Geopolitics

Highlights Macron has won in France; Economic reforms are forthcoming; Euroskeptic parties are moving to the center; Yet Italy remains a real risk; Stick to long French industrials versus German; stay long EUR/USD for now. Feature "A chair, a table, or a bench would be elected rather than her [Le Pen] in this country." - Jean-Luc Mélenchon Third-party candidate Emmanuel Macron is the new president of France following his win over populist and nationalist Marine Le Pen (Table 1). The victory was resounding, with polls underestimating support for the centrist, and vociferously Europhile, Macron (Chart 1). Macron's victory was all the more impressive given the low turnout, which should have favored Le Pen. Table 1Results Of French Presidential Election Chart 1Underestimating Emmanuel There are numerous narratives competing to make sense of the election in France. Our conclusion is simple: Marine Le Pen got trounced by a 39-year old political neophyte with no party organization and an investment-banking background. Le Pen wasn't so much defeated as she was routed, in a veritable Battle of Sedan for the European populists. What does this mean for investors? First, European assets are about to "rip." Second, the EUR/USD may have some more upside in the short term. Third, investors remain overly complacent about Italy, which we think has a good chance of breaking the trend of victories for the centrist forces in Europe. However, this is a story for 2018 and thus off the radar screen for investors at the moment. Le Pen Loses More Than Macron Wins Left-wing firebrand, and surprise first-round performer, Jean-Luc Mélenchon forecast in April that "a chair, a table, or a bench" would defeat Le Pen head-to-head. Naturally, the comment was self-serving for Mélenchon as he was trying to convince swing voters to support his campaign. Nonetheless, we fully agree with his assessment! Not only did Le Pen lose, but she lost to a political neophyte with investment banking on his resume. In France... In 2017... Chart 2Le Pen's Flaw Is The Euro So what happened? It is not a coincidence that Le Pen got precisely the same proportion of voters as the percent of the French public that does not support the euro, around 30-35%. Le Pen's popularity has in fact closely mirrored French Euroskepticism for years, peaking in 2013. Chart 2 essentially illustrates that Le Pen's ceiling is determined by the Euroskeptic mood of the country. We have stressed to clients since the December 2015 regional elections that Le Pen's Euroskpeticism is a major handicap to her political fortunes. In that election, her Front National (FN) was massacred in the second round despite a highly favorable context for an anti-establishment, nationalist party. The election took place on the heels of an epic migration crisis and a massive terrorist attack (which occurred just 23 days before the election).1 The Front National was defeated in all 13 mainland French regions, despite leading in six following the first round. As such, investors should ignore both the positive and negative hype surrounding the media coverage of Macron. The main lesson of the French election is that Euroskepticism does not pay political dividends, not that Le Pen still has a chance in the next election or that Macron has pulled off an extraordinary victory. The upcoming legislative elections - set for two rounds on June 11 and 18 - will cement our call on Le Pen and FN. Polls are sparse, but what we have thus far suggests that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Républicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature (Table 2). We do not have enough polling data to gauge the reliability of this forecast, but it does make sense given FN's previously weak electoral performances in legislative and regional elections. In fact, following Macron's strong performance on May 7, we would be surprised if FN gets more than 15-20 seats in the National Assembly. Table 2Macron May Have To Work With The Republicans What matters for investors is the likely strong performance in the legislative elections for the center-right Les Républicains. Its presidential candidate François Fillon was the leading centrist candidate to get into the second round for most of early 2017 and only faded due to his corruption scandal (Chart 3). His primary challenger - Bordeaux mayor and former conservative Prime Minister Alain Juppé - in fact was comfortably leading all candidates before he was bested by Fillon in late November in party primaries (Chart 4). Chart 3Scandal, Not Policies, Killed Fillon Chart 4Juppe Led The Race Before Fillon Took Over A Macron presidency supported by Les Républicains in the National Assembly could be the best outcome for investors. On the international stage - where the president has no constraints - France will be led by a committed Europhile willing to push Germany towards a more proactive - rather than merely reactive - policy. On the domestic stage - where the National Assembly dominates - Macron's cautiously pro-growth agenda will be pushed further to the right by Les Républicains. In our view, the best outcome would be either genuine "cohabitation," where Macron's En Marche does not get a majority and he is forced to cohabitate with a center-right prime minister, or an En Marche sweep. The worst outcome would be a hung parliament, where Les Républicains refuse to cooperate with En Marche so as not to give Macron any further political wins. We continue to believe that the context is ripe for genuine structural reforms. We expanded on this topic in a February report titled "The French Revolution" and will not repeat the arguments here.2 Suffice it to say that a "silent majority" in France appears ready to incur the pain of reforms (Chart 5). As a play on the reform theme, we have been long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities on a long-term horizon (Chart 6). The idea is that French reforms should suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive vis-à-vis their main competitor, Germany (Chart 7). Chart 5"Silent Majority" Wants Reform Chart 6France Will Revive, Germany Is Peaking Chart 7Reforms Could Close This Gap Bottom Line: As we have expected for years, Marine Le Pen is unelectable due to her opposition to European integration. At the minimum, this should allay the fears of many investors that Frexit is a possibility. It has never even been close.3 At its most optimistic, Macron's victory will usher in a period of economic reforms in France. The Big Picture: Europe's Populists Defeated In April 2016 - ahead of the U.K. EU referendum and the U.S. general election - we made a controversial call: Anglo-Saxon populists would surprise to the upside in the upcoming plebiscites, whereas continental European would underperform.4 The U.K. has subsequently chosen Brexit and the U.S. electorate has chosen Donald Trump, both outcomes that we noted were more likely than the consensus expected. On the other side of the ledger, populists were defeated in two Spanish elections (December 2015 and June 2016), the Austrian presidential election in December 2016, and the Dutch general election in April 2017. The latest defeat for the anti-globalization populists is surprising because it happened in France, a country with a long tradition of both. One cannot blame relative economic performance for the outcome, as France has clearly underperformed the U.S. on both the growth and employment fronts (Chart 8). Nor can it be blamed on a more sanguine security situation: since 2015, France has experienced far more tragedy due to terrorist attacks than the U.S. and has been in a state of emergency since the November 2015 terror attack (Chart 9). And while France has largely avoided the 2015 European migration crisis, it was at least far more threatened by it than the U.S. due to mere geography. Chart 8Economic Woes Not Lacking In France... Chart 9... Nor Is Threat Of Terrorism In our view, the long-term socio-economic context is more important than the day-to-day economic and security situation in explaining the success of populists. The French social welfare state - which is onerous, inefficient, and clearly in need of reform (Chart 10) - has nonetheless played a crucial role in tempering the appeal of anti-establishment politics. Chart 10France: Welfare State Needs Reform Chart 11Anti-Establishment Candidates Win... Unlike the U.S. - which has seen the real median household income decline over the past two decades and grow much slower than the economy (Chart 11) - European countries have redistributed the gains of globalization in such a way as to ensure that more people benefit from it (Chart 12). Income inequality has grown in Europe regardless, but to a much lower level - and by a lower magnitude - than in the U.S. (Chart 13). This is perhaps most pronounced in France, where the top 10% of households by income retain much the same share of the economy as they did in 1950 (Chart 14). Chart 12Redistributing Globalization's Gains Chart 13U.S. & U.K.: Outliers On Inequality Chart 14France: Inequality Flat For 70 Years Many of our clients in the U.S. and the U.K. have reacted negatively to our view above. Our analysis is not meant to endorse French levels of social welfare spending. In fact, we are bullish on France precisely because we expect Emmanuel Macron to reduce French state largesse over time. We merely point out that the political effect of a redistributive socio-economic system is greater stability and centrism of the voting public in the midst of a painful socio-economic context. The median voter in Europe is simply not as angry as the median voter in the U.S. This is not by chance, but rather by design. Europe's "socialism" is a relatively modern development and a product of Europe's disastrous inter-war period, which instilled a fear of a populist backlash against failed economic policies of the time. The inter-war period saw the rise of both left- and right-wing extremism, which fed on each other with increasing intensity. These included a failed communist revolution in Germany (1918-1919), a failed Nazi coup in Germany (1923), a fascist takeover of Italy (1925), a Nazi takeover in Germany (1933), far-right unrest in France (1934), and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). These political upheavals were a product of both the Great Depression and the First World War. But they were also colored by Europe's socio-economic context at the time: very high wealth inequality at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, Europe had a much higher starting level of wealth concentration than the U.S., resulting in a much sharper correction during the inter-war period (Chart 15). What most commentators who forecast Europe's doom after the Great Recession missed is that the socio-economic context matters. It is the reality through which voters filter contemporary events. In Europe's case, the median voter was in a much better place to deal with the post-2008 economic and financial crises because Europe's "socialism" had dampened the negative consequences of globalization. In the U.S., and we would argue in the U.K. to a much lesser extent, the median voter was far more exposed to the vagaries of globalization and thus was (and remains) more open to anti-establishment political outcomes. This is the great paradox of the past 18 months: that the two best performing economies in the developed world - the U.S. and the U.K. - experienced the greatest level of populism. To us, it is not much of a paradox. Economic performance is by nature a study of the mean performance, whereas political forecasting deals with the median outcomes. This is not to say that the French are not angry with elites. After all, nearly 50% of the votes cast in the first round of the election went to anti-establishment candidates (Chart 16). However, French voters are not angry enough to want a dramatic reordering of their society, particularly in terms of their support for European institutions. What about other countries in Europe? A trend is emerging across the continent where anti-establishment parties are retaining their commitment to economic redistribution, anti-immigrant sentiment, or unorthodox foreign policy, but abandoning their Euroskepticism for the sake of competitiveness. The best examples of this trend are Spain's Podemos and Greece's SYRIZA, which have evolved in a short period of time into mainstream left-wing parties. Meanwhile, parties that retain an official strategy of Euroskepticism are increasingly finding out that the "Euroskeptic ceiling" is real. As such, these parties are struggling between remaining politically competitive and staying true to their Euroskeptic ideals: Germany: The German Euroskeptic Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD) party has been beset by massive internal conflict and identity crisis. Ousted leader Frauke Petry tried to move the party towards the center, but was rebuked at an April party congress. The AfD is still polling just under 10% (Chart 17), and will therefore enter the Bundestag in the September 24 election, but its leadership is torn between openly embracing the German alt-right and setting a course as a conservative alternative to Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union. We would expect the party to enter the Bundestag, but only just, in the upcoming election. Chart 15U.S. And France: Different ##br##Starting Points Of Inequality... Chart 16French Voters##br## Are Angry Chart 17German Euroskeptics To ##br##Squeak Into Bundestag, At Best Austria: The presidential candidate of the anti-establishment Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), Norbert Hofer, tried mightily to soften his Euroskepticism ahead of the December 2016 elections. He failed and lost the election despite a solid lead in the polls for much of the year. Austria is set to hold general elections by October 2018 and support for the FPO has clearly peaked (Chart 18). Given that all other parties in Austria are pro-EU, the FPO is likely to remain isolated. Finland: The "True Finns," since rebranded as just "The Finns," were once the only competitive Euroskeptic party in northern Europe. They did very well in the 2015 general election and entered the governing coalition. To do so, they compromised on their Euroskeptic positions and became largely irrelevant, with a big dip in support (Chart 19). April municipal elections went terribly for The Finns, with the Europhile Green League emerging as the big winner. An upcoming party congress in June will determine the future of the party and whether it swings towards populism or centrism. Chart 18Austrian Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Chart 19Finnish Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Italy: The one party to watch over the next several months is Italy's Five Star Movement (5SM). There is evidence that 5SM is itself riven by internal conflict over how far to take its Euroskepticism. And several moves by party leadership - including attempting to leave the legislative alliance with UKIP at the European Parliament level - appear designed to pursue the political center. The problem, however, is that there is little evidence that the Italian median voter is as committed to European integration. This remains the key risk for Europe going forward. Bottom Line: Populism has underperformed in continental Europe, much to the surprise of most commentators. Europe's economic redistribution has dampened demands for anti-establishment outcomes. Evidence suggests that Euroskeptic parties will continue to migrate to the center, at least as far as European integration is concerned, in the near future. One outlier to this view is Italy, which we elaborate on below. Investment Implications European risk assets should continue to outperform the U.S. in the coming months. The European economy continues to fire on all cylinders, whereas the U.S. appears to have hit a soft patch, according to the sharply divergent Economic Surprise Indexes (Chart 20).5 The euro may benefit from the reduction in risk premia for the time being. We will retain our long EUR/USD for now, but look to close it over the summer as we doubt the ECB's commitment to a hawkish turn in monetary policy ahead of critical risks in 2018. At the forefront of those risks is the upcoming Italian election. As we have argued repeatedly for two years, the Italy's Euroskeptic turn is real and underpinned by data. Whereas the median European has been far less Euroskeptic than the conventional wisdom has held, the median Italian is becoming more Euroskeptic. We spent a week in Europe warning clients in London, Paris, and Zurich of the upcoming Italian risks. There was little appetite for our bearish view. Even clients in the U.K. who previously held deeply skeptical views of the Euro Area's ability to survive have changed their view on Italy. Why such complacency? The oft-repeated refrain was that Italian politics have always been a mess. The election, which is highly likely to produce either a weak coalition or a hung parliament, will therefore not produce a definitive outcome worthy of risk premia. We highly disagree with this view. Our concern with Italy is not the current polling of Euroskeptic parties, but rather the underlying turn in the Italian electorate towards greater acceptance of a future outside of Europe (Chart 21). If the median voter is more willing to entertain Euroskeptic outcomes, than the Euroskeptic parties will not be forced to adopt a centrist position, as they have done in the rest of Europe. Chart 20U.S. Economy Hits A Soft Patch Chart 21Italy: The Real Risk To Euro Area Nonetheless, investor complacency tells us that European asset outperformance could last well into late 2017. There will be no immediate risk rotation from the French election to the Italian one. The market will have to be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus, likely in Q1 2018. Until then, the party will continue. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2016: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Breakout," dated May 5, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The headwinds against commodity currencies are still brewing, the selloff is not over. Global liquidity conditions are deteriorating and EM growth will disappoint. The valuation cushion in commodity currencies and EM plays is not large enough to compensate for the red flags emanating from financial markets. The euro is peaking. A capitulation by shorts is likely early next week. A move to 1.12 should be used to sell EUR/USD. Feature Commodity currencies have had a tough nine weeks, weakening by 5% in aggregate, helping boost our short commodity currency trade returns to 3.8%. At this juncture, the key questions on investors' minds is whether or not this trend will deepen and if this selloff will remain playable. We believe the answer to both questions is yes. A Less Friendly Global Backdrop When observed in aggregate, the past 12 months represented a fertile ground for commodity currencies to perform well as both global liquidity and growth conditions were on one of the most powerful upswings in the past two decades, lifting risk assets in the process (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Zenith Is Passing Global Liquidity Is Drying When we look at the global liquidity picture, the improvement seems to be over, especially as the Fed, the key anchor to the global cost of money, is more confidently embracing its switch toward a tighter monetary policy. It is true that U.S. Q1 data has been punky at best; however, like the Fed, we think this phenomenon will prove to be temporary. Recently, much ink has been spilled over the weakness in the auto sector. However, when cyclical spending is looked at in aggregate, the picture is not as dire and even encourages moderate optimism. Driven by both corporate and housing investment, cyclical sectors have been growing as a share of GDP (Chart I-2). This highlights that poor auto sales may have been a sector specific development and do not necessarily provide an accurate read on the state of household finances. Chart I-2Autos Do Not Paint The Full Picture For The U.S. Cyclical Spending Is Firm... Moreover, the outlook for household income is still positive. Our indicator for aggregate household disposable income continues to point north (Chart I-3). As we have highlighted in recent publications, various employment surveys are suggesting that job growth should improve in the coming months.1 Also, this week's productivity and labor cost report showed that compensation is increasing at a nearly 4% annual pace. This healthy outlook for household income, combined with the consumer's healthy balance sheets - debt to disposable income stands near 14 year lows while debt-servicing ratios are still near 40 year lows - and elevated confidence suggests that house purchases can expand. With the inventory of vacant homes standing at 11 year lows, this positive backdrop, along with the improving household-formation rate, is likely to prompt additional housing starts, lifting residential investment (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Bright U.S. Household ##br##Income Prospects Chart I-4As Households Get Formed,##br## Housing Starts To Pick up For the corporate sector, the strength in survey data is also likely to result in growing capex (Chart I-5). Not only have "soft" data historically been a good leading indicator of "hard" data, but the outlook for profit growth has also improved substantially. Profit growth is the needed ingredient to realize the positive expectation of business leaders embedded in "soft" data. Profit itself is very often dictated by the trend in nominal revenue growth. The fall in profits in 2016 mostly reflected the fall in nominal GDP growth to 2.5%, which produced a level of revenue growth historically associated with recessions (Chart I-6). As such, the recent rebound in nominal GDP growth, suggests that through the power of operating leverage, profit should also continue to grow, supporting capex in the process. Chart I-5Business Confidence Points ##br##To Better Growth And Capex... Chart I-6...Especially As A Key Profit##br## Driver Is Improving With the most cyclical sector of the U.S. economy still on an upswing, the Fed will continue to increase rates, at least more aggressively than the 45 basis points of tightening priced into the OIS curve over the next 12 months. With liquidity being sucked into the U.S. economic machine, international dollar-based liquidity, which is already in a downtrend, is likely to deteriorate further (Chart I-7). Moreover, global yield curves, which were steepening until earlier this year, have begun flattening again, highlighting that the tightening in global liquidity conditions is biting (Chart I-8). This will represent a continuation of the expanding handicap against global growth, and EM growth in particular. Chart I-7Global Dollar Liquidity Is Already Poor Chart I-8A Symptom Of The Tightening In Liquidity Global Growth Conditions Are Also Past Their Best, Especially In EM Global growth conditions are already showing a few troubling signs, potentially exerted by the tightening in global liquidity. To begin with, while our global leading economic indicator is still pointing north, its own diffusion index - the number of nations with improving LEIs versus those with deteriorating ones - has already rolled over. Normally, this represents a reliable signal that growth will soon peak (Chart I-9). For commodity currencies, the key growth consideration is EM growth. Here too, the outlook looks precarious. The impulse to EM growth tends to emerge from China as Chinese imports have been the key fuel to boost exports, investments, and incomes across a wide swath of EM nations. Chinese developments suggest that Chinese growth, while not about to crater, may be slowing. Chinese monetary conditions have been tightening abruptly (Chart I-10, top panel). Moreover, this tightening seems to be already yielding some results. The issuance of bonds by smaller financial firms has been plunging, which tends to lead the growth in aggregate total social financing (Chart I-10, bottom panel). This is because the grease in the shadow banking system becomes scarcer as the cost of financing rises. Chart I-9Deteriorating Growth##br## Outlook Chart I-10Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Are Tightening This situation could continue. Some of the rise in Chinese interbank rates to two-year highs reflects the fact that easing capital outflows have meant that the PBoC can tighten monetary policy through other means. However, the recent focus by the Beijing and president Xi Jinping on financial stability and bubble prevention, suggests that there is a real will to see tighter policy implemented. This means that the decline in total credit growth in China should become more pronounced. As a result, this will weigh on the country's industrial activity, a risk already highlighted by the decline in Manufacturing PMIs (Chart I-11). Additionally, this decline in credit growth tends to be a harbinger of lower nominal GDP growth, and most importantly for EM and commodity producers, a foreboding warning for Chinese imports (Chart I-12). Chart I-11China Industrial ##br##Growth Worry Chart I-12Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse ##br##Will Weigh On EM Growth Financial markets are already flashing red signals. The Canadian Venture exchange and various coal plays have historically displayed a tight correlation with Chinese GDP growth.2 Today, they are breaking below key trend lines that have defined their bull markets since the February 2016 troughs (Chart I-13). This message is corroborated by the recent weakness in copper, iron ore, and oil prices. Additionally, the price of platinum relative to that of gold is also breaking down. While the VW scandal has a role to play, this breakdown is also a symptom of the pain on growth created by the tightening in global liquidity conditions. In the past, the message from this ratio have ultimately been heeded by EM stock prices, suggesting that the recent divergence is likely to be resolved with weaker EM asset prices (Chart I-14). Confirming this risk, the sectoral breadth of EM equities has also deteriorated, and is already at levels that in the past have marked the end of stock advances (Chart I-15). At the very least, the narrowing of the EM bull market should prompt investors in EM-related plays to pause and reflect. Chart I-13Two Worrisome Breakdowns##br## On Chinese Plays Chart I-14Platinum's Dark##br## Omen For EM Chart I-15The Falling Participation ##br##In The EM Rally This moment of reflection seems especially warranted as EM assets do not have much cushion for unanticipated growth disappointment. The implied volatility on EM stocks is near cycle lows, so are EM sovereign CDS and corporate spreads (Chart I-16). This picture is mimicked by commodity currencies. Even after the recent bout of weakness, the aggregate risk-reversal in options points to a limited amount of concern, and therefore, a growing risk of negative surprises (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Little Cushion##br## In EM Assets Chart I-17Commodity Currency Options##br## Turn Optimistic As Well If commodity currencies have already depreciated in the face of a slightly soft dollar and perky EM asset prices, we worry that further weaknesses will emerge if the dollar strengthens again and EM assets self-off on the back of less liquidity and more EM growth disappointment. If the price of platinum relative to that of gold was a signal for EM assets, it is also a good indicator of additional stress in the commodity-currency space (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Platinum Raises Concerns ##br##For Commodity Currencies As Well We remain committed to our trade of shorting a basket of commodity currencies. AUD is the most expensive and most exposed to the Chinese tightening of the group, but that doesn't mean much. The Canadian housing market seems to be under increased scrutiny thanks to the combined assault of rising taxes on non-residents and growing worries about mortgage fraud, which is deepening the underperformance of Canadian banks relative to their U.S. counterparts. If this two-front attack continues, the housing market, the engine of the domestic economy, may also prove to weaken faster than we anticipated. Finally, the New Zealand dollar too is expensive even if domestic economic developments suggest that its fair value may be understated by most PPP metrics. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. economy remains good, but this will deepen the tightening in global liquidity. When combined with the tightening of monetary conditions in China, this suggests that global industrial activity and EM growth in particular could disappoint, especially as cracks in the financial system are beginning to appear. Moreover, EM assets and commodity currencies do not yet offer enough of a valuation cushion to fade this risk. Stay short commodity currencies. Macron In = Buy The Euro? The euro has rallied a 3.6% since early April, mostly on the back of Emmanuel Macron's electoral victories. Obviously, the last big hurdle is arriving this weekend with the second round. The En Marche! candidate still leads Marine Le Pen by a 20% margin. Wednesday's bellicose debate is unlikely to overturn this significant lead. The Front National candidate's lack of substance seems to have weighed against her in flash polls. If anything, her performance might have prompted some undecided Mélanchon voters to abstain or cast a "vote blanc" this weekend instead of picking her. This was her loss, not Macron's win. Does this mean that the euro has much upside? A quick rally toward 1.12 early next week still seems reasonable. New polls are beginning to show that En March! might perform much better than anticipated in the legislative election. Also, the center-right Les Républicains should also perform very well, resulting in the most right wing, pro-market Assemblée Nationale in nearly 50 years. While these polls are much too early to have any reliability, they may influence the interpretation by traders of Sunday's presidential election. However, we would remain inclined to fade any such rally. As we highlighted last week in a Special Report, our EUR/USD intermediate-term timing model shows that the euro is becoming expensive tactically, and that much good news is now in the euro's prices (Chart I-19).3 Additionally, investors have been excited by the rebound in core CPI in the euro area, a development interpreted as giving a carte-blanche to the ECB to hike rates sooner than was anticipated a few months ago. Indeed, currently, the first hike by the ECB is estimated to materialize in 27 months, versus the more than 60 months anticipated in July 2016. We doubt that market participants will bring the first rate hike closer to the present, a necessary development to prompt the euro to rally given our view on the Fed's tightening stance. We expect the rebound in the European core CPI to prove transient. Not only does European wage dynamics remain very poor outside of Germany, our country-based core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and points to a decelerating euro area core CPI (Chart I-20). Chart I-19EUR/USD: ##br##Good News In The Price Chart I-20European Core CPI Rebound ##br##Should Prove Transient Additionally, as we argued four weeks ago, tightening Chinese monetary conditions and EM growth shocks weigh more heavily on European growth than they do on the U.S.4 As such, our EM view implies that the euro area's positive economic surprises might soon deteriorate. Therefore, the favorable growth differential between Europe and the U.S. could be at its zenith. Shorting the euro today may prove dangerous, as a violent pop next week is very possible if the last euro shorts capitulate on a positive electoral outcome. Instead, we recommend investors sell EUR/USD if this pair hits 1.12 next week. Moreover, for risk management reasons, despite our view on the AUD, we are closing our long EUR/AUD position at a 6.9% gain this week. Bottom Line: Emmanuel Macron's likely victory this weekend could prompt a last wave of euro purchases. However, we are inclined to sell the euro as economic differentials between the common currency area and the U.S. are at their apex. Moreover, European core CPI is likely to weaken in the coming quarters, removing another excuse for investors to bid up the euro. Close long EUR/AUD. A Few Words On The Yen The yen has sold-off furiously in recent weeks. The tension with North Korea and the rise in the probability of a Fed hike in June to more than 90% have been poisons for the JPY. We are reluctant to close our yen longs just yet. Our anticipation that EM stresses will become particularly acute in the coming months should help the yen across the board. That being said, going forward, we recommend investors be more aggressive on shorting NZD/JPY than USD/JPY. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models", dated April 28, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "ECB: All About China?", dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The Fed decided to keep the federal funds rate unchanged at the 0.75% - 1% range. The Committee highlighted the Q1 GDP weakness as transitory, as the labor market has tightened more since their last meeting, inflation is reaching its 2% target, and business investment is firming. Continuing and initial jobless claims both beat expectations; However, ISM Manufacturing PMI came in less than expected at 54.8; PCE continues to fluctuate around the 2% target, coming in at 1.8% from 2.1%; ISM Prices Paid came in at 68.5, beating expectations. Furthermore, the Committee expects that "near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced", and that "economic activity will expand at a moderate pace". The market is now pricing in a 93.8% probability of a hike. We therefore expect the dollar to continue its appreciation after the French elections. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Macron's lead over Le Pen has risen after the heated debate between the two rival candidates. We believe these dynamics were a key bullish support for the euro in the run up to elections as the possibility of a Le Pen victory is being completely priced out. Adding to this optimism is a plethora of positive data from Europe. Business and consumer confidences have both pick up. German HICP came in at 2% yoy; Overall euro area headline CPI came in at 1.9%, and core at 1.2%. Nevertheless, labor market data in the peripheries, as well as the overall euro area, was disappointing. We believe this highlights substantial slack in the economy, and will keep the ECB from increasing rates any time soon. We expect the euro to climb in the short run, but the longer-run outlook remains bleak. Look to short EUR/USD at 1.12. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Economic data in Japan has been positive this past week: The unemployment rate went down to 2.8%, outperforming expectations. Retail trade annual growth came in 2.1%, also outperforming expectations. The jobs offer-to-applicants ratio came in at 1.45. This last number is significant, as this ratio has reached it 1990 peak, and it provides strong evidence that the Japanese labor market is very tight. Eventually, this tight labor market will exert pressures on wage inflation. In an environment like Japan, where nominal rates are capped, rising inflation would mean a collapse in real rates and consequently a collapse on the yen. Thus, we are maintaining our bearish view on the yen on a cyclical basis. On a tactical basis, we continue to be positive on the yen, given that a risk-off period in EM seems imminent. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 In spite of the tougher rhetoric coming from Brussels recently, the pound has maintained resilient and has even gain against the U.S. dollar. Indeed, recent data from the U.K. has been positive: Markit Services PMI came in at 55.8, outperforming expectations. Meanwhile, Markit Manufacturing PMI came in at 57.3, crushing expectations. Additionally, both consumer credit and M4 money supply growth also outperformed. Overall we continue to be positive on the pound, particularly against the euro, as we believe that expectations on Britain are too pessimistic, while the ability for the ECB to turn hawkish limited given that peripheral economies are still too weak to sustain tighter monetary conditions. Against the U.S. dollar the pound will have limited upside from now, given that it has already appreciated substantially. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA left its cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. The Bank also stated that its "forecasts for the Australian economy are little changed." It remains of the opinion that the low interest rate environment continues to support the outlook. This will also be a crucial ingredient to generate a positive outcome in the labor market in the foreseeable future. This past month has been very negative for the antipodean currency, with copper and iron ore prices displaying a similar behavior, losing almost 10% and 25% of their values since February, respectively. With China tightening monetary policy, and dissipating government spending soon to impact the Chinese economy, we remain bearish on AUD. In brighter news, the Bank's trimmed mean CPI measure increased by 1.9% on an annual basis, beating expectations of 1.8%. This is definitely a positive, but economic slack elsewhere could limit this development. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Data for New Zealand was very positive this week: The participation rate came in at 70.6%, outperforming expectations. Employment growth outperformed expectations substantially in the first quarter of 2017, coming in at 1.2%. The unemployment rate also outperformed coming in at 4.9% This recent data confirms our belief that inflationary pressures in New Zealand are stronger than what the RBNZ would lead you to believe. Indeed, non-tradable inflation, which measures domestically produced inflation is at its highest since 2014. Eventually, this will lead the RBNZ to abandon its neutral bias and embrace a more hawkish one, lifting the NZD in the process, particularly against the AUD. Against the U.S. dollar the kiwi dollar will likely have further downside, as the tightening in monetary conditions in China should weigh on commodity prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The oil-based currency has once again succumbed to fleeting oil prices, depreciating to a 1-year low. U.S. crude inventories have recently been declining by less than expected and production in Libya has been increasing. Moreover, headline inflation dropped 0.5% from its January high of 2.1%. The Bank of Canada acknowledged the weak core CPI data in its last monetary policy meeting, but instead chose to focus on stronger economic data to change their stance to neutral. As the weakness in oil prices proves temporary due to another likely OPEC cut, headline inflation should pick up again. However, labor market conditions and economic activity remain questionable based on the weakness of recent data: retail sales are contracting 0.6% on a monthly basis, and the raw materials price index dropped 1.6%. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales growth came in at 2.1%, crushing expectations. However, Aprils PMI underperformed coming in at 57.4 against expectations of 58.3. Additionally, the KOF leading indicator came in at 106, al coming below expectations. EUR/CHF now stands at its highest level since late 2017 and while data has not been beating expectations it still very upbeat. We believe that conditions are slowly being put into place for the SNB to abandon its implied floor, given that core inflation is approaching its long term average. Therefore, once the French elections are over, EUR/CHF will become an attractive short, given that the euro will once again trade on economic fundamentals rather than political risks. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone continues to depreciate sharply. This comes as no surprise given that oil is now down 13% in 2017. Overall we expect that oil currencies will outperform metal currencies given that oil prices will have less sensitivity to EM liquidity and economic conditions. That being said, it is hard to be too bullish on oil if China slows anew, even if one believe that the OPEC deal will stay in place . This means that USD/NOK could have additional upside. On a longer term basis, there has been a slight improvement in Norwegian data, as nominal retail sales are growing at a staggering 10% pace, while real retail sales are growing at more than 2%, which are a 5-year and a 2-year high respectively. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The April Monetary Policy meeting delivered an unexpected decision, with members deciding to extend asset purchases till the end of the year, while delaying the forecast for a rate hike to mid-2018. Recent inflationary fluctuations and weak commodity prices support the Riksbank's actions. Forecasts for both inflation and the repo rate were lowered for 2018 and 2019. The Riksbank highlighted that "to support the upturn in inflation, monetary policy needs to be somewhat more expansionary", and is prepared to be more aggressive if need be. This increasingly dovish rhetoric by the Riksbank contrasts markedly with the FOMC's hawkish tilt, a dichotomy that will prove bearish for the krona relative to the greenback. Implications for EUR/SEK are a little more blurred, as the ECB will also remain dovish for the foreseeable future. However, Sweden's attentive and cautious stance on its currency's strength will cap any downside in EUR/SEK. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Chart 1European Policy Uncertainty Down Macron remains on target to win the French election, but Italy looms as a risk ahead; Fade any relief rally after South Korean elections; Russia is not a major source of geopolitical risk at present; Stay underweight Turkey and Indonesia within the EM universe. Feature The supposed pushback against populism is emerging as a theme in the financial industry. The expected defeat of nationalist-populist Marine Le Pen in the second round of the French election on May 7 has reduced Europe's economic policy uncertainty, despite continued elevated levels globally (Chart 1). We are not surprised by this outcome. A year ago, ahead of both the Brexit referendum and the U.S. election, we cautioned investors that it was the Anglo-Saxon world, not continental Europe, which would experience the greatest populist earthquake.1 The middle class in the U.S. and the U.K. lacks the socialist protections of large welfare states (Chart 2), leading to frustrating outcomes in terms of equality and social mobility (Chart 3). In other words, the gains of globalization have not been redistributed in the two laissez-faire economies. Hence the Anglo-Saxon world got Trump and Brexit while the continent got market-positive outcomes like Rajoy, Van der Bellen, Rutte, and (probably) Macron. Chart 2Given The Qualities Of The##br## Anglo-Saxon Economy ... Chart 3...Brexit And Trump ##br##Should Not Be A Surprise Looking forward, we agree with the consensus that Marine Le Pen will lose, as we have been stressing with high conviction since November.2 Despite a poor start to the campaign, Macron remains 20% ahead of Marine Le Pen with only four days left to the election (Chart 4). Could the polls be wrong? No. And not just because they were right in the first round. Polls are likely to be right because French polls have an exemplary track record (Chart 5) and there is no Electoral College to throw off the math. Chart 4Le Pen Unlikely To Bridge This Gap Chart 5French Polls Have Strong Track Record As we go to press, the two candidates are set to face off in an important televised debate. Given Le Pen's post-debate polling performance in the first round (Chart 6), we doubt she will perform well enough to make a change. Next week, we will review the second round and its implications for the legislative elections in June and French politics beyond. Overall, we think Europe's policy uncertainty dip is temporary, as the all-important Italian election risk looms just ahead in 2018.3 For now, we are sticking with our bullish European risk asset view, but will look to pare it back later in the year. Chart 6Debates Have Not Helped Le Pen Chart 7Commodity Currencies Suggest Global Trade Is At Risk... What about emerging markets? With investors laser-focused on developed market political risks - Trump's policies and protectionism, European elections, Brexit, etc - have EM political risks fallen by the wayside? Chart 8...And Commodities Are At Risk Too Chart 9China's Growth To Decelerate Again We don't think so. According to BCA's Emerging Market Strategy, the recent performance of the commodity currency index (an equally weighted average of AUD, NZD, and CAD) augurs a deceleration of global growth in the second half of this year (Chart 7) and a top in the commodity complex (Chart 8).4 At the heart of the reversal is the slowdown in China's credit and fiscal spending impulse (Chart 9).5 Given China's critical importance as the main source of EM final demand (Chart 10), the slowdown in money and credit growth is a significant risk to EM growth in the latter part of the year (Chart 11).6 Chart 10EM Is Leveraged To China Much More Than DM Chart 11China: Money/Credit Growth Is Slowing At the heart of China's credit slowdown are efforts by policymakers to cautiously introduce some discipline in the financial sector. Chinese interbank rates have risen noticeably, which should have a material impact on credit growth (Chart 12). Given that the all-important nineteenth National Party Congress is six-to-seven months away, we doubt that the tightening efforts will be severe. But they may foreshadow a much tighter policy in 2018, following the conclusion of the Congress, when President Xi has full reign and the ability to redouble his initial efforts at reform, namely to control the risks of excessive leverage to the state's stability. With both the Fed and PBoC looking to tighten over the next 12-18 months, in part to respond to improvements in global inflation expectations (Chart 13), highly leveraged EM economies may face a triple-whammy of USD appreciation, Chinese growth plateauing, and easing commodity demand. In isolation, none is critical, but as a combination, they could be challenging. Chart 12Chinese Policymakers End The Credit Party? Chart 13Global Tightening Upon Us? In this weekly report, we take an around-the-world look at several emerging economies that we believe are either defying the odds of political crisis or particularly vulnerable to growth slowdown. South Korea: Here Comes The Sunshine Policy, Part II South Korea's early election will be held on May 9. The victory of a left-wing candidate has been likely since April 2016, when the two main left-wing parties, the Democratic Party and the People's Party, won a majority of the 300-seat National Assembly. It has been inevitable since the impeachment of outgoing