to resolve trade tensions, will seek to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, will suppress anti-establishment politics, will seek a multilateral approach to China trade tensions, and will only substantially aggravate the Europeans by being too aggressive on Russia. EM: Chile And Thailand Emerging markets are showing the first inevitable signs of upheaval in the wake of this year’s global crisis. What is critical to note about our Social Unrest Index for EM is that even if a country ranks high on the list overall, it could still face significant sociopolitical upheaval. This is manifest in the top-ranked countries of our list – Chile, Malaysia, Thailand, Russia, Indonesia – all of which have already seen some degree of social and/or political unrest in this crisis year (Table 3). Table 3Even Emerging Markets That Look Good On Paper Are Susceptible To Unrest The best example is Chile, which is top-ranked in the index but ranks ninth in the “Household Grievances” column, which measures inequality, inflation, and unemployment. The latter measure helps explain how Chile erupted last fall and again this fall in mass protests. Chart 11Political Risk Weighs On Chile Over the past week Chileans voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to revise their constitution with a constitutional convention that will be elected, i.e. not overdetermined by current members of the National Congress. The constitutional revision process is ultimately a positive way for a country with good governance to assuage its household grievances. But the process will continue through a revision process in April 2021, the November 2021 general election, and a final referendum in 2022, ensuring that political risk persists. Chilean assets have fallen short of their expected performance based on global copper prices, suggesting that they have upside in the near term (Chart 11). Positive news is driven by macro fundamentals, including Chinese stimulus, but political risk will periodically put a cap on rallies by highlighting Chile’s transition to expansive social spending, higher debts, and hence future currency risk. Thailand’s case is different, as it is not household grievances per se but rather the ongoing governance problem that is triggering mass protests. The governance problem stems from regional disparities in wealth and representative government. Modern society and pro-growth populism have repeatedly clashed with the royalist political establishment and its military backers over the past 20 years and that process is set to continue. Chart 12Thailand Not Fully Pricing New Instability Cycle The newest round of the crisis will build for some years and ultimately culminate in some degree of bloodshed before a new political settlement is achieved. Typically, over the past 20 years, Thai political unrest creates a buying opportunity for investors. But the previous major wave of unrest, from 2006-14, occurred during the lead-up to the all-important royal succession. Now the succession is “over” and it is not clear that the new king, Vajiralongkorn, will live up to his father’s legacy as a successful arbiter of society’s conflicts. It is possible that he will overreact to domestic opposition and abuse his powers. Our Emerging Markets Strategy has downgraded Thailand in its portfolio, showing that the economy is suffering from insufficient stimulus as a negative credit impulse offsets public spending during the crisis. Thai equities do not offer relative value within the emerging market space at present (Chart 12). Most likely Thai political troubles will continue to provide a buying opportunity, but at the moment the risks are not sufficiently priced. If Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand are already experiencing significant political risk despite their high rankings on our index, then Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and the Philippines face even greater challenges going forward. We have written about Brazil recently – we continue to see a rising political risk premium there (Chart 13). We will update our views on South Africa and the Philippines in forthcoming special reports. For now we turn to Turkey. Turkey: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Turkey scores near the bottom of our Social Unrest Index. The regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power for nearly two decades, is suffering cracks in public support, is continuing to suffer the inflationary consequences of populist monetary and fiscal policy, and is embroiled in a range of international adventures and conflicts, now including Nagorno-Karabakh. After a brief pause of tensions in September, we argued that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s retreat would be temporary and that geopolitical tensions would re-escalate. They have done so even sooner than we thought. The lira is collapsing, as registered by our GeoRisk Indicator, which is once again on the rise (Chart 14). Chart 13Brazilian Political Risk Nearing 2018 Levels Chart 14Turkish Political Risk Spikes Anew Relations with Europe have worsened significantly. Aggressive rhetoric between Erdogan and Macron in response to France’s treatment of French Muslims and handling of recent terrorist incidents has led to a diplomatic crisis: Paris recalled its ambassador. The episode highlights both Erdogan’s increased assertiveness vis-à-vis the EU as well as his Neo-Ottoman bid to become the leader of the Muslim world. Erdogan has called for a boycott of French goods (alongside similar popular calls in various Muslim countries). The European Commission warned Turkey could face punitive action at its December summit. The feud in the eastern Mediterranean is also escalating. Turkey’s Oruc Reis seismic research vessel was once again sent out on an exploratory mission in contested waters on October 12. The mission’s duration was extended multiple times. The EU may impose sanctions as early as December. Brussels' response to Turkish provocations may include targeted anti-dumping measures, likely on steel and fish. There have also been calls to suspend the customs union, but this would require the conflict to rise above rhetoric as it would harm EU investments in Turkey. Turkey is growing even more assertive in its neighborhood with its support for Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia. Tensions with Russia are rising yet again. Erdogan is already overextended in Syria and Libya, and recently threatened to launch a new military operation in northern Syria if Kurdish militants do not relocate from along Turkey’s border. The warning follows a Russian airstrike on Turkey-backed Syrian rebels in Idlib earlier this week – the deadliest strike in Idlib since March. Provoking the United States, Turkey also tested its newly purchased Russian S400 missile defense system on October 16. This was swiftly followed by US warnings that Turkey faces US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act if it operationalizes the system. The risk of punitive action would rise under a Biden presidency as he is more likely to adopt a tougher stance on Erdogan than President Trump. Chart 15More Downside For Turkish Lira These developments all point to a continuation in geopolitical tensions, as Erdogan flouts various risks and constraints. Turkey’s relationship with NATO allies is continuing to deteriorate meaningfully. The lira’s collapse is also in response to economic developments. After a surprise 200 basis points rate hike in September, the CBRT disappointed markets by keeping the benchmark 1 week repo rate on hold at its October 22 meeting. Investors had hoped that the September hike marked a reversal of Erdogan’s unorthodox policies. However, the October decision disconfirms this hope, as the central bank is instead opting for stealth measures to raise the cost of funding (e.g. limiting funding at the benchmark rate and thus forcing banks to borrow at higher costs; widening the interest rate corridor to give itself more room to raise the weighted average cost of funding). These decisions come amid rising inflation, debt monetization, a loss in foreign interest in Turkish equities and bonds, and deteriorating budget and current account balances. All point to further lira weakness (Chart 15). Bottom Line: The TRY faces downside pressure from the deteriorating geopolitical and economic backdrop. Although the EU has so far shown restraint in penalizing Ankara, its stance has not dissuaded Erdogan from adopting a provocative foreign policy stance. Moreover tensions with the US are at risk of escalating due to the possibility of a Biden presidency. Economic factors also point to continued weakness as monetary policy is too loose and the CBRT has not abandoned Erdoganomics. Nigeria: No Political Change Waves of protests have erupted across Nigeria in recent weeks, largely driven by the country’s youth. Protests center on calls to end the special anti-robbery squad (SARS), an arm of the national police service, which has long been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, extortion, and corruption. Most recently, dozens of soldiers and police officers approached the scene of a major protest site in Lekki, a large district in Lagos, and opened fire, killing 12 people. The violence fueled outrage toward the government and security forces. To quell unrest, the government announced that SARS would be disbanded and promised a host of reforms. Demonstrators are skeptical of government promises without clearly specified timeframes. After all, previous incumbents have suggested police reform would be expedited. This has yet to happen, so we do not expect national policy to meet public demand. Moreover, President Buhari is a former military dictator who has maintained a hard line on security matters. He is in his final term in office and not legally required to step down until 2023. While discontent grows toward the government for social injustices, the Nigerian economy remains vulnerable and imbalanced. The local currency is facing considerable risk of major devaluation stemming from strains on its balance of payments, as BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy pointed out in a recent report. Low oil prices and weak FDI inflows will foster various imbalances impeding the nation’s structural adjustments and its potential growth rate. The US election will act as a positive catalyst for markets in the short run as long as it produces a clear result and resolves the US fiscal stalemate. Nigeria’s current account excluding oil has been structurally wide, a sign of weak domestic productivity