President Park Geun-hye in December - whose removal was deemed legal by the Constitutional Court in March - for a corruption scandal that split the main center-right party and decimated its popular support after ten years of ruling the country.7 The only question was whether Moon Jae-in, leader of the Democratic Party and erstwhile chief of staff of former President Roh Moo-hyun, would finally get his turn as president, or whether Ahn Cheol-soo, an entrepreneurial politician who broke from the Democratic Party to form the People's Party, would defeat him. At the moment, Moon has a significant lead in the polls, while Ahn has lost the bump in support he received after other candidates were eliminated through the primary process (Chart 14). Moon's lead has grown throughout the recent spike in saber-rattling between the United States and North Korea, which suggests that Moon is most likely to win the race. The debates have also hurt Ahn. Moon leads in every region, among blue collar and white collar voters, and among centrists as well as progressives. Also, the pollster Gallup Korea has a solid track record for presidential elections going back to 1987, with a margin of error of about 3%, so Moon is highly likely to win if polls do not change in Ahn's or Hong's favor. The key difference between Moon and Ahn boils down to this: Moon is the established left-wing candidate and has mainstream Democratic Party machinery backing him, a clear platform, and experience running the country from 2003-8. Ahn does not have experience in the executive branch (Blue House) and his policy platform is less clear. His party is a progressive offshoot of the Democratic Party, yet he is bidding for disenchanted center-right voters, a contradiction that has at times given him the appearance of flip-flopping on important issues. Thus Ahn's election would bring greater economic policy uncertainty than Moon's, though Ahn is more business-friendly by preference. Regardless, the new president will have to work with the opposing left-wing party in the National Assembly if he intends to get anything accomplished. The combined left-wing vote is 164, yielding only a 13-seat majority if the two parties work together. Differences between them will cause problems in passing legislation. It would be easier for Moon to legislate with his party's 119-seat base than for Ahn with his party's 40-seat base, unless Ahn can steer his party to cooperate with the center right like he is trying to do in the presidential campaign. Markets may celebrate the election regardless of the victor because it sets the country back on the path of stable government. The Kospi bottomed in November when the political crisis reached a fever pitch and has rallied since December 5, when it became clear that the conservatives in the assembly would vote for Park's impeachment. This suggested an early government change to restore political and economic leadership. The market rallied again when the Constitutional Court removed Park, which pulled the presidential elections forward to May and cut short what would otherwise have been another year of uncertainty until the original election date in December 2017 (Chart 15). Chart 14South Korea: Moon In The Lead Chart 15Korean Stocks Cheered Impeachment Investors can reasonably look forward to an increase in fiscal thrust after the election, particularly if Moon is elected. Table 1 compares the key policy initiatives of the top three candidates - both Moon and Ahn are pledging increases in government spending. Note that South Korean fiscal thrust expanded in the first two years of the last left-leaning government, i.e. the Roh Moo-hyun administration (Chart 16). Table 1South Korean Presidential Candidates And Their Policy Proposals Chart 16Left-Wing Leaders Drive Up Fiscal Spending Beyond any initial relief rally, however, investors may experience some buyer's remorse. South Korea is experiencing a leftward swing of the political pendulum that is not conducive to higher growth in corporate earnings. This is the implication of the April legislative elections and the collapse of President Park's support prior to the corruption scandal; it will also be the takeaway of either Moon's or Ahn's election win over a discredited conservative status quo (both fiscal and corporate). The leftward shift is motivated by structural factors, not mere political optics. Average growth rates have fallen since the Great Recession, yet South Korea lacks the social amenities of a slower-growing developed economy. The social safety net is comparable to Turkey's or Mexico's and wages have been suppressed to maintain competitiveness (Chart 17). Inequality has grown dramatically (Chart 18). Chart 17Keeping Labor Cheap Chart 18Fueling The Populist Fire Therefore the policies to come will emphasize redistribution, job security, and social benefits. Moon's policies, in particular, are aggressive. He has pledged to require the public sector to increase employment by 5% per year and add 810,000 jobs by 2022, and to expand welfare for the elderly regardless of their income level. This will swell the budget deficit and public debt, especially over time, given South Korea's demographic profile, which is rapidly graying (Chart 19). Moon also intends nearly to double the minimum wage, require private companies to hire 3-5% more workers each year, depending on company size, and give substantial subsidies to SMEs that hire more workers. He supports a hike in corporate taxes, though the details of any tax changes have yet to be disclosed. Chart 19Society Turning Gray Ahn's policy preferences are more focused on productivity improvements than social welfare. While Moon panders to middle-aged workers concerned about job security - among whom he leads Ahn by 30 percentage points - Ahn panders to the youth, who are currently battling an unemployment rate of 11%. He would pay subsidies to young workers while they look for jobs immediately after graduation ($266 per month) and for the first two years of their employment at an SME ($532 per month). He would direct budgetary funds to research and development, high-tech industries, and job training. The SME policies speak to the general dissatisfaction with the cozy relationship between large, export-oriented industrial giants - the chaebol - and the political elite. Both Moon and Ahn will attempt to remove subsidies and privileges from the chaebol, potentially forcing them to sell or spin-off branches that are unrelated to their core business, and will seek to incentivize SMEs. Chaebol reform is a long-running theme in South Korean politics with very little record of success, but the one thing investors can be sure of on this front is greater uncertainty regarding policies toward the country's multinationals. Bottom Line: South Korea is experiencing a swing of the political pendulum to the left regardless of who wins the presidential race on May 9. What About Geopolitics? Internationally, Moon, if he wins, will attempt to improve relations with China and North Korea at the expense of the U.S. and Japan. His voter base came of age during the democracy movement of the 1980s and is friendlier toward China and less hostile toward North Korea than other age groups (Chart 20 A&B). Ahn may attempt a similar foreign policy adjustment, but he is less willing to confront the United States. His attempt to woo the youth will constrain any engagement with Pyongyang, since young South Koreans feel the least connection with their ethnic brethren to the north. Given that a Moon presidency would be paired with that of Trump, it would likely precipitate tensions in the U.S.-Korean relationship. News headlines will announce that South Korea is "pivoting" toward China, much in the way that U.S. ally the Philippines was perceived as shifting toward China after President Rodrigo Duterte's election in 2016. This will be an exaggeration, since Koreans still generally prefer the U.S. to China and view North Korea as an enemy (Chart 21). Nevertheless, there is potential for real, market-relevant disagreements. Chart 20Moon's Middle-Aged Constituency Chart 21Constraints On The Sunshine Policy In the short term, the risk is to trade, given the South Korean Left's strain of opposition to the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (KORUS) and Trump's intention to renegotiate it, or even impose tariffs. Trump is bringing a protectionist tilt to U.S. trade policy - at very least - and he is relatively unconstrained on trade so we consider this a high-level risk over his four-year term in office. Trade tensions could become consequential if South Korea breaks with the U.S. over North Korea, angering the Trump administration. At the same time, South Korea's trade with China (Chart 22) is a risk due to China's secular slowdown, protectionism, and intention to move up the value chain and compete with South Korea in global markets. Chart 22South Korea's Twin Trade Risks In the short and long term, Moon's attempt to revamp Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" of economic engagement and denuclearization talks with North Korea could create serious frictions with the U.S. What Moon is proposing is to promote economic integration so that South Korea has more leverage over the North, which is increasingly reliant on China, and also to reduce military tensions via negotiations toward a peace treaty (the 1950-3 war ended with an armistice only). The idea is to launch a five-year plan toward an inter-Korean "economic union." This would begin by re-opening shuttered cooperative projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours and later establish duty-free agreements, free trade zones, and multilateral infrastructure projects that include Russia and China.8 The problem is that any new Sunshine Policy - which is ostensibly a boon for the region's security - will clash with the Trump administration's attempt to rally a new international coalition to tighten sanctions on North Korea to force it to freeze its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. North Korea will want to divide the allies and thus will be receptive to China's and South Korea's offers of negotiations; the U.S. and Japan will not want to allow any additional economic aid to the North without a halt to tests and tokens of eventual denuclearization. How will this tension be resolved? Trump is preparing for negotiations and over the next couple of years the U.S. and Japan are highly likely to give diplomacy at least one last chance, as we have argued in recent reports.9 Eventually, if the U.S. becomes convinced of total collaboration between China and South Korea with the North (i.e. skirting sanctions and granting economic benefits), while the North continues testing capabilities that would enable it to strike the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon, some kind of confrontation is inevitable. But first the U.S. will try another round of talks. The "arc of diplomacy" could extend for several years, as it did with Iran (Chart 23), if the North delays its missile progress or appears to do so. Chart 23The 'Arc Of Diplomacy' Can Last For Several Years Despite our belief that the North Korean situation will calm down as diplomacy gets under way, South Korea is seeing rising geopolitical headwinds for the following reasons: Sino-American tensions: U.S.-China competition is growing over time, notwithstanding the apparently friendly start between the Trump and Xi administrations.10 Trump's North Korea policy: The Trump administration has signaled that the U.S. does not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea and the need to maintain the credibility of the military option will keep tensions at a higher level than in recent memory.11 Japanese re-armament: Japanese tensions with China and both Koreas are rising as Japan increases military expenditures and maritime defenses and moves to revise its constitution to legitimize military action.12 The costs of peace: If diplomacy prevails, South Korean engagement with the North still poses massive uncertainties about the future of the relationship, the North's internal stability amid liberalization, whether the transition to greater economic integration will be smooth, and whether the South Korean economy (and public finances) can absorb the associated costs. This is not even to mention eventual unification. Bottom Line: The current saber-rattling around the Korean peninsula is not over yet, but tensions are soon to fall as international negotiations get under way. Still, geopolitical risks for South Korea are rising over the long run. Investment Conclusions The currency will be the first to react to the election results and will send a signal about whether the fall in policy uncertainty is deemed more beneficial than the impending rise in pro-labor policies. Beyond that, the won has been strong relative to South Korea's neighbors and competitors (Chart 24). The Korean central bank is considering cutting rates at a time when fiscal policy is set to expand substantially, a negative for the currency. Chart 24Won Strength, Yen Weakness Therefore we remain short KRW / long THB. Thailand, another U.S. ally, is running huge current account surpluses, is more insulated from U.S.-China geopolitical conflicts, and has navigated tensions between the two relatively well. We expect a relief rally in stocks due to resolution of the campaign and the likelihood of an easing in trade tensions with China. However, this is the only reason we are not yet ready to join our colleagues in the Emerging Markets Strategy in shorting Korean stocks versus Japanese. We will look to put on this trade in future. We do not have high hopes for Korean stocks over the long run due to the headwinds listed above. As for bonds, both Moon's and Ahn's agendas, particularly Moon's, will be bond bearish because they will increase deficits and debt. At the short end of the curve, yields may have reason to fall; but the long end should reflect looser fiscal policy, the worsening debt and demographic profile, and increasing geopolitical risk, whether from conflicts with the U.S. and North Korea, or from the rising odds of a greater future burden from subsidizing (or even merging with) North Korea. Therefore we recommend going long 2-year government bonds / short 10-year government bonds. Russia: Defying Odds Of A Political Crisis Russia has emerged from the oil-price shocks scathed, but unbowed.13 Its textbook macro policy amid a severe recession over the past two years has been exemplary: The government has maintained constant nominal expenditure growth and substantially cut spending in real terms (Chart 25). The fiscal deficit is still large at 3.7%, but it typically lags oil prices (Chart 26). Hence, the recovery in oil prices over the past year should lead to a notable improvement in the budget balance. For 2017, the budget is conservative, as it assumes $40/bbl Urals crude. Chart 25Russia Has Undergone##br## Through Real Fiscal Squeeze... Chart 26...Which Is##br## Now Over Early this year, the Ministry of Finance adopted a new fiscal rule where it will buy foreign currency when the price of oil is above the set target level of 2700 RUB per barrel (the price of oil in rubles at the $40 bbl Urals) and sell foreign exchange when the oil price is below that level (Chart 27). The objective of this policy is to create a counter-cyclical ballast that will limit fluctuations in the ruble caused by swings in oil prices. Chart 27Oil Price Threshold For New Fiscal Rule Chart 28Forex Reserves Have Stabilized The recovery of oil prices and strict macroeconomic policy has allowed Russia to stabilize its foreign exchange reserves (Chart 28), although they remain at a critical level as a percent of broad money supply. However, the GDP growth recovery will be tepid and fall far short of the high growth rates of the early part of the decade (Chart 29). Chart 29Russia: ##br##Recovery Is At Hand Chart 30Inventories Remain Far ##br##Above Average Levels Russian policymakers should be cautiously optimistic. On one hand, they have been able to withstand a massive decline in oil prices. On the other, the situation is still precarious and warrants caution given the delicate situation in oil markets. OECD oil inventories remain elevated and could precipitate an oil-price collapse without OPEC's active oil-production management (Chart 30). From this macroeconomic context, we would conclude that: Russia will abide by the OPEC 2.0 production-cut agreement: While the new budget rule will go a long way in insulating the ruble from swings in oil prices, Russia is still an energy exporter. As such, we expect Russia to play ball with Saudi Arabia and continue to abide by the conditions of the OPEC deal. Thus far, Russia has been less enthusiastic in cutting production than the Saudis, but still going along (Chart 31). Russia will not destabilize the Middle East: While Russia will continue to support President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, its involvement in the civil war will abate. Moscow already began to officially withdraw from the conflict in January. While part of its forces will remain in order to secure Assad's government, Russia has no intention of provoking its newfound OPEC allies with geopolitical tensions. Russia will talk tough, but carry a small stick: Shows of force will continue in the Baltics and the Arctic, but investors should fade any rise in the geopolitical risk premium (Chart 32). It is one thing to fly strategic bombers close to Alaska or conduct military exercises near the Baltic States; it is quite another to act on these threats. In fact, Russia has been doing both since about 2004 and its bluster has amounted to very little with respect to NATO proper. This is because Russia depends on Europe for almost all of its FDI and export demand and it is only in the very early innings of replacing European demand with Chinese (Chart 33). As long as Russia lacks the pipeline infrastructure to export the majority of its energy production to China, it will be reluctant to confront Europe. Chart 31Moscow Will Play ##br##Ball With OPEC Chart 32Fade Any Spike ##br##In Geopolitical Risk Chart 33Russia Relies On Europe;##br## China Not A Replacement As we have posited in the past, energy exporters are emboldened to be aggressive when oil prices are high.14 When oil prices collapse, energy exporters become far more compliant. Nowhere is this dynamic more true than with Russia, whose military interventions in foreign countries have served as a sure sign that the top of the oil bull market is at hand! Bottom Line: We do not expect any serious geopolitical risk to emanate from Russia, despite the supposed souring of relations between the Trump and Putin administrations due to the U.S. cruise-missile strike against Syria.15 And we also do not expect President Putin to manufacture a geopolitical crisis ahead of Russia's March 2018 presidential elections, given that his popularity remains high and that the opposition is in complete disarray. While Russia may continue to talk tough on a number of fronts, investors should fade the rhetoric as it is purely for domestic consumption. Turkey: Deceitful Stability Turkey held a constitutional referendum that dramatically expands the powers of the presidency on April 16.16 The proposed 18 amendments passed with a 51.41% majority and a high turnout of 85%. As with all recent Turkish referenda and elections, the results reveal a sharply divided country between the Aegean coastal regions and the Anatolian heartland, the latter being a stronghold of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Is Turkey Now A Dictatorship? First, some facts. Turkey has not become a dictatorship, as some Western press allege. Yes, presidential powers have expanded. In particular, we note that: The president is now both head of state and government and has the power to appoint government ministers; The president can issue decrees; however, the parliament has the ability to abrogate them through the legislative process; The president can call for new elections; however, he needs three-fifths of the parliament to agree to the new election; The president has wide powers to appoint judges. What the media is not reporting is that the parliament can remove or modify any state of emergency enacted by the president. In addition, overriding a presidential veto appears to be exceedingly easy, with only an absolute majority (not a super-majority) of votes needed. As such, our review of the constitutional changes is that Turkey is most definitely not a dictatorship. Yes, President Erdogan has bestowed upon the presidency much wider powers than the current ceremonial position possesses. However, the amendments also create a trap for future presidents. If the president should face a parliament ruled by an opposition party, he would lose much of his ability to govern. The changes therefore approximate the current French constitution, which is a semi-presidential system. Under the French system, the president has to cohabitate with the parliament. This appears to be the case with the Turkish constitution as well. Bottom Line: Turkish constitutional referendum has expanded the powers of the presidency, but considerable checks remain. If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were ever to lose parliamentary control, President Erdogan would become entrapped by the very constitution he just passed. Is Turkey Now Stable? The market reacted to the results of the referendum with a muted cheer. First, we disagree with the market consensus that President Erdogan will feel empowered and confident following the constitutional referendum that gives him more power. This is for several reasons. For one, the referendum passed with a slim majority. Even if we assume (generously) that it was a clean win for the government, the fact remains that the AKP has struggled to win over 50% of the vote in any election it has contested since coming to power in 2002 (Chart 34). Turkey is a deeply divided country and a narrow win in a constitutional referendum is not going to change this. Chart 34Turkey's Ruling Party Struggles To Get Over 50% Of The Vote Second, Erdogan is making a strategic mistake by giving himself more power. It will focus the criticism of the public on the presidency and himself if the economy and geopolitical situation surrounding Turkey gets worse. If the buck now stops with Erdogan, it means that all the blame will go to him in hard times. We therefore do not expect Erdogan to push away from populist economic and monetary policies. In fact, we could see him double down on unorthodox fiscal and monetary policies as protests mount against his rule. While he has expanded control over the army, judiciary, and police, he has not won over the major cities on the Aegean coast, which not only voted against his constitutional referendum but also consistently vote against AKP rule. Events in Turkey since the referendum have already confirmed our view. Despite rumors that the state of emergency would be lifted following the referendum, the parliament in fact moved to expand it by another three months. Furthermore, just a week following the plebiscite, the government suspended over 9,000 police officials and arrested 1,120 suspects of the attempted coup last summer, with another 3,224 at large. This now puts the total number of people arrested at around 47,000. Investors are confusing lack of opposition to stability. Yes, the opposition to AKP remains in disarray. As such, there is no political avenue for opposition to Erdogan. The problem is that such an arrangement raises the probability that the opposition takes the form of a social movement and protest. We would therefore caution investors that a repeat of the Gezi Park protests from 2013 could be likely, especially if the economy stumbles. Bottom Line: The referendum has not changed the facts on the ground. Turkey remains a deeply divided country. Erdogan will continue to feel threatened by the general sentiment on the ground and thus continue to avoid taking any painful structural reforms. We believe that economic populism will remain the name of the game. What To Watch? We would first and foremost watch for any sign of protest over the next several weeks. Any Gezi Park-style unrest would hurt Erdogan's credibility. May Day protests saw police scuffle with protesters in Istanbul, for example. Given his penchant for equating any dissent with terrorism, President Erdogan is very likely to overreact to any sign that a social movement is rising in Turkey to oppose him. It is not our baseline case that the constitutional referendum will motivate protests, but it is a risk investors should be concerned with. Next election is set for November 2019 and the constitutional changes will only become effective at that point (save for provisions on the judiciary). Investors should watch for any sign that Erdogan's or the AKP's popularity is waning in the interim. A failure to secure a majority in parliament could entrap Erdogan in an institutional fight with the legislature that creates a constitutional crisis. Chart 35Turkey Constrained By European Ties Relations with the EU remain an issue as well. Erdogan will likely further deepen divisions in the country if he goes ahead and makes a formal break with the EU, either by reinstituting the death penalty or holding a referendum on the EU accession process. Erdogan's hostile position towards the EU should be seen from the perspective of his own insecurity as a leader: he needs an external enemy in order to rally support around his leadership. We would recommend that clients ignore the rhetoric. Turkey depends on Europe far more than any other trade or investment partner (Chart 35). If Turkey were to lash out at the EU by encouraging migration into Europe, for example, the subsequent economic sanctions, which we are certain the EU would impose, would devastate the Turkish economy and collapse its currency. Nonetheless, Ankara's brinkmanship and anti-EU rhetoric will likely continue. It is further evidence of the regime's insecurity at home. Bottom Line: The more that Erdogan captures power within the institutions he controls, the greater his insecurities will become. This is for two reasons. First, he will increase the risk of a return of social movement protests like the Gezi Park event in 2013. Second, he will become solely responsible for everything that happens in Turkey, closing off the possibility to "pass the buck" to the parliament or the opposition when the economy slows down or a geopolitical crisis emerges. As such, we see no opening for genuine structural reform or orthodox policymaking. Turkey will continue to be run along a populist paradigm. Investment Conclusions BCA's Emerging Market Strategy recommends that clients re-instate short positions on Turkish assets, specifically going short TRY versus the U.S. dollar and shorting Turkish bank stocks. The central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system have recently been expanded again (Chart 36). This is a form of quantitative easing and warrants a weaker currency. To be more specific, even though the overnight liquidity injections have tumbled, the use of the late liquidity money market window has gone vertical. This is largely attributed to the fact that the late liquidity window is the only money market facility that has not been capped by the authorities in their attempt to tighten liquidity when the lira was collapsing in January. The fact remains that Turkish commercial banks are requiring continuous liquidity and the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) is supplying it. Commercial banks demand liquidity because they continue growing their loan books rapidly. Bank loan and money growth remains very strong at 18-20% (Chart 37). Such extremely strong loan growth means that credit excesses continue to be built. Chart 36Liquidity Injections Reaccelerating Chart 37Money And Credit Growth Strong Besides, wages are growing briskly - wages in manufacturing and service sector are rising at 18-20% from a year ago (Chart 38, top panel). Meanwhile, productivity growth has been very muted. This entails that unit labor costs are mushrooming and inflationary pressures are more entrenched than suggested by headline and core consumer price inflation. It seems Turkey is suffering from outright stagflation: rampant inflationary pressures with a skyrocketing unemployment rate (Chart 38, bottom panel). The upshot of strong credit/money and wage growth as well as higher inflationary pressures is currency depreciation. Excessive credit and income/wage growth are supporting import demand at a time when the current account deficit is already wide. This will maintain downward pressure on the exchange rate. The currency has been mostly flat year-to-date despite the CBT intervening in the market to support the lira by selling U.S. dollars (Chart 39). Without this support from the CBT, the lira would be much weaker than it currently is. That said, the CBT's net foreign exchange rates (excluding commercial banks' foreign currency deposits at the CBT) are very low - they stand at US$ 12 billion and are equal to 1 month of imports. Therefore, the central bank has little capacity to defend the lira by selling its own U.S. dollar. Chart 38Turkish Stagflation Chart 39Turkey Props Up The Lira We also believe there is an opportunity to short Turkish banks outright. The currency depreciation will force interbank rates higher (Chart 40, top panel). Chart 40Weak Lira Will Push Interbank Rates Higher Historically, currency depreciation has always been negative for banks' stock prices as net interest margins will shrink (Chart 40, bottom panel). Surprisingly, bank share prices in local currency terms have lately rallied despite the headwinds from higher interbank rates and the rollover in net interest rate margin. This creates an attractive opportunity to go short again. Bottom Line: We are already short the lira relative to the Mexican peso. In addition, we are recommending two new trades based on the recommendations of BCA's Emerging Market Strategy: long USD/TRY and short Turkish bank stocks. Dedicated EM equity as well as fixed-income and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Turkish assets within their respective EM universes. Indonesia: A Brief Word On Jakarta Elections President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo saw his ally, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (nicknamed "Ahok"), badly defeated in the second round of a contentious gubernatorial election on April 19. Preliminary results suggest that Ahok received 42% against 58% for his contender, Anies Baswedan, a technocrat and defector from Jokowi's camp whose own party only expected him to receive 52% of the vote. This was a significant setback. Jokowi's loss of the Jakarta government is a rebuke from his own political base, a loss of prestige (since he campaigned to help Ahok), and a boost to the nationalist opposition party Gerindra and other opponents of Jokowi's reform agenda. Ahok is a Christian and ethnic Chinese, which makes him a double-minority in Muslim-majority Indonesia, which has seen anti-Chinese communal violence periodically and has also witnessed a swelling of Islamist politics since the decline of the oppressive secular Suharto regime in 1998. Ahok fell under popular scrutiny and later criminal charges for allegedly insulting the Koran in September 2016 by casting doubt on verses suggesting that Muslims should not be governed by infidels. Mass Islamist protests ensued in November. Gerindra exploited them, as did political forces behind the previous government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and trade unions opposed to the Jokowi administration's attempt to regularize minimum wage increases.17 Ahok's sound defeat shows that the opposition succeeded in making the race a referendum on him versus Islam. Despite the blow, Jokowi's popularity remains intact (Chart 41). The latest reliable polling is months out of date but puts Jokowi 24% above Prabowo Subianto, leader of Gerindra, whom he has consistently led since defeating him in the 2014 election. Jokowi remains personally popular, maintains a large coalition in the assembly, and is still the likeliest candidate to win the 2019 election. Jokowi's approval ratings in the mid-60 percentile are comparable to those of former President Yudhoyono at this time in 2007, and the latter was re-elected for a second term. Moreover Yudhoyono slumped at this point in his first term down to the mid-40 percentile in 2008 before recovering dramatically in 2009, despite the global recession, to win re-election. In other words, according to recent precedent, Jokowi could fall much farther in the public eye and still recover in time for the election. However, Jokowi will now have to shore up his support among voters with a strong Muslim identity, which is a serious weak spot of his, as indicated in the regional electoral data in Table 2. Jokowi relies on two key Islamist parties in the National Assembly. He cannot afford to let opposition grow among Muslim voters at large (notwithstanding Gerindra's own problems working with Islamist parties). Chart 41Jokowi Still Likely To Be Re-Elected In 2019 Table 2Islamist Politics A Real Risk For Jokowi He clearly faces a tougher re-election bid now than he did before. Risks to China and EM growth on the two-year horizon are therefore even more threatening than they were. And since a Prabowo victory would mark the rise of a revanchist and nationalist government in Indonesia that would upset markets for fear of unorthodox economic policies, the political dynamic will be all the more important to monitor. These election risks also suggest that traditional interest-group patronage is likely to rise at the expense of structural economic reform over the next two years. Bottom Line: We remain bearish on Indonesian assets. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Signs Of An EM/China Growth Reversal," dated April 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: The Beginning Of The End," dated April 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Desynchronized World?" dated April 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016; Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017; and Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, all available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Moon Jae-in's initiative for 'Inter-Korean Economic Union," National Committee on North Korea, dated August 17, 2012, available at www.ncnk.org. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 For our latest feature update on what is one of our major themes, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and EM Equity Sector Strategy, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see footnote 7 above. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Forget About The Middle East?" dated January 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat'," dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 An original version of this analysis of Turkey appeared in BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: The Beginning Of The End," dated April 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see "Indonesia: Beware Of Excessive Wage Inflation" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Turkey: Military Adventurism And Capital Controls," dated December 7, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Geopolitical tensions eased last week, but there are still a few near term hurdles to clear. Domestic policy uncertainty remains. Investors still can't seem to reconcile the disconnect between weak "hard" data and solid "soft" data. A gradual Fed may be the right response to the recent run of mixed economic data. Housing and housing-related investments led the global economy into the last recession. Housing is still on the mend. The housing sector will contribute about 0.2 percentage points and 0.5 percentage points to real GDP growth in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Investors should look to housing-related assets as a source of potential outperformance over the coming 6-12 months. Feature U.S. equity prices neared record highs and Treasury yields bounced off of their late-March low last week as near term international and domestic political risk melted away in the minds of investors. We continue to expect U.S. equities to beat bonds this year. Oil prices continue to trade near $50/bbl, and the dollar held steady amid all the news-good and bad. Both have upside over the remainder of 2017. In today's report, we examine the following key issues for investors: Since the end of the Great Recession, geopolitical risks have ebbed and flowed, and 2017 has proven to be no different. Are political risks over, or just over for now? How does the recent run of mixed U.S. data influence the Fed, and what does this mean for risky asset prices? Housing and housing-related investments led the global economy into the last recession. Where do we stand now? Are Geopolitical Concerns Over? North Korea failed to test another nuke after a nerve rattling Easter Weekend. The leadup to the presidential election in South Korea on May 9 may have motivated a part (or most) of the uptick in belligerence that we are seeing from North Korea. All leading candidates are more likely to try diplomacy and economic engagement with North Korea than to maintain the past ten years of conservative efforts to strengthen military deterrence via stronger alliances with the U.S. and Japan. In the euro area, the good news is that the polls in the first round of the French election (April 23) were correct. The bad news is that there is still another election. Macron and Le Pen face off on this Sunday (May 7), and markets are betting that the polls will be correct again given Macron's 20 point lead over Le Pen. The June parliamentary elections in France should be a non-event for U.S. financial markets; we still see Italy - where most voters favor Eurosceptic parties - as the biggest risk on the geopolitical scene in the next year or so. In the U.K., the ruling Tories look to add to their majority in June's parliamentary election, which will provide British Prime Minister Theresa May with a stronger hand to negotiate with Europe and increases the odds of a less extreme Brexit outcome (Chart 1). Chart ICGeopolitical Risk Is Ebbing...For Now Chart 1BGeopolitical Risk Is Ebbing...For Now Chart 1AGeopolitical Risk Is Ebbing...For Now There was good news and bad news on the domestic policy front last week as well. The release of the long awaited Trump tax plan and the passage of a spending bill by Congress to avert a government shutdown (at least until later this week) helped to remove some domestic political uncertainty. The bad news is that the plan was more tax cut than tax reform. The one page plan lacked detail and still has to pass muster with the House GOP. The Trump Administration may have started a trade war with Canada (over lumber) and sent trial balloons about pulling out of NAFTA (despite walking back from this position soon after). Is this "negotiator" Trump or something worse? The bad news is that tax reform, trade wars, dynamic scoring, and yes, even Obamacare will be with us until late Summer/early Fall. The good news is that the border adjustment tax may not be. The takeaway for investors is that while geopolitical concerns have not disappeared, they have ebbed, and this will support the relative performance of U.S. equities over 10-year government bonds over the coming year. Italy (not North Korea, France, or Germany) remains the biggest geopolitical risk on the horizon, but the next election there isn't until early-2018. Domestically, Trump's pro-growth agenda is advancing at a pace that is slower than many investors would prefer, but it is advancing, which we believe will continue to support a pro-cyclical asset allocation stance. Bottom Line: Geopolitical concerns have not disappeared, but they have ebbed materially to the benefit of risky asset prices. Investors should stay overweight U.S. stocks vs 10-year government bonds within a multi-asset portfolio. Mixed Data Warrants A Gradual Fed Investors still can't seem to reconcile the disconnect between weak "hard" data and solid "soft" data. The recent uptick in initial claims and the soft Q1 GDP data are the most recent examples. Investors should recall that claims are inherently noisy; a rise in claims of more than 75,000 over a 6-month period is typically needed to signal a recession. Chart 2 makes it clear that the latest wiggles on claims are not sending a recessionary signal. Chart 2Claims Are Not Even Close To Sending A Recession Signal Friday's GDP report highlighted that growth in Q1 was soft again. As we noted in last week's report, GDP growth in Q1 averaged -0.1% over the last 10 years. Q2 growth has averaged more than 2%. Q1 growth has been below Q2 in 8 of the last 10 years. 2017 is shaping up to be a repeat performance. Defense spending - identified by the Cleveland Fed as a key culprit in the unwanted seasonal weakness in Q1 GDP - fell 4% in Q1, subtracting 0.2% from growth. Inventories were also singled out by the Cleveland Fed, and they shaved 0.9% off of GDP in Q1. We expect to see a snapback in all three components of growth (GDP, defense spending and inventories) in Q2. Business capital spending, and housing were bright spots in Q1 (Chart 3). Corporate earnings are the ultimate piece of hard data. Equity prices track earnings growth over the long term. With 288 members of the S&P 500 reporting, 77% have beaten expectations on the bottom line. Healthcare, financials and technology lead the way. Weakness was evident in defensives. More impressive is the 7.1% gain in revenues in Q1 so far (Table 1). But overall, corporations appear to have pricing power. The ECI accelerated in Q1 to +2.4% year-over-year from +2.2%, but remain relatively subdued. This implies that margins will hold up, which will continue to support our view that stocks will beat bonds this year. With no Fed Chair Yellen press conference, a new set of dot plots or a new economic forecast, markets will have to be content with just the FOMC statement this week. A speech by Fed Vice Chair Fischer will be closely watched for signals about the June FOMC meeting. The market has been too quick to price out rate hikes in 2017. Expectations for rate hikes in 2018 have all but disappeared (Chart 4). We expect this gap will close - in favor of the Fed for both 2017 and 2018. We expect Treasury yields and inflation to head higher this year, despite recent soft readings on March CPI. The March PCE deflator - also due this week-is key. Chart 3Markets Shouldn't Be Surprised By Weak##br## Q1 GDP, Or What Caused It Table 1S&P 500: ##br##Q1 2017 Results* Chart 4Still Plenty Of Disagreement Between Fed ##br##And Market; Both Expect Gradual Hikes Though Bottom Line: We continue to expect the hard data to catch up to the soft data in the coming months. Financial markets have overreacted to the weak data and have been too quick to price out Fed rate hikes this year and next. The Fed is taking a gradual approach to rate hikes for a reason; the data-hard or soft-doesn't warrant an aggressive Fed. But a gradual Fed and solid profit growth strongly favor an allocation towards stocks over bonds this year. Housing: Set To Keep A "Slow-Burn" Expansion Burning Housing is one sector of the economy that stands to look relatively good over the coming few years, with some important implications for housing-related asset performance. The monthly Bank Credit Analyst recently published some research in which we split U.S. post-1950 economic cycles into three sets based on the length of the expansion phase: short (about 2 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (8-10 years). What distinguishes short from medium and long expansions is the speed at which the most cyclical parts of the economy accelerated, and the time it took unemployment to reach a full employment level. Long expansions were characterized by a drawn-out rise in the cyclical parts of the economy and a very slow return to full employment in the labor market, similar to what has occurred since the Great Recession. Chart 5 compares the current cycle (dotted lines) with the average of the 1980s and 1990s long expansions (solid lines). The cycles are all lined up with the beginning of the expansion, indicated by the first vertical line. These long "slow burn" recoveries also extended well beyond the point at which the economy first reached full employment (called late-cycle phases, shaded in Chart 5). Inflation pressures were slower to emerge in these types of recoveries, allowing the Fed to proceed cautiously when normalizing interest rates. Interestingly, earnings-per-share for S&P 500 companies expanded by an average of 18% in inflation-adjusted terms during the two late-cycle phases, despite the twin headwinds of narrowing profit margins and a strengthening dollar (the dollar appreciated by an average of 23% in trade-weighted terms). The stock market provided an impressive average real return of 25%. We are not making the case that returns will be anywhere near this level in the coming years. The starting point for valuation, for example, is much more extended than it was in previous long cycles. There are also plenty of possible sources of shocks that could end the expansion abruptly. Nonetheless, it is not going to die simply of old age. In the absence of any major shocks, this expansion may continue for a while yet. One reason is that there are no major areas of overspending that would make the economy highly vulnerable. This includes the housing sector, where investment has lagged previous slow-burn recoveries by a wide margin. A lagging housing market is not surprising given the bloated inventory of vacant homes that had to be absorbed in this cycle. The good news is that overhang appears to now be gone. The stock of unsold new and existing homes has returned to low levels by historical standards (inventories of new homes are in fact now rising, after plunging between 2006 and 2012; Chart 6). Chart 5The Current Cycle Is ##br##A "Slow Burn" Expansion Chart 6The Overhang From Housing##br## Inventories Is Gone Other positive factors include the following: Lending standards haven't eased much, but FICO scores have increased sharply, meaning that more renters now qualify for loans and thus might move from rental unit to a single family home (which generates more GDP per unit). This factor was highlighted in a recent Special Report on housing.1 Affordability is favorable, and the cost of owning is cheap relative to the cost of renting. The home-ownership rate has returned to its long-term average (Chart 6, bottom panel). If the pre-Lehman bubble in the homeownership rate has been unwound, it removes a headwind for construction activity because renting favors multi-family construction that produces less GDP per unit than single family homes. The supply of foreclosed homes onto the market has withered along with the foreclosure rate. This might not affect construction activity because it represents families simply swapping homes for other ones, but it supports home prices. Importantly, household formation is still recovering from a period in which young adults stayed with their parents for longer than normal for economic reasons. The tightening in the labor market and cyclical rebound in real disposable income growth is allowing millennials to finally move out, boosting the demand for new housing stock (Chart 7). Chart 8 presents a simple way of estimating the remaining pent-up demand for housing, based on the deviation from its 1990-2007 trend in the ratio of the number of households to the total population. A closing of the remaining gap implies an extra 540,000 housing units. Chart 7Income Growth Is Helping Young Americans To Leave The Nest Chart 8A Catch-Up Housing Construction Will Occur If This Gap Closes The equilibrium number of housing starts that cover underlying population growth plus the units lost to scrappage is estimated to be about 1.4 million annually. If the household formation 'catch up' occurs over the next two years, adding another 250,000 units per year, total demand could be 1.6 to 1.7 million in each of the next two years. This compares to the just-released March housing starts level of 1.2 million. If starts rise smoothly from today's level to 1.7 million at the end of 2018, then the housing sector will contribute about 0.2 percentage points and 0.5 percentage point to real GDP growth in 2017 and 2018, respectively (Chart 9). Chart 9A Housing Catch-Up Will Boost GDP Growth For the economy, the implication is that this already-aged expansion phase could persist for a couple of more years as long as it is not hit by a negative shock and inflationary pressures remain quiescent, allowing the Fed to proceed slowly. Bottom Line: Housing starts remain well below the equilibrium level implied by underlying household formation, and a "catch up" phase could help keep the current "slow burn" expansion burning over the coming years. Favor Housing-Related Assets The above analysis also has some favorable implications for housing-related financial assets. We originally examined the implications of a rebound in home construction in 2012, during the early phase of the recovery in housing starts.2 Our approach was to test the historical excess return performance of several financial assets as a function of key housing market variables, and concluded that housing-related financial assets were set to outperform their respective benchmarks in a bullish housing scenario over the following year (and beyond). We have updated our original analysis in this report, with a few modifications. First, we examine the relationship between key housing market variables and excess returns of housing-related assets since the onset of the U.S. economic expansion in June 2009, given the structural change in the housing market that occurred following the Great Recession. Second, our analysis is based on a more focused set of housing market indicators, given the relatively poor predictive power of new home sales and the months' supply of homes following the crisis period on housing-related asset returns. Table 2 presents the list of housing-related assets that we examined,3 along with the key housing market variables used to forecast excess returns (and whether they were significant predictors in the post-crisis era). The table highlights that most of the variables do contain useful information, with the exception of the two noted above. The rightmost column presents the share of excess returns explained by a composite model of the factors noted as significant for each asset, which varies from a low of 13% to a high of 20%. Table 2Important Predictors Of Housing-Related Asset Excess Returns* (June 2009-December 2016) Charts 10 and 11 present a set of relatively conservative assumptions for the key housing market variables shown in Table 2, based on a rise in housing starts modestly above the scrappage rate that we noted in the previous section. We assume that house price appreciation and housing affordability moderate due to further rate hikes from the Fed, that the already-elevated homebuilders' confidence index stays flat, that refi applications remain low due to the uptrend in mortgage rates, and that purchase applications rise in lockstep with housing starts. Chart 10A Set Of Conservative Assumptions... Chart 11...For Key Housing Market Variables Finally, Table 3 illustrates the predicted excess returns over the coming 12-months of the housing-related assets that we examined, along with the annualized excess returns in 2016 and over the entire sample period for the purposes of comparison. It is important to note that excess returns of corporate bonds are presented relative to duration-matched government bonds, not a speculative- or investment-grade corporate bond aggregate. Table 3Excess Returns Of Housing-Related Assets* (%) The analysis presented above highlights several important conclusions for investors: The predictive power of key housing market variables has been smaller over the course of this economic expansion than in the past economic cycle (including the recession of 2008-2009), suggesting that housing market developments were more important during the downturn than they have been during the recovery. Still, housing market data is an important driver of excess returns for housing-related assets. All of the housing-related assets that we examined are expected to outperform their respective benchmarks over the coming year, even given the relatively conservative assumptions that we have made about the pace of gains in the housing market. For the three corporate bond assets shown in Tables 2 and 3, our model predicts outperformance even relative to their respective corporate bond benchmarks, albeit only marginally in the case of investment-grade banks. With the exception of S&P 500 homebuilders and banks, the model's predicted excess returns are lower over the coming year than they have been on an annualized basis since the onset of the recovery, highlighting that housing-related assets have front-run at least some of the expected normalization in the housing market over the coming few years. However, a full rise to our equilibrium estimate of 1.7 million starts over the coming two years could potentially lead to even larger outperformance than the model would predict. Charts 12 and 13 do not suggest that valuation will be an impediment to the outperformance of housing-related assets. Chart 12Valuation Won't Be An Impediment... Chart 13...For Housing Related Assets Bottom Line: Investors should look to housing-related assets as a source of potential outperformance over the coming 6-12 months. The historical relationship between key housing market variables and the excess returns of these assets implies the latter is set to outperform even given conservative assumptions about the former. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge Vice President, Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "U.S. Housing: What Comes Next?", dated March 27, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report U-3 Or U-6?", dated February 13, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 Note that we have excluded fixed and floating rate home equity loan ABS from our list of housing-related assets owing to a lack of data, as well as investment-grade REITs because of a very low degree of return predictability from key indicators of the housing market

Dear Client, In addition to this abbreviated Weekly Report, I sent you a Special Report earlier today written by my colleague Mark McClellan of our monthly Bank Credit Analyst publication. Following up on many of the themes discussed in our latest Quarterly Strategy Outlook, Mark makes a convincing case that most of the factors that have suppressed global interest rates since the financial crisis could begin to unwind or even reverse over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Davos Man Is Happy Chart 1Macron Leading Le Pen Populist forces have been in retreat of late. First came the Austrian presidential elections, which saw voters reject a populist right-wing challenger in favor of a former Green Party leader who pledged to be an "open-minded, liberal-minded, and above all a pro-European president." Then came the Dutch elections, where Prime Minister Mark Rutte won more seats than the maverick Geert Wilders. Last week the pound surged after U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May called for a fresh election. May's announcement was designed to expand the Conservative Party's majority, thus neutralizing the ability of a few hardline Tories to scuttle a Brexit deal. These uncompromising MPs would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. This week we have the results of the first round of the French presidential elections. Despite the media's absurd characterization of Emmanuel Macron as an "outsider," the former government minister was, in fact, the establishment's dream candidate: pro-business and fervently Europhile. Current polls show Macron beating Le Pen in a runoff by 21 points (Chart 1). Finally, on the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump has caved on most of his populist campaign pledges. He agreed to drop his requests that Congress pay for a border wall with Mexico and defund Planned Parenthood. The move is likely to avert an imminent government shutdown. In addition, Trump backed off his pledge to scrap NAFTA. This follows on the heels of his decision not to label China as a "currency manipulator," something he had promised to do during the campaign. And to top it all off, Trump released a one-page tax plan with all the goodies the Republican establishment has been craving: Lower corporate and personal tax rates and the abolition of the estate tax. Risk Assets Will Benefit... Not surprisingly, global equities have responded positively to these developments. The MSCI All-Country World Index hit a record high this week (Chart 2). A rebound in corporate earnings is helping to propel stocks higher. Our global earnings model points to further upside for profits over the coming months (Chart 3). Chart 2Global Equities At Record Highs Chart 3More Upside Ahead For Global Earnings The laggard remains the Treasury market. Trump's tax plan will add about $5 trillion to the national debt over the next decade above and beyond what the Congressional Budget Office is already projecting. Yet, the 10-year Treasury yield remains 30 basis points below where it was in early March. The market is pricing in just under two rate hikes over the next 12 months. This is below the Fed's guidance and our own expectations. We went short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract last week (Chart 4). Higher U.S. rate expectations should lead to a further widening of rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 5). Mario Draghi underscored yesterday that the ECB has no plans to remove monetary stimulus anytime soon. If anything, rising inflation expectations in the euro area on the back of a firming economy could lead to lower real yields there, putting downward pressure on the euro. Chart 6 shows that the market expects real U.S. five-year yields to be only 11 basis points higher than in the euro area in 2022.1 That seems too low to us, given the euro area's bleak demographics and high debt levels. We continue to see EUR/USD reaching parity later this year. Chart 4The Market Is Lowballing The Fed Chart 5Higher U.S. Rate Expectations Will Lead To Further Widening Of Rate Differentials Chart 6The Vanishing Transatlantic Bond Spread ...But Populists Will Triumph In The End Steady growth and falling unemployment will reduce support for populist parties over the coming 12 months. This will help keep global equities in an uptrend. Beyond then, the clouds are likely to darken. We argued in our Q2 Strategy Outlook that global growth could begin to slow in the second half of next year.2 If that happens, support for mainstream political parties will fade. Structural forces will further bolster support for populist leaders. Chart 7 shows that Le Pen won the plurality of voters between the ages of 35 and 59. Young voters tilted towards Mélenchon, while older voters overwhelmingly went for Emmanuel Macron and François Fillon. If recent voting trends are any guide, the elderly of tomorrow will be more sympathetic to Le Pen than the elderly of today. Le Pen's populist message on the economy could resonate more with younger voters (indeed, Le Pen beat Macron among voters between the ages of 18 and 24). Chart 7Who Likes Le Pen? Meanwhile, worries about terrorism will undermine support for the establishment. There are 17,000 people on the French government's terrorist watch list, 2,000 of whom have fought in Syria and Iraq. Macron's feeble pledge to hire 10,000 additional police officers will do little to thwart future attacks. In the U.S., Trump's pivot towards the establishment wing of the Republican Party could prove to be short-lived. Most Republican voters have mixed feelings about Donald Trump the man. They voted for Trumpism, not Trump. Either Trump will start delivering on the promises that endeared him to blue-collar workers in states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, or he will go down in flames in the next election. Bottom Line: Investors should overweight global equities in a balanced portfolio over the next 12 months, but look to reduce exposure in the second half of next year. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Towards Parity," dated April 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Outlook: "Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Despite Saudi-Iranian tensions, the OPEC 2.0 production-cut deal will survive; Petro-state balance sheets remain under pressure; OPEC 2.0 agreement will backwardate the forward curve, and slow the pace of shale recovery; Aramco IPO will motivate Saudi Arabia to over-deliver on the cuts; In expectation of backwardation, investors should go long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, while also going long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. Feature Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 The Interests At Stake By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.2 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.3 Chart 3Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.4 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.5 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.6 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.7 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.8 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting\ Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.9 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex ##br##Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation ##br##Under Way Chart 8Unlimited Resources ##br##Undermine Democracy What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, the main national security risk for energy-producing regimes is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.10 Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."11 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Chart 12... Or The 'Shia Bloc' To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:12 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.13 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.14 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 3 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 4 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 9 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 11 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, available at reuters.com. 14 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 Energy: Overweight. We are long the Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short the Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts at a net premium of -$0.47/bbl. This new recommendation was down 46.8%, which we initiated last week following our assessment of OPEC 2.0's strategy to reduce global oil inventories. We remain long the Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 94.7%. Our long GSCI position is down 4.5%; we have a 10% stop on this position. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper registered a 51k metric ton physical surplus in January, according to estimates from the International Copper Study Group. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold retreated going into French elections over the weekend, indicating investors were not as fearful as some pundits. Our long volatility position is down 43.8%. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Reuters reported the Brazilian government will provide up to 500 million reals (~$159mm) to market this year's corn crop. An expected record harvest and weak export volumes prompted the action.2 Feature By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.3 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Chart 3Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.4 Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.5 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.6 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.7 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.8 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.9 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.10 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation Under Way What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, energy-producing states face a primary security risk that is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.11 Chart 8Unlimited Resources Undermine Democracy Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."12 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Chart 12... Or The "Shia Bloc" To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:13 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13"Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.14 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.15 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 Please see "Brazil readies $159 million in corn subsidies amid record crop," Reuters, April 19, 2017, available at Reuters.com. 3 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 4 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 5 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 10 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 12 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, availableat reuters.com. 15 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Lean against depressed and euphoric interest rate expectations. The ECB will remove or fade the negative deposit rate, with an outside chance that it happens this year. The U.K. economy will determine the nature of Brexit - not the other way round. The snap General Election doesn't change anything. Expect an ongoing narrowing in the U.S. T-bond/German bund yield spread and U.S. T-bond/U.K. gilt yield spread. Expect the following order of currency performance: euro first, pound second, dollar third. Expect the FTSE100 to outperform the Eurostoxx50. Feature The interplay between interest rate expectations - in the U.K., U.S. and euro area - is one of the most important factors in explaining what has happened, what is happening, and what will happen, to financial markets. Chart of the WeekBrexit Depression Has Unwound; ##br##Trump Euphoria Hasn't... Yet Interest rate expectations convincingly explain the movements in the U.S. T-bond/German bund yield spread, the U.S. T-bond/U.K. gilt yield spread, euro/dollar, and pound/dollar. Thereby, they also explain FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 relative performance which is just an (inverse) currency play. Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5 and Chart I-6 should leave readers in absolutely no doubt. Chart I-2Interest Rate Expectations Explain The ##br##T-Bond/German Bund Yield Spread Chart I-3Interest Rate Expectations Explain The##br## T-Bond/U.K. Gilt Yield Spread Chart I-4Interest Rate Expectations ##br##Explain Euro/Dollar Chart I-5Interest Rate Expectations##br## Explain Pound/Dollar Chart I-6Pound/Euro (Inversely) Explains ##br##FTSE100/Eurostoxx50 Lean Against Depressed And Euphoric Interest Rate Expectations Last year's shock victories for Brexit and Trump dramatically swung the market mood towards the U.K. and U.S. economies. After Brexit, the knee-jerk response was depression; after Trump, the knee-jerk response was euphoria. But extreme mood swings to depression and euphoria are rarely justified, and ultimately tend to unwind. Responding to last year's dramatic mood swings, U.K. and U.S. interest rate policy - both actual and expected - moved very sharply in opposite directions. Following the Brexit vote, the BoE cut the base rate by a quarter percent, and the rate expected two years out plunged by three quarters of a percent. In contrast, following the Trump victory, the Federal Reserve twice hiked the Fed funds rate by a quarter percent, and the rate expected two years out surged by more than a percent. Meanwhile, throughout all this activity, the ECB repo rate and deposit rate were anchored at zero and -0.4% respectively, and the interest rate expected two years out remained in negative territory. Fast forward to today, and the U.K. interest rate expected two years out has fully unwound the Brexit vote depression - the expected BoE policy rate two years out stands exactly where it stood before the EU Referendum. In contrast, the expected Fed policy rate two years out retains its Trump euphoria (Chart of the Week). Meanwhile, the expected ECB policy rate two years out remains anchored close to the realistic limit of negativity. To reiterate, the extreme market moods of depression and euphoria are rarely justified, and tend to unwind. On this basis, we can say that policy rate expectations in relative terms now have the scope to: Get less depressed in the euro area. Remain broadly unchanged in the U.K. Get less euphoric in the U.S.1 Hence, on a 12-month horizon, expect a continued narrowing in the U.S. T-bond/German bund yield spread and U.S. T-bond/U.K. gilt yield spread. For currencies, expect the following order of performance: euro first, pound second, dollar third. And therefore, expect the FTSE100 to outperform the Eurostoxx50. Brexit: A Reductionist View Many millions of words have been written about Brexit, and we suspect that many millions more will be written. But true to our reductionist philosophy, we can reduce those millions of words to a single sentence. Brexit was, is, and always will be, about the trade-off between national sovereignty and access to the European single market. Irrespective of the vote to leave the EU and the start of the divorce proceedings, the full spectrum of possibilities in this trade-off is still open to the U.K. At one extreme the U.K. could get a full divorce, and thereby regain absolute national sovereignty in all areas including law and immigration. But in this full divorce, the EU27 would regard the U.K. as a complete outsider whose status is little different to say, Russia. At the other extreme, the U.K. could near enough replicate its current economic and political relationship with the EU27 in a 'pseudo-marriage'. Technically, the U.K. would be divorced, but practically, there would be only minor differences to being married. Although the U.K. would lose its official place at the EU top table, in all likelihood the EU27 would still listen to the British voice given the U.K.'s size and global standing. But in this pseudo-marriage the EU27 would exact a cost: the U.K. could not regain any national sovereignty. All points on the spectrum between a full divorce and a pseudo-marriage are now available to the U.K. The relationship that the U.K. ends up with depends on the trade-off that the British public - and therefore its political representatives in the government and parliament - will accept. In turn, this will depend on the evolution of the economy and standards of living. A strong economy will embolden the British public to want something close to a full divorce. Conversely, a weakening economy might be blamed, rightly or wrongly, on Brexit. In which case, public opinion would shift towards something closer to a pseudo-marriage. Therefore, the causality runs from the economy to Brexit, not from Brexit to the economy. The U.K. economy will determine where the U.K. ends up on the Brexit spectrum - at least, in terms of the initial deal. The snap General Election doesn't change anything. Nor is the General Election a game changer for the pound. The preceding section demonstrated that relative interest rate expectations - rather than Brexit per se - are driving the pound. We expect the BoE to remain relatively inactive because empirically, U.K. real consumption is hyper-sensitive (inversely) to inflation. When inflation is too high, real consumption growth is undermined, making it difficult to hike rates; and when inflation is too low, real consumption tends to grow strongly, making it difficult to cut rates (Chart I-7). This ties the hands of the BoE, and explains why the post EU Referendum emergency rate cut has been the BoE's only interest rate change since early 2009! Chart I-7Why The Bank Of England's Hands Are Tied While rate expectations can get less depressed in the euro area, and less euphoric in the U.S., they are likely to change least in the U.K. Hence, we like the pound less than the euro; but we like the pound more than the dollar. Role Playing On The ECB Governing Council We are writing ahead of the ECB policy meeting, but we do not anticipate any substantive announcements - given that we are only half way through the French Presidential Election. In the absence of major developments, the euro's strong recent advance might take a tactical breather. But what then? Some people argue that ECB policy should be based not on the aggregate euro area economy, but instead on the weaker links in the euro area economy. These arguments have some merit, as the ECB - unlike other central banks - has to contend with a permanent existential threat. On this basis, let's finish this week with a role playing exercise. Imagine you're on the ECB Governing Council, and the weak link that worries you is euro area bank fragility, particularly in some of the southern member states. Your own (ECB) analysis, illustrated in Chart I-8, shows that extreme accommodative monetary policy has had a negligible net impact on bank profitability. The QE component has probably been a mild net positive - admittedly, a flatter yield has dragged down banks' net interest margins; but it has also generated profits in banks' bond portfolios; and in so far as QE has boosted economic growth, it has reduced bank charge-offs. Chart I-8What Is The Point Of The ECB's Negative Deposit Rate? But the negative deposit rate - charging banks for excess liquidity - has been a clear drag on bank profitability. And there is little evidence that it has encouraged lending. What would you do? Even if the ECB is setting policy for the euro area weak links, the central bank's own analysis suggests that it should remove, or at least fade, the negative deposit rate. Our central expectation is for this to happen early next year, with an outside chance that it is even sooner. With expectations for ECB policy rates still anchored close to the realistic limit of negativity, the euro exchange rate has cyclical upside. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Assuming that the U.S. government does not approve inappropriate fiscal stimulus. Fractal Trading Model* This week's trade is to go long the FTSE100 versus the IBEX35 with a profit target and stop loss of 4%. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators for 2018, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. first-quarter economic data. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. It is positive for risk assets that centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. Italian elections could be troublesome, but that is a story for next year. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. North Korea might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. Disappointing U.S. Q1 real GDP growth largely reflects weather and seasonal adjustment factors. The deceleration in bank credit growth is also temporary. The window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals remain constructive. Importantly, signs of improving pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector are finally emerging, which should allow margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. The bond rally has depressed yields to a level that makes fixed-income instruments highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Market expectations for the fed funds rate are far too benign. The ECB will announce the next tapering step later this year, and may remove the negative deposit rate. But the central bank will not be in a position to lift the refi rate for some time. Yield spreads will shift in a way that allows one last upleg in the U.S. dollar. The recent pullback in oil prices will not last, as OPEC and Russia manage global stockpiles lower this year. Feature Chart I-1Reflation Trades Returning? Traders and investors gave up on the global reflation story in early April, sending the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield below the year's trading range. Missile strikes, European elections and U.S. saber rattling regarding North Korea lifted the allure of safe havens such as government bonds (Chart I-1). At the same time, the Fed was unwilling to revise up the 'dot plot', doubts grew over the ability of the Trump Administration to deliver any stimulus and U.S. data releases disappointed. The major equity indexes held up well against the onslaught of bad news, but looked increasingly vulnerable as April wore on. The market gloom was overdone in our view, and it appears that financial markets have now returned to a 'risk on' phase. It is difficult to forecast the ebb and flow of geopolitical news so we cannot rule out another bout of risk aversion. Nonetheless, the global economic backdrop remains upbeat and tensions regarding North Korea have eased. President Trump also unveiled his Administration's tax reform plan, raising hopes of a fiscal boost to the economy. Moreover, investors have read too much into the distorted U.S. first quarter data, and our corporate pricing power indicators support our constructive earnings view in 2017. There are clouds hanging over the outlook for 2018, but the backdrop will favor risk assets for most of this year. Investors should remain overweight equities versus bonds and cash, and bullish the dollar. Geopolitics Weigh On Risk Tolerance President Trump's military show of force in Asia and comments about "losing patience" with North Korea have the world on edge. The U.S. has acted tough with the regime before, but nothing beyond economic sanctions ever materialized. The balance of power vis-à-vis China and the military threat to South Korea made North Korea a stalemate. Nonetheless, our geopolitical team argues that the calculus of the standoff is changing. Most importantly, the rogue regime is getting closer to being capable of hitting the U.S. with long-range missiles. Second, China is unhappy with the increased U.S. military presence in its backyard that North Korea is inviting. China also sees North Korea's missile tests as a threat to its own security. Third, the U.S. is prepared to use the threat of trade sanctions as leverage with Beijing. It is demanding that China