and an uncompetitive currency (Chart 16). Foreign currency reserves stand at $36bn, barely above foreign debt obligations at $28bn. FDI inflows have reached their second lowest point over the past decade, weighing on productivity growth, which is near 0%. A positive for Nigeria’s macro fundamentals is that public debt is low, at 23% of GDP, decreasing the likelihood of a sovereign default in the near term. Government officials refrained from large COVID fiscal relief, keeping spending in check. Coupled with low debt servicing costs, of which the foreign share only represents 2% of government revenues, a currency depreciation to improve competitiveness would not make public debt dynamics a concern. Nominal GDP is above short-term rates (Chart 17). Hence there is room for the currency to fall and government spending to pick up into next year to support the economy. Chart 16Nigeria Struggles With Economic Rebalance Chart 17Nigeria Has Fiscal Firepower In the post-dictatorship era, oil revenues knit the country’s predominantly Muslim north with its oil-rich and predominantly Christian south. The country has struggled to rebalance the economy in the wake of the 2014 oil shock. Crude production has fallen from over 2 million barrels per day to around 1.6 million bpd since 2010, and Nigeria struggles to meet its modest OPEC quotas. The current global crisis could have a negative long-term impact as rig counts have fallen again. We expect global oil demand to be supported in 2021, as lockdowns will be less stringent the second time and global fiscal stimulus will keep coming. And while Buhari’s age and poor health make him vulnerable, he is not without reserves of political strength. He is seen as someone who has kept up a good fight against the Islamist militant group Boko Haram. Considering that he is a northerner and a Muslim by faith, this strategy has helped ease sectarian tensions across the country, strengthening his grip. The problem is that the size of the global crisis could upset even the most stable of petro-states. Like most of sub-Saharan Africa, the youth population is large – the median age is around 18. If global oil demand relapses amid the second wave of the pandemic and a lack of domestic and global stimulus, the country will suffer yet another wave of unemployment. And if policy remains hawkish, sociopolitical troubles will be amplified. Nigeria’s impact on global oil prices is limited – it only provides 2% of global oil supply – but it could become a contributor to rising unplanned outages if instability gets out of hand. Bottom Line: The SARS protests are not likely to threaten overall government stability, but mounting economic pressures could exacerbate social unrest, and the negative feedback with security forces. This could deliver a significant blow to the aging Buhari’s government if he does not enact expansionary fiscal policy to smooth out the external shocks. Investment Takeaways Chart 18Biden Good For Global Trade Rebound The US election will act as a positive catalyst for markets in the short run as long as it produces a clear result and resolves the US fiscal stalemate. But a contested election is not unlikely and a deflationary risk arises in the 28% chance that Biden wins while Republicans retain the Senate. Stimulus would still be agreed but its size and timing would be uncertain, prolonging the selloff. Therefore we are updating our portfolio to book some gains and cut some losses. We are booking gains on our EUR-GBP volatility trade for a return of 13%. We are closing our long Indian pharmaceuticals trade for a gain of 12%. We are throwing in the towel on our long defense and aerospace trade for a loss of 21%. And we are closing our rare earths basket trade for a gain of 5%. We are closing two pair trades and re-initiating them as absolute longs: long China Play Index relative to MSCI global stocks (0.1% return) and long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the NASDAQ (-6.8%). Chinese reflation and global cyber-attacks will remain relevant themes. The inverse of Trump, Biden is positive for the euro, negative for the dollar, and supportive of global trade. However, a range of higher taxes and levies on corporations suggests that his administration will ultimately weigh on S&P global stocks relative to those at home. And while Biden appears softer on China, we consider this a mispricing, as he has largely coopted Trump’s and Sanders’s trade agenda (Chart 18). Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Chart 19China: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 20Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 21UK: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 22Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 23France: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 24Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 25Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 26Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 27Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 28Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 29Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 30Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Geopolitical Calendar Footnotes 1 There have been strange warnings in recent days – an unidentified aircraft intercepted over a Trump rally in Arizona, a Saudi warning of a potential Houthi attack on Americans, and a Chinese warning of a potential US drone attack against Chinese assets in the South China Sea. None of these have amounted to anything, and the idea of a US drone attack on China is absurd, but investors should be cautious nonetheless, particularly because a range of state and non-state actors will have an incentive to take actions once the US outcome is known. 2 Please see FBI Director Christopher Wray, “Statement Before The House Homeland Security Committee,” Washington DC, September 17, 2020, fbi.gov; Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Threat Assessment,” October 2020, dhs.gov; Tresa Baldas and Paul Egan, “More details emerge in plot to kidnap Michigan Gov. Whitmer as suspects appear in court,” USA Today, October 13, 2020, usatoday.com.
Highlights Global risk assets have more downside in the near term. The US dollar is primed to rebound. Without major fiscal stimulus in the US, the upside in the greenback will be substantial. China’s business cycle recovery will continue but Chinese stocks and China-related plays are over-hyped and will experience a setback. For equity and credit investors, we recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to EM versus their DM counterparts. Feature Global risk assets have been in a twilight zone. On the one hand, there has been enormous uncertainty related to the US elections, the US fiscal stimulus and the impact of renewed social mobility restrictions on economic activity, especially in Europe. On the other hand, ultra-accommodative central banks, zero or negative interest rates on risk-free investments and the possibility of positive news on the COVID-19 vaccine front have until recently precluded a carnage in global risk assets. What will be the path going forward? We believe the risk-off period in global markets will continue in the near run, i.e., there will be a dusk before a sunrise. Hence, investors should maintain dry powder at the moment. Several negative outcomes have a non-trivial probability of occurring over the very near term. Chiefly these include a contested US presidential election or a Republican Senate under a Biden presidency acting as a constraint on large fiscal stimulus. Chart I-1The US Needs $1.5tn (7.4% Of GDP) Of Fiscal Stimulus In 2021 To Have A Neutral Fiscal Thrust Needless to say, without a large fiscal stimulus package, the US is facing a fiscal cliff. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, the fiscal thrust will be negative 7.4% of GDP in 2021 if no further stimulus is enacted (Chart I-1). The fiscal thrust is the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit. Even if the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit as a share of GDP remains the same, fiscal thrust will be zero. Hence, to achieve a positive fiscal thrust in the US, the fiscal stimulus must be greater than 7.4% of GDP or above $1.5 trillion. Even though Congress eventually approves a large fiscal package, there is a risk that the economy will slip in the interim. To emphasize, we do not mean there will be no fiscal stimulus. The point is that a large fiscal package is possible only if markets riot. With equity and credit markets still richly priced relative to their fundamentals, the carnage in global risk assets will likely continue. With equity and credit markets still richly priced relative to their fundamentals, the carnage in global risk assets will likely continue. Chart I-2The US: Lower Inflation Expectations, Higher Real Rates And A Stronger Dollar In the absence of a large US fiscal package and amid falling oil prices, US break-even inflation expectations will drop and the TIPS (real) yields will bounce in the near term (Chart I-2). A rebound in TIPS (real) yields will induce a bounce in the US dollar (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Provided that the primary risks presently stem from DM rather than Chinese growth, we recommend maintaining a neutral allocation to EM within respective global equity and credit portfolios. Why not overweight EM versus DM? First, the rebound in the greenback will weigh on EM financial markets. Second, outside China, Korea and Taiwan, EM fundamentals are poor. Net-net, odds of EM out- and under-performance versus DM are, for now, balanced. China: Peak Stimulus, Equities And Commodities China’s business cycle recovery is intact. However, Chinese equities have become fully priced and are at risk of a setback (in absolute terms) along with global share prices. Notably, there are several elements that could trigger a meaningful setback in Chinese stocks. First, the money and credit impulses are about to peak. The top panel of Chart I-3 shows that changes in commercial banks’ excess reserves ratio lead the credit impulse by about six months. The drop in the excess reserves ratio since May foreshadows the top in the private credit impulse. Interbank rates – shown inverted in the bottom panel of Chart I-3 – point to an apex in the narrow money (M1) impulse. Authorities have been shrinking commercial banks’ excess reserves at the PBoC since May/June. Tightening liquidity conditions in the banking system have led to higher interbank rates as well as government and corporate bond yields. Higher borrowing costs will weigh on money and credit growth. Second, the loan approval index of the PBoC banking survey has rolled over (Chart I-4). This implies that bank loan origination will subside going forward. Chart I-3China: Money/Credit Impulses Are At An Apex Chart I-4China: Loan Growth To Moderate Finally, fiscal stimulus is also peaking. Chart I-5 shows that the issuance of local government bonds is set to dwindle in the coming months. A peak in stimulus does not herald an immediate end of the recovery in the business cycle. China’s combined credit and fiscal spending impulse leads the business cycle by about nine months (Chart I-6). Therefore, even as the credit and fiscal spending impulse reaches an apex, the Chinese mainland’s economic activity will stay firm in H1 2021. Consequently, corporate profits will continue to recover. Chart I-5China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Peaking Chart I-6China: The Economy Will Continue Recovering What do all these imply for share prices? In periods when borrowing costs rise along with accelerating profit growth/improving net EPS revisions, share prices could still advance (Chart I-7). Hence, peak stimulus is not a sufficient reason to turn negative on share prices. Chart I-7China: Share Prices (ex-TMT), EPS Expectations And Corporate Bond Yields That said, there are some signs that the Chinese equity market is overbought and over-hyped, making it vulnerable: A major IPO often marks a top in an asset class. Chart I-8 illustrates that Goldman Sachs’ IPO in 1999 preceded the secular top in US equities, IPOs of KKR and Blackstone in 2007 took place before the US credit bubble and the LBO boom unraveled; and finally, Glencore, the largest commodity trading house, went public in 2011 at the very peak of the secular bull market in commodities. In this respect, will Ant Group’s upcoming IPO mark a major top in Chinese or new economy stocks? Time will tell. Chart I-9 illustrates that Chinese IPO booms were historically associated with equity market tops. The current surge in Chinese IPOs – in various jurisdictions including China, Hong Kong, and the US – is a symptom of an over-hyped market. Chart I-8A Major IPO Often Marks The Top in Respective Asset Classes Chart I-9China: Booming IPOs = An Equity Market Top? Finally, new economy stocks in both the US and China have risen by about 20-fold since January 2010. Both in terms of duration and magnitude, their rallies are identical to the bull market in the Nasdaq 100 index in the 1990s (Chart I-10). The striking similarity with those episodes as well as current euphoria among investors about FAANG and Chinese new economy stocks warrant caution. In regard to commodities, in recent months we have been arguing that China is entering a commodity destocking cycle following the major restocking cycle that occurred in April-August. As Chinese imports of key commodities temporarily diminish due to destocking, commodities prices will relapse. Importantly, investor sentiment and net long positions in some key commodities are very elevated, suggesting overbought conditions (Chart I-11). Chart I-10FAANG And Tencent Have Been Tracking The Trajectory Of Nasdaq 100 In The 1990s Chart I-11Investors Are Very Bullish On Copper Critically, global mining stocks have been dropping since early September and are signaling a relapse in industrial metals prices (Chart I-12). In brief, commodity prices and commodity plays remain vulnerable. Chart I-12Global Mining Stocks Point To A Relapse In Industrial Commodities Prices Bottom Line: Marrying the positive outlook for China’s business cycle on the one hand with an impending potential correction in global stocks, the peak in Chinese stimulus and signs of Chinese equity investor euphoria, we conclude that the risk-reward profiles of Chinese stocks and China-related plays in absolute terms are unattractive. That said, we continue recommending overweighting Chinese stocks within an EM equity portfolio. From a cyclical perspective, Chinese corporate profits will outperform EM and DM corporate earnings because China has dealt with the pandemic much better than almost all other countries. An Update On Currencies And Local Fixed-Income We have been shorting a basket of EM currencies – BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW and IDR – against an equally-weighted basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This strategy remains intact. However, we believe the US dollar is primed to stage a major rebound, in general, and versus EM currencies, in particular. Therefore, US dollar-based investors should hedge their currency risk or short the same EM currency basket versus the greenback. In EM local fixed-income markets, we have been receiving 10-year swap rates but have not recommended owning cash domestic bonds because of currency risk. We continue to recommend investors receive 10-year swap rates in the following markets: Mexico, Colombia, Russia, China, India and Korea. We have also been recommending long positions in domestic bonds in certain frontier markets like Egypt, Ukraine, and Pakistan. The global risk-off phase will cause their currencies to relapse versus the US dollar, raising the possibility that local bond yields will rise. Therefore, investors who are long these markets should close these positions. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Your feedback is important to us. Please take our client survey today. Highlights New position: Go structurally overweight DM equities versus EM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally overweight healthcare versus basic resources. New position: Go cyclically underweight the resource-heavy Finland stock market. Structurally underweight European equities versus DM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally overweight technology and communications. Structurally neutral European equities versus EM equities. This position is equivalent to structurally neutral between healthcare and technology. Cyclically underweight basic resources versus financials. Fractal trade: Fractal analysis confirms that Finland is overbought. Underweight Finland versus Switzerland. Feature Chart of the WeekOverweight DM Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Basic Resources A Major Misunderstanding About Valuation One of the biggest misunderstandings that we come across in investment is in assessing an asset’s valuation versus its own history. It is common to read claims such as ‘asset X is undervalued by two standard deviations.’ Yet these claims often betray a major flaw. The comparison with a historical average is meaningful only if there has not been a ‘phase-shift’ in the historical time-series. In mathematical terms, the time-series must be stationary. If the time-series is non-stationary, meaning that it has undergone a phase-shift, then the concepts of the historical average and standard deviation are meaningless. The comparison with a historical average is meaningful only if there has not been a ‘phase-shift’ in the historical time-series. To draw a simple analogy, we cannot compare our adult bodyweight with our lifetime average bodyweight. This is because our bodyweight undergoes a phase-shift from childhood to adulthood. If we did compare our adult bodyweight with the lifetime average it would give the false signal that we were permanently overweight! Clearly, we should compare our adult bodyweight only with its history in the adult phase. Likewise, as the structural prospects for financials and resources phase-shifted at the start of the 2000s, their average valuations also phase-shifted. The average forward price-to-earnings multiple dropped from 13 to 10 for financials and from 18 to 11 for resources. In contrast, the average multiple of healthcare did not phase-shift, remaining at around 17 (Chart I-2-Chart I-4). Chart I-2The Valuation Of Financials Experienced A Phase-Shift Down Chart I-3The Valuation Of Basic Resources Experienced A Phase-Shift Down Chart I-4The Valuation Of Healthcare Did Not Experience A Phase-Shift It follows that we should compare the valuations of all sectors only with their history in their current phase. Unsurprisingly, this shows that healthcare is now modestly expensive versus its history. But surprisingly, and against the popular perception, financials and resources are not cheap. They are expensive versus their current phase history. In fact, the valuation of a long-duration sector such as healthcare should also take account of the bond yield. On this basis, healthcare’s forward earnings yield at 5 percent might look slightly expensive versus its history. But it looks extremely attractive versus the 0.8 percent yield on the 10-year T-bond (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5Healthcare's Forward Earnings Yield At 5 Percent... Chart I-6...Looks Very Attractive Versus The 10-Year T-Bond Yield At 0.8 Percent This valuation analysis carries repercussions for regional and country allocation, which we will now discuss. What Drives European Equity Performance Versus Developed Markets? Europe recently overtook the US to become the region with the largest stock market weighting in healthcare. The lead is slim. Europe’s stock market exposure to healthcare now stands at 16 percent versus the US at 14 percent, and the lead is mostly the result of Europe’s value sectors withering away. Nevertheless, it does mean that Europe is now the leader in a growth sector, at least in terms of its stock market exposure. That’s the good news.1 The bad news is that European stock market exposure to the other growth sectors – technology and communications – at 12 percent, remains a very distant laggard behind the US, at 40 percent. This is important, because Europe’s massive underweighting to technology and communications versus the US is by far the biggest determinant of the two stock markets’ relative performance. European stock market exposure to technology and communications, at 12 percent, remains a very distant laggard behind the US, at 40 percent. To be clear, currency moves matter too. Stock prices are denominated in the currency of their home stock market, yet the companies that dominate the major stock markets are international companies with multi-currency earnings. If the international currencies appreciate versus the home currency – meaning, the home currency weakens – the stock market gets an uplift from the so-called ‘positive currency translation effect’. Hence, our expectation of a gradually weakening dollar versus European currencies should give the US stock market a mild relative tailwind versus Europe from such a currency translation effect. That said, sector relative moves tend to dominate currency moves. This makes the sector outlook combined with the regional and country sector ‘fingerprints’ the key driver of regional equity relative performance (Tables 1-3). Table I-1The Sector Fingerprints Of Major Regional Stock Markets Table I-2The Sector Fingerprints Of Euro Area Stock Markets Table I-3The Sector Fingerprints Of Non Euro Area European Stock Markets Our expectation of long-term outperformance from technology and communications is the main reason to structurally favour the US over Europe (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Overweight Europe Vs. US = Underweight Technology What Drives European Equity Performance Versus Emerging Markets? The European equity market’s combined exposure to the growth sectors – healthcare, technology, and communications – is massively underweight versus the US, and therefore also versus the developed markets (DM) equity index. Interestingly though, Europe’s growth sector exposure is not significantly different to that in the emerging markets (EM) equity index. Europe’s key difference with EM is the distribution of growth sector exposure. Europe has a high exposure to healthcare but a massive underexposure to technology and communications. The emerging markets (EM) equity market is the precise opposite – EM is overweight in technology and communications but massively underweight in healthcare. Europe versus EM relative performance boils down to healthcare versus technology. The upshot is that Europe versus EM relative performance boils down to healthcare versus technology. Chart I-8 should leave you in no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant! It follows that investors that favour healthcare versus technology should overweight Europe versus EM. Albeit, right now, we do not have a high conviction on this view. Chart I-8Overweight Europe Vs. EM = Overweight Healthcare Vs. Technology The Case For Overweight Healthcare Versus Resources, And Overweight DM Versus EM Our high conviction view is to overweight DM versus EM. This view boils down to DM’s overexposure to healthcare versus EM’s overexposure to the classic cyclicals, epitomised by basic resources. Again, the Chart of the Week should leave you in no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. The long-term case for healthcare versus resources hinges on the outlook for their profits. Healthcare profits can grow, because as economies (and people) mature, they spend a greater proportion of their income on healthcare to improve the quality and quantity of life. In contrast, resources profits are in terminal decline, because we now rely less on the ‘physical stuff’ that requires basic resources. And even the physical stuff that we do rely on contains less mass. Think about how light your phones, TV screens, and cars are compared to a couple of decades ago. What about the expected surge in resource-heavy infrastructure investment as governments open the fiscal taps? The problem is that as the world changes to a post-pandemic way of living, working, and interacting, it will take a long time to establish which, if any, infrastructure investments make sense. For example, previously sensible high-speed rail links between city centres and extra runways at airports could turn out to be white elephants. Hence, we think that major infrastructure projects may not arrive in the way that the market is anticipating. The short-term case for healthcare versus resources hinges on monetary developments in China. When looking at money supply and bank credit growth and impulses, conventional analysis focusses on 1-year rates of change. We have no objections with that. However, we prefer to focus on the shorter-term 6-month rates of change, because we find that they have a greater predictive power for the financial markets. China’s bank credit 6-month impulse has fallen off a cliff. Right now, China’s bank credit 6-month impulse has fallen off a cliff. When this happened in late 2016, early 2018, and early 2019 it presaged an underperformance of the resources sector. We anticipate the same to happen again, especially given the scale of the drop in the bank credit impulse and the scale of the recent outperformance of the resources sector (Chart I-9). Chart I-9When China's Bank Credit 6-Month Impulse Falls, Basic Resources Underperform Hence, we expect resources to underperform in the short term too, and our preferred near-term expression is to underweight resources versus financials. Looking at sector fingerprints of equity markets, one consequence is that Finland’s resource-heavy stock market is also likely to underperform. Accordingly, go underweight Finland. Fractal Trading System* Supporting the fundamental arguments to underweight Finland, its 130-day fractal structure also appears to be near a tipping-point of fragility. The recommended trade is to short Finland versus Switzerland, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 7 percent. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 53 percent. Chart I-10Finland Vs. Switzerland When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Sector weightings based on MSCI indexes. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart Of The WeekInvestor Consensus Is Bearish On Dollar Today we are releasing another issue from our series Charts That Matter. Going forward, this publication will become a regular monthly deliverable to our clients. This is a charts-only report with minimal wording. It presents the key charts, indicators, and relationships that we monitor at the time of publication. Needless to say, the importance of different indicators and factors varies over time. Thus, each issue of Charts That Matter will present different charts, indicators and relationships. Presently, global assets are experiencing a tug-of-war. On the one hand, equity and credit markets are overbought and have elevated valuations. On the other hand, expectations of a large US fiscal stimulus package are sustaining prospects of continued US and global economic recoveries. We have been expecting a pullback in risk assets before year-end due to a delay in significant US fiscal stimulus, potential volatility around the US elections as well as overbought conditions in risk assets. In addition, since April commodities prices have benefited from China’s growth recovery as well as inventory restocking (see Charts on page 11). Given that the latter is likely to be followed by a destocking phase, we believe resource prices are at a risk of experiencing a setback. This will weigh on commodity-producing emerging markets. The correction in September has been short circuited. It seems the prospects of an eventual large US fiscal stimulus package, even if it is next year, and the ongoing recovery in China (Charts on pages 8-9) are sustaining a bid under risk assets. Besides, cash on the sidelines has not been fully exhausted (Charts on page 6). Consistently, we illustrate on pages 3 that various US equity indexes are presently trying to break out and that the US equity market breadth has recently been strong. In contrast, EM equity breadth has been very weak (Chart on page 4). The latest rebound in the EM equity index has been again narrow, led by mega-cap new economy stocks in China, Korea and Taiwan. Provided such poor EM equity breadth in both absolute terms and relative to the US, we are reluctant to upgrade EM equities from neutral to overweight in a global equity portfolio. As to absolute performance, the Charts on pages 12-18 illustrate that many market-based indicators are flagging yellow or red lights for EM risk assets. Even though we turned structurally bearish on the US dollar in early July, we currently expect a tactical rebound in the greenback. Investor sentiment on the greenback is very depressed, which is positive for the US dollar from a contrarian perspective (Chart of the Week on page 1). In short, global financial markets are due to reset, which will not be long-lasting but will be meaningful and produce a better entry point. For now, we maintain a neutral allocation to EM stocks and credit markets within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. In the currency space, we are short several EM currencies – BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW and IDR – versus a basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. As to local rates, we are long duration – receiving 10-year swap rates in several countries – but are reluctant to take on currency risk at the moment. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com US Equities Have Been Trading Well Various US equity indexes have broken out to new cyclical highs. This is a sign of a broad-based rally. Chart I-1US Equities Have Been Trading Well Chart I-2US Equities Have Been Trading Well Equity Market Breadth Is Strong In The US But Poor In EM The advance-decline line for the US equity market has rebounded from the neutral level of 0.5. On the contrary, the same measure for EM stocks remains below the 0.5 line, signaling poor breadth despite the rebound in the EM equity index. Chart I-3Equity Market Breadth Is Strong In The US But Poor In EM The World Economy And Global Trade Are Reviving Economic data for September continue to register a sequential revival in business activity in most parts of the world. Chart I-4The World Economy And Global Trade Are Reviving Chart I-5The World Economy And Global Trade Are Reviving The US: Cash On The Sidelines Has Declined But Is Not Exhausted US institutional and money market funds presently amount to 8.5% of the value of the US equity market cap plus all US-dollar denominated bonds available to investors. The Fed and commercial banks hold $11 trillion of debt securities. This amount of securities has been withdrawn from the market and is not available to non-bank investors. Chart I-6The US: Cash On The Sidelines Has Declined But Is Not Exhausted Chart I-7The US: Cash On The Sidelines Has Declined But Is Not Exhausted A Delay In The US Fiscal Stimulus Package Is A Risk to The US Economy US fiscal transfers have produced a surge in household disposable income, which through consumer spending have contributed to the global recovery via a widening trade deficit. In the absence of large fiscal transfers to consumers, the opposite dynamics will prevail. Chart I-8A Delay In The US Fiscal Stimulus Package Is A Risk to The US Economy Chart I-9A Delay In The US Fiscal Stimulus Package Is A Risk to The US Economy The Business Cycle In China Is Recovering China’s domestic demand and production are recovering but labor market improvements are still timid. Chart I-10The Business Cycle In China Is Recovering Chart I-11The Business Cycle In China Is Recovering China: The Stimulus Is Working Its Way Into The Economy In China, the credit and fiscal stimulus leads the business cycle by about nine months. Thereby, China’s recovery will continue until the end of Q2 2021. Chart I-12China: The Stimulus Is Working Its Way Into The Economy Chart I-13China: The Stimulus Is Working Its Way Into The Economy China: Liquidity Tightening Has Not Yet Affected Money And Credit Growth The PBoC has withdrawn liquidity, pushing up the policy rate and bond yields. With a time lag, money and credit growth will eventually roll over. But for now, China is enjoying another period of credit splurge and the credit excesses are getting larger. Chart I-14China: Liquidity Tightening Has Not Yet Affected Money And Credit Growth Chart I-15China: Liquidity Tightening Has Not Yet Affected Money And Credit Growth China: From Commodities Restocking To Destocking? Chinese imports of many commodities have been super strong since April. However, they have substantially outpaced their final demand. This suggests there has been an inventory restocking phase. This will likely soon be followed by a period of destocking when Chinese imports of resources dwindle for several months. Chart I-16China: From Commodities Restocking To Destocking? Chart I-17China: From Commodities Restocking To Destocking? Red Flags For EM Currencies The rollover in platinum prices and pick-up in EM currency volatility (shown inverted on the bottom panel) point to a rebound in the US dollar and a relapse in EM exchange rates. Chart I-18Red Flags For EM Currencies Yellow Flags For EM Equities The new cyclical high in EM share prices has not been confirmed by a new low in EM equity volatility (the latter shown inverted in the top panel). Moreover, our Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency ratio has been trending lower since June, flagging risks to EM assets. Finally, global ex-TMT stocks are struggling to break above their June highs. Chart I-19Yellow Flags For EM Equities EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads, Currencies, Equities And Commodities Commodities prices and EM currencies drive EM sovereign and corporate spreads while EM corporate bond yields (shown inverted in the bottom panel) correlate with EM share prices. Chart I-20EM Sovereign And Corporate Spreads, Currencies, Equities And Commodities Many Currencies Against The US Dollar Are At Critical Resistances If these currencies break out of these technical resistance levels, they will experience a lasting appreciation versus the US dollar. However, in our view, they will initially weaken before breaking out next year. Chart I-21Many Currencies Against The US Dollar Are At Critical Resistances Chart I-22Many Currencies Against The US Dollar Are At Critical Resistances Are Global Defensive Equity Sectors On A Cusp Of Outperformance? Many defensive equity sectors have reached or are close to their technical support lines. Their outperformance will likely occur during a risk-off period. Chart I-23Are Global Defensive Equity Sectors On A Cusp Of Outperformance? Chart I-24Are Global Defensive Equity Sectors On A Cusp Of Outperformance? These Markets Have Not Yet Entered A Bull Market These markets have rebounded to their technical resistance lines but have so far failed to break out. This gives us comfort to remain neutral on EM by expecting a pullback. Chart I-25These Markets Have Not Yet Entered A Bull Market Chart I-26These Markets Have Not Yet Entered A Bull Market Risk Measures Signal Modest Investor Complacency The SKEW index for the S&P 500 is low, entailing that investors are not hedging tail risks. The put-call ratio is not elevated despite many investors hedging against the US election uncertainty. Critically, the Nasdaq’s volatility is in a bull market. Chart I-27Risk Measures Signal Modest Investor Complacency Chart I-28Risk Measures Signal Modest Investor Complacency EM (ex-China, Korea And Taiwan): The Recovery Is Sluggish And Subdued Outside China, Korea and Taiwan, EM domestic demand recovery is very slow and tame. In these economies, the fiscal stimulus has been small, the banking system is unhealthy and the monetary transmission mechanism is broken, i.e. banks are failing to properly transmit monetary easing into the real economy. Chart I-29EM (ex-China, Korea And Taiwan): The Recovery Is Sluggish And Subdued Chart I-30EM (ex-China, Korea And Taiwan): The Recovery Is Sluggish And Subdued Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Highlights Long-term investors should seek companies and sectors that facilitate and support a new way of doing things: specifically, a way of life and business that is more de-centralised and de-urbanised… …and a way of life in which we live, work, and interact more online, remotely, and digitally. The long-term winners will be technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications: the growth defensives. The long-term losers will be banks, oil and gas, and resources: the value cyclicals. The European stock market’s substantial underweighting to the growth defensives will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal trade: Overweight the US 30-year T-bond versus the French 30-year OAT. Also, we have closed our tactical underweight to equities versus bonds. Feature Chart of the WeekYield Chasers Get A Rude Awakening As Dividends Collapse For the world’s yield chasers, 2020 has been a rude awakening. What seemed to be safe and attractive dividend yields have vanished into smoke, as blue-chip company after blue-chip company has slashed its dividend. To name just a few, HSBC has cut its dividend to zero for the first time ever; Barclays has cut its dividend to zero for the first time since 2009; and Royal Dutch Shell has slashed its dividend by 34 percent, taking it back to where it was in 2009. More generally, the high-yielding sectors have slashed their dividends: the world oil and gas sector by 60 percent (Chart of the Week) and the world bank sector by 33 percent (Chart I-2). The basic resources sector has cut its dividend by a more modest 15 percent, but the dividend now stands at the same level as it was in 2009 (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Dividend Cuts From High-Yielding Banks... Chart I-3...And High-Yielding Resource Companies In contrast, the low-yielding technology and healthcare sectors have managed to grow their dividends consistently over the past decades, and then maintain the dividends during the current crisis (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Dividend Growth And Continuity From ##br##Low-Yielding Healthcare... Chart I-5…And Low-Yielding ##br##Tech The world’s yield chasers have had a rude awakening because they often confuse yield with return. One reason for this confusion is that for cash and for high-quality government bonds held to redemption, yield and return are broadly the same.1 But for an equity, yield and return are not the same. As we have seen with the oil and gas sector and banks, an equity could start with a seemingly safe and attractive dividend yield yet end up generating a deeply negative return.2 The lesson is that long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Mental Accounting Bias, And The Irrational Search For Yield The confusion between yield and return is not just an issue of semantics. It is a well-known phenomenon in behavioural finance known as mental accounting bias.3 This psychological bias describes the tendency to group financial gains and losses into separate mental accounts or buckets. This causes people to treat money differently according to the bucket that the money occupies. One version of this bias is a distinction between the return that an investment provides from yield and that which it provides from capital appreciation. The distinction between yield and capital appreciation is irrational. Assuming an equal tax treatment, the money that comes from yield and the money that comes from capital appreciation is perfectly fungible. Yet psychologically, the distinction is very stark. Behavioural finance postulates that because of fears about self-control, some people tend to categorize an investment’s yield as spending money, and its capital as saving money. Long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Hence, those people who want their assets to generate spending money – say, retirees – have an irrational bias towards investments that generate yield. Whereas those people that are saving for the long term have a bias towards investments that generate capital growth. To reiterate, these biases are completely irrational. Under normal circumstances, the irrational biases are not a problem because there are enough investments available for both buckets. But in today’s world of zero and negative interest rates, the assets that would normally generate the safe income for the spending bucket – cash and government bonds – are no longer doing so (Chart I-6). In the ensuing ‘search for yield’, income focussed investors have flocked to the dwindling number of investments that appear to generate the required income, such as high-yielding equities. But in irrationally focussing on yield rather than on expected return, the world’s yield chasers have lost a lot of money. Chart I-6Equities Are The Only Yield-Generating Mainstream Asset-Class The Halo Effect, And The Shattered Halo The matter is made worse by a second phenomenon in behavioural finance known as the halo effect. This is the tendency to worship – place a halo – on someone or something based on some narrow criteria. For a company, the narrow criteria can mean its dividend history. The dividend is one of the few financial metrics over which the company has substantial control, giving it totemic significance with the company’s investors. Investors place a halo on companies with dividend continuity, a lengthy absence of a dividend cut. The distinction between yield and capital appreciation is irrational. However, if the company cuts its dividend, even slightly, then the halo shatters. Given this stigma, companies try very hard not to cut the dividend until it is unavoidable. But when they do cut, they usually cut big, and for an extended period – because the halo is shattered anyway (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7When Firms Cut Their Dividends, They Usually Cut Big... Chart I-8...And For An Extended ##br##Period Realising this, investors flip the company from saint to sinner, meaning that they demand a higher cost of capital. The upshot is that even after the dividend cut, the stock can suffer a prolonged period of underperformance. Low Yield To Deliver High Return To repeat, long-term investors should never search for yield, they should always search for return. Today, this search for return boils down to two questions: Which companies will be able to grow or, at the very least, maintain their dividends in the post-pandemic world? What is the likely direction of bond yields, and specifically the long-duration T-bond yield, given its pivotal role in setting the discount rate on all investments? To the first question, the winning companies will be the ones that facilitate and support a new way of doing things: specifically, a way of life and business that is more de-centralised and de-urbanised. And one in which the way we live, work, and interact – both socially and economically – is more remote, online, and digital. The pandemic is the accelerant, and not the cause, of the structural shift in our way of life. Crucially, this means that when a credible treatment for Covid-19 eventually arrives, it will not reverse the major changes that our way of life is now undergoing. To the second question, the Federal Reserve’s recent strategic review has made its reaction function blatantly asymmetric, especially to the labour market. The central bank has told us that it will be thick-skinned to reflationary shocks or lower unemployment, but trigger-happy to the slightest further deflationary shock or higher unemployment. The pandemic is the accelerant, and not the cause, of the structural shift in our way of life. Hence, when the slightest further deflationary shock comes – and sooner or later it will – the Fed will either follow the Bank of England in a volte-face about adding negative interest rate policy into its toolbox. Or more likely, the Fed will follow the Bank of Japan in formally implementing yield curve control. Either way, US long-duration bond yields will eventually converge with those in the UK and Japan at zero. The result of our two answers is that long-term investors should seek companies that can thrive off the major changes in the way we live, work, and interact; and investors should seek companies with long-duration cashflows that benefit most from a further compression in the long-duration T-bond yield. In combination, the long-term winners will be technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications: the growth defensives (Chart I-9). And the long-term losers will be banks, oil and gas, and resources: the value cyclicals (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Growth Defensives Are The Long-Term Winners Chart I-10Value Cyclicals Are The Long-Term##br## Losers For the European stock market, the unfortunate consequence is that its substantial underweighting to the growth defensives sectors will weigh on its relative performance, both in the short term and in the long term. Fractal Trading System* This week’s recommended trade is to go long the US 30-year T-bond versus the French 30-year OAT. Set the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 3.2 percent. The tactical underweight to equities versus bonds (short DAX versus 10-year T-bond) reached the end of its holding period. Although it closed in slight loss, the fractal signal correctly identified that the majority of the strong rally in the DAX was over by mid-July after which the DAX has traded broadly sideways. The countertrend move in the Italian BTP’s rally versus the German bund did not materialise, so this trade was closed at its stop-loss. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. Chart I-1130-Year Govt. Bonds: US Vs. France When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Assuming no reinvestment risk on the bond’s income. 2 This is because unlike the government bond, the equity does not generate a predetermined stream of cash flows. 3 See Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Our model suggests that more rate hikes are ahead in 2021; we project a less than 50bps increase in the PBoC policy rate from the current level. Chinese stock prices positively correlate with interest rates and bond yields. The relationship has strengthened since 2015. In the next six to nine months, Chinese stock prices will likely trend up alongside a rising policy rate and an accelerating economic growth. Feature China’s policy rate and bond yields have been rising sharply since May and are breaching their pre-COVID 19 levels. Meanwhile, Chinese stock prices have moved sideways since mid-July, despite a steady recovery in the domestic economy. While some commentators view higher interest rates as a harbinger of an impending equity market weakness, our research shows that the relationship between China’s stock prices and short-term rates has been positive since 2015. A rally in Chinese stocks and outperformance of cyclical stocks relative to defensives positively correlate with rising interest rates and bond yields (Chart 1A and 1B). Chart 1ARising Bond Yields Coincide With Ascending Chinese Stock Prices... Chart 1B...And Offshore Cyclicals Chart 2Massive Stimulus In 2020 Will Accelerate Economic Growth Into 1H21 China’s massive stimulus this year generated some self-sustaining momentum that will likely push the nation’s output higher in 1H21(Chart 2). The PBoC may raise the policy rate by as much as 50bps in 2021 from its current level, but strong domestic fundamentals should be able to drive up Chinese stock prices, in both absolute term and relative to global equities in the next six to nine months. PBoC Policy Hikes:Still More Ahead While the PBoC’s policy rate has rebounded sharply, it remains at its lowest level since the Global Financial Crisis. Looking forward, will the central bank bring the policy rate (e.g. 3-month SHIBOR) back to its pre-COVID 19 range of 3 – 3.5% or the pre-trade war level near 5%? The acceleration in China’s economic recovery is expected to continue and would boost China’s annual output growth in 1H21 to two to three percentage points above its trend. Based on these estimates, our interest rate model implies more than 200bps in rate increases in 2021 from the current level1 (Chart 3). Chart 3Rising Odds Of PBoC Rate Hikes In 2021 Historically, our model has successfully captured the major turning points in China's policy rate cycles. This time around, however, the pandemic and the subsequent economic recovery may have complicated the model's predictive power. The model suggests that, in 1H21 the policy rate will return to its pre-trade war range of 4-5%, but we think the rate increases will be capped within 50bps. The model follows a modified version of "Taylor's Rule," in which we assume that the PBoC will target its short-term interest rate based on the deviation between actual and desired inflation rates and the deviation between real GDP growth and China’s trend GDP growth rate. The latest data shows across-the-board strengthening in the economy; most indicators have surprised to the upside, confirming our optimistic assessment.2 However, Taylor's Rule is not able to account for sudden shocks in the economy, such as a pandemic-induced global recession. Thus, the model exaggerates the magnitude of interest rate bumps, based on an economic growth acceleration following a one-off economic shock. In a report earlier this year, we noted that the PBoC has been proactive in normalizing its monetary policy following short-term shocks.3 This is contrary to economic downturns when the PBoC has been a reactive central bank and its decisions often lagged a pickup in economic activity. As such, although interest rates have swiftly rebounded after the pandemic-induced growth contraction in Q1, we expect the pace of rate hikes to be slower in 2021. Chart 4Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Bring Headwinds To Chinese Industrial Profits External factors are accounted for in the model, though they may be underestimated. The US Federal Reserve Bank has decisively shifted its monetary policy to broadly accommodative and will stay behind the inflation curve in the next few years. The collapse in interest rate differentials between the US and China has made RMB-denominated assets attractive, boosting strong inflows of foreign capital and rapidly pushing up the value of the RMB (Chart 4, top panel). While we think Chinese policymakers have pivoted to prefer a strong RMB, the recent countermeasures by the PBoC indicate that the central bank will not allow the RMB to climb too rapidly.4 China's drastic tightening in monetary conditions and the sharp rally in the trade-weighted RMB from 2011 to 2014 led to a prolonged economic downturn (Chart 4, bottom panel). Therefore, in the absence of synchronized policy tightening from other central banks, the magnitude of rate hikes by the PBoC will be measured. Bottom Line: The PBoC will continue to push up the policy rate in 2021, but our baseline view is that the magnitude will be capped below 50bps. Interest Rates And Chinese Stocks Chart 5Chinese Stocks/Bond Yields Correlation Became Much More Positive After 2015 Many investors might think that stock prices tend to react negatively to monetary policy tightening because interest rate upturns and mounting bond yields lead to higher costs of funding for corporations and lower profit growth. However, Chinese stock prices started moving in the same direction with policy rates and bond yields following the burst of the 2014/15 stock market bubble (Chart 5 and Chart 1A and 1B on Page 4 and 2). In general, when China’s economic and profit growth accelerates, share prices can rise with higher interest rates. Share prices can still climb with cuts in interest rates even when economic growth slows but profit growth rate remains in positive territory. However, when profit growth is expected to drop below zero, share prices will drop even if rates are falling (Chart 6A and 6B). In this vein, the most pertinent reason for Chinese stocks to move in tandem with bond yields is that Chinese stocks are increasingly driven by economic fundamentals, which are supported by the volume of total credit creation (measured by total social financing) rather than the price of money in China. Furthermore, the reverse relationship between the volume and price of money in China broke down after 2015; China’s credit creation has become less sensitive to changes in interest rates. Chart 6AWhen Interest Rates Rise... Chart 6B...Economic Growth Holds The Key For Stock Performance Since 2015, the PBOC shifted its policy to target interest rates instead of the quantity of money supply (Chart 7). In order to effectively manage the official interbank rates (the 7-day interbank repo rate), the central bank uses tools such as reserve requirement ratio cuts and liquidity injections in the interbank system (Chart 8). In other words, the central bank has forgone its control of the volume of money. Moreover, since late 2016, rather than direct interest rate hikes, the PBoC has been taking monetary policy tightening measures through changes in its macro-prudential assessment (MPA). The changes in the MPA are evident in the 3-month / 1-week repo spread.5 As such, an increase in the 3-month interbank repo rate (and SHIBOR) is often intended to curb shadow-banking activities rather than depress aggregate credit creation and business activities (Chart 9). Chart 7Monetary Policy Regime Shifted In 2015 Chart 8More Open Market Operations Chart 9Most Monetary Tightening Has Been Carried Out Through MPA Since 2016 Another idiosyncrasy is China’s fiscal stimulus, which has become a more relevant driver of total social financing since the onset of the 2014/15 economic downcycle (Chart 10). The amount of government bond issuance is specified by the People’s Congress in March each year and is not affected by changes in interest rates or bond yields. Therefore, growth in total social financing can still accelerate despite a higher price of money (Chart 11). Chart 10Fiscal Lever Has Become More Prominent In Driving Business Cycles Since 2015 Chart 11Changes In Interest Rates Have Little Impact On Fiscal And Quasi-Fiscal Borrowing By the same token, a rising 3-month SHIBOR can also be the result of rapid fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansions, as seen in Q3 this year. A flood of central and local government bond issuance drained liquidities from commercial banks, boosting the banks’ needs to borrow money from the interbank system. Nevertheless, the market’s appetite for risk assets increases because fiscal stimulus provides an imminent and powerful reflationary force in China’s business cycles. Chart 12Bank Lending Rates Can Still Trend Downwards Against A Rising Policy Rate Rising policy rates typically push up corporate bond yields. However, bond yields in China play a relatively small role in driving corporate financing costs on an aggregate level, since commercial banks are still dominant in China’s debt market. Commercial banks' average lending rates closely track the PBoC’s policy rate on a cyclical basis, but Chinese authorities periodically use window guidance to target the Loan Prime Rate (LPR), a reformed bank lending rate. Hence, the direction in both the LPR and the average lending rate can temporarily diverge from the policy rate. These measures can boost bank loan growth even in a rising interest rate environment (Chart 12). Bottom Line: The key driver of Chinese stock performance is the country’s domestic credit, business, and corporate profit growth cycles. Since the 2014/15 cycle, the policy rate has not been the determinant of China’s economic or credit growth. Investment Conclusions We expect that this year’s massive monetary and fiscal stimulus to accelerate the country’s economic recovery into 1H21. Therefore, even if interest rates and bond yields advance, Chinese stock prices can still trend upward. Chinese cyclical stocks should also continue to outperform defensives, in both the onshore and offshore markets (Chart 13A and 13B). Chart 13AStay Invested In Chinese Stocks Chart 13BCyclicals Still Have Upside Potentials Rates will begin to climb and fiscal policy will also become more restrictive if China’s output moves above trend growth through 1H21. Government bond quotas and fiscal budget will be determined at the National People’s Congress in March. If the economy is strong, odds are that fiscal stimulus will be scaled back. At that point, investors should start to look for a peak in China’s business cycle linked to monetary and fiscal policy tightening. As growth expectations start to downshift in the equity market, yields on long-dated government bonds will start to decline while yields on the short end will not drop. Additionally, the small-cap ChiNext market has been considered as a speculative segment of the domestic financial market with higher multiples and greater volatility than large-cap A shares. The bourse's trailing price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book ratio are extremely elevated at 79 and 8.6, respectively, much higher than for broader onshore and offshore Chinese stocks. As such, this market will remain the most vulnerable to domestic liquidity tightening. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 based on our estimates for 1h21: 7.5-8.0% GDP growth, 2.5-2.8% headline CPI, 6.5-6.7 USD/CNY, and the fed holding current fund rate unchanged. 2Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated October 7, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Don’t Chase China’s Bond Yields Lower," dated February 19, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4On October 12, the PBoC removed financial institutions’ Forex reserve ratio of 20%, making betting against the RMB cheaper. 5Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Does it still make sense to use historical yield betas for fixed income country allocation? Yes, favoring countries with higher government bond yield betas when global yields are falling, and vice versa, is still an appropriate way to manage fixed income risk – although betas do vary between global bond bull and bear markets. Can inflation breakevens and real yields continue moving in opposite directions? Yes, but that negative correlation will become less intense, especially in the US, with rising inflation expectations eventually becoming the more dominant influence on nominal bond yields. Will inflation breakevens continue to have a strong positive correlation with oil prices? Yes, but only for as long as non-energy inflation remains low and stable, which has made energy prices the only source of inflation variability in most developed countries. Feature Sleepy bond markets got a bit of a jolt over the past couple of weeks, with longer-maturity government bond yields moving higher across the developed markets, led by the US where the 30-year Treasury yield is now back to levels last seen in June. The move higher in US Treasury yields may be a sign that investors are taking the US election polling numbers – which now signal not only a Joe Biden victory on November 3, but also a swing of the US Senate to Democratic Party control – seriously. A so-called “Blue Sweep”, resulting in the full implementation of the Biden policy platform including a massive fiscal stimulus, is potentially bond bearish, and not only for US Treasuries, given the close correlation of US yields to other bond markets. There is a strong correlation between the level of bond yields, and the yield beta, for the major developed market countries. This brief burst of global bond market volatility, stemming from developments in the US, is a reminder that investors should always be aware of the importance of cross-market correlations when making trading and portfolio construction decisions. With that in mind, this week we ask some important questions about the critical correlations across global government bond markets that support our current investment recommendations – and under what conditions they could possibly change. Does It Still Make Sense To Use Historical Yield Betas For Fixed Income Country Allocation? Chart 1Developed Bond Yields Relative To The 'Global' Bond Yield One of the key elements underlying our bond country allocation recommendations is the concept of “yield beta”. Simply put, this is a measure of the sensitivity of changes in individual country bond yields to changes in the overall level of global bond yields. The way we measure yield betas is by using a regression (over a three-year rolling window) of monthly changes for an individual country’s 10-year bond yield on the monthly change of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index yield for the 7-10 year maturity bucket (as the proxy for the “global” 10-year yield). The regression coefficient on the individual country yield change is the yield beta. There is a strong correlation between the level of bond yields, and the yield beta, for the major developed market countries. Currently, the list of “high-yielders” – with 10-year government bond yields above the benchmark index yield – includes the US, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Chart 1). The low-yielders, with 10-year yields below the benchmark index yield, are Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Japan. When we look at the yield betas for that same list of countries, we can also break up the list into high-beta and low-beta bond markets. When we rank the ten countries by their rolling three-year yield betas, the five highest betas belong to the same five countries with the highest yields, and vice versa (Chart 2). This is an intuitive correlation, as countries with higher yield betas are, by definition, more volatile and should require higher yields from investors to compensate for that additional volatility. Chart 2The Higher-Yielding Countries Also Have Higher Yield Betas The yield betas are not stable over time for all countries, however. The US has consistently remained the highest beta market, and Japan the lowest beta market, over the past twenty years. Other countries have seen their yield betas evolve over time. For example, France, Spain and, more recently, the UK have seen their yield betas decline in recent years, while Italy has gone from being low-beta to one of the higher-beta markets. In our view, the evolution of yield betas relates to the “activism” of policymakers in each country. Higher-beta, higher-yield countries also have central banks that move interest rates higher and lower with more frequency compared to the low-beta, low-yield countries. In our view, the evolution of yield betas relates to the “activism” of policymakers in each country. That high-beta group includes bond markets linked to the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand – all central banks that are not shy about aggressively cutting or hiking interest rates. The low-beta markets have central banks that move rates very infrequently, like the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. Table 1Yield Betas For The Major Developed Markets One other interesting point on yield betas is that they do vary depending on the overall direction of global bond yields. As a way to show this, we estimated “upside” and “downside” yield betas for the same ten countries shown earlier. Those betas were calculated by sorting the monthly yield changes for all countries by months when the benchmark global bond index yield was rising or falling. Thus, upside yield beta comes from a regression of monthly yield changes for individual countries on changes in overall global bond yields, but only using data for months when global yields increased. The opposite is true for downside beta, where only data from months when the global benchmark index yield declined are used. The individual yield betas – for the overall sample and the upside and downside groupings – are presented in Table 1. One conclusion that comes from breaking up the data this way is that countries that were in the low-beta group when looking at the full set of data have relatively high yield betas during periods of rising global yields, like France and the UK (Chart 3). In addition, when looking at downside betas, US Treasuries have the highest beta, by far, when global yields are falling – with yields for euro area countries having relatively lower betas (Chart 4). Chart 3Yield Betas During Periods Of Rising Global Yields Chart 4Yield Betas During Periods Of Falling Global Yields Our conclusion from this analysis is that yield betas do have a useful role in making country allocation decisions for global fixed income investors. Specifically, adjusting allocations based on a view on the overall direction of global bond yields should help better manage portfolio risk and, potentially, improve returns. Chart 5Italy Has Become High-Beta As Spreads Have Narrowed A final point on Italy – the reason Italy has had such a high yield beta over the past few years is because Italian government bond yields have been driven more by the reduction of Italian sovereign credit risk – including the redenomination risk from a potential Italian exit from the euro (Chart 5). As Italian credit spreads have melted away from the levels reached during the 2011/12 European Debt Crisis, yields have fallen faster than others during periods of falling global yields, and vice versa. Looking ahead, with the ECB continuing to be an aggressive buyer of Italian bonds in its various asset purchase programs, and with the COVID-19 pandemic forcing the European Union into a deeper level of economic co-operation – which now includes grants to Italy – the sovereign risk premium on Italian government debt should continue to narrow. That means Italy will continue to trade as a high-beta market when global yields are falling, and a low-beta market when yields are rising, making Italy an ideal overweight candidate in global bond portfolios. Bottom Line: Favoring countries with higher government bond yield betas when global yields are falling, and vice versa, is still an appropriate way to manage fixed income risk – although betas do vary between global bond bull and bear markets. Can Inflation Breakevens And Real Yields Continue Moving In Opposite Directions? The behavior of real bond yields over the past few months garnered a lot of attention in 2020, particularly the sharp fall in US TIPS yields into deeply negative territory. This has occurred at the same time as a widening of inflation breakevens, which exhibited a deeply negative correlation with real yields. The result: narrow trading ranges for nominal government bond yields in most developed countries, with moves in real yields and inflation breakevens largely offsetting each other. Adjusting allocations based on a view on the overall direction of global bond yields should help better manage portfolio risk and, potentially, improve returns. Looking at the history of real yields and inflation breakevens, periods of a negative correlation between the two are not unusual. In Chart 6, we show the range of historic correlations between 10-year inflation-linked bond yields, and 10-year inflation breakevens, for the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Canada and Japan since 2010. The dark bars represent the range of rolling correlations over a three-year period, while the red diamonds are a more recent correlation over the past thirteen weeks. All countries shown have seen periods of negative correlation, with only Australia and France having the most recent correlation be far lower than the historic experience. Chart 6Negative Real Yield/Breakevens Correlations Are Not Unprecedented So if a negative real yield/inflation breakeven correlation is not that unusual, then what is the cause of it? We see two drivers: the amount of spare capacity in an economy and the central bank policy response to it. We can see this by looking at the data from the countries with the two largest inflation-linked bond markets, the US and UK. In the US, real TIPS yields and inflation breakevens have generally been positively correlated only during Fed tightening cycles, specifically after the Fed has raised the fed funds rate above the rate of realized core inflation (Chart 7). This was the case in the tightening cycles of the mid-2000s and 2016-18. During those episodes, the Fed pushed the real funds rate steadily higher, which also had the effect of pushing real TIPS bond yields higher, even as inflation expectations were stable-to-rising. Looking at the history of real yields and inflation breakevens, periods of a negative correlation between the two are not unusual. The opposite held true during Fed easing cycles since the advent of the TIPS market in the late 1990s, when the Fed always lowered the funds rate below realized inflation. The result was a period of a falling real funds rate, leading to lower real TIPS yields and eventually triggering an increase in inflation breakevens. In other words, the correlation between breakevens and real yields became negative. In the UK, the negative correlation between real index-linked Gilt yields and inflation breakevens has been consistently negative since the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 8). The Bank of England has barely moved policy rates since that crisis, while keeping nominal policy rates below 1% - a level that was consistently below core UK inflation. Thus, the Bank of England has maintained negative real policy rates for the past twelve years, with real Gilt yields declining steadily and inflation breakevens rising – a negative correlation - over that period. Chart 7Fed Policy Influences The US Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Chart 8A Persistently Negative Correlation Of UK Real Yields & Breakevens For both the US (Chart 9) and UK (Chart 10), the rolling 3-year correlation between real yields and breakevens has itself been correlated to the unemployment gap, or the difference between the unemployment rate and the full-employment NAIRU rate, over the past two decades. This suggests that the ebbs and flows of labor market slack, and how the Fed and Bank of England have responded to them by easing or tightening monetary policy, also play a role in determining the real yield/breakevens correlation. Chart 9Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The US Chart 10Real Yield/Breakevens Correlation Will Stay Negative In The UK In the case of the US, a more extended UK-like period of negative real policy rates and real bond yields is likely if the Fed is to be taken at their word that they will keep rates low to engineer a US inflation overshoot. We suspect that the correlation will not be perfectly negative, as has occurred at times this year, with inflation expectations rising alongside stable-to-falling real TIPS yields as the US economy recovers from the COVID-19 shock – especially if there is a major boost from fiscal stimulus after next month’s elections. Bottom Line: We continue to see a case for inflation breakevens and real yields to stay negatively correlated in the developed economies over at least the next few years, as the labor market slack created by the 2020 COVID-19 global recession is slowly absorbed. That negative correlation will become less intense, especially in the US, with rising inflation expectations eventually becoming the more dominant influence on nominal bond yields. Will Inflation Breakevens Continue To Have A Strong Positive Correlation With Oil Prices? While the negative correlation between real inflation-linked bond yields and real yields has gotten attention this year, the positive correlation between breakevens and oil prices has become familiar to investors over the past several years. That correlation has been persistently high and positive across all developed economies since the 2008 financial crisis. Prior to that, oil prices and inflation breakevens moved together less frequently and, at times, were even uncorrelated (Chart 11). In both the US and euro area, the lack of non-energy inflation is the main reason why breakevens and oil are so correlated. In our view, the reason why breakevens and oil became strongly correlated is relatively straightforward. Since the 2008 crisis and ensuing Great Recession, swings in oil prices have been the main driver of changes in realized inflation, with ex-energy inflation rates staying very low and stable. We can see that in the US, where ex-energy CPI inflation has been broadly stable around 2% for the past decade, even as headline CPI inflation has seen more variability and has even approached 0% after the collapse in oil prices in 2014/15 and 2020 (Chart 12). Chart 11A Persistent Strong Correlation Of Global Breakevens To Oil Chart 12Strong Oil/Breakevens Correlation While US Ex-Energy Inflation Is Low Chart 13Energy Has Become The Only Source Of Euro Area Inflation The same dynamics, only more intense, exist in the euro area. Ex-energy inflation has struggled to stay above 1% over the past decade, leaving changes in energy prices as an even greater determinant of realized headline inflation than in the US (Chart 13). In both the US and euro area, the lack of non-energy inflation is the main reason why breakevens and oil are so correlated. Until there is evidence of a more broad-based move higher in inflation rates outside of oil - which will almost certainly require an extended period of above-trend global growth and accommodative global fiscal and monetary policies - trading inflation breakevens off oil will still be a successful strategy. Bottom Line: Global inflation breakevens will maintain a strong positive correlation to oil prices, but only for as long as non-energy inflation remains low and stable, which has made energy prices the only source of inflation variability in most developed countries Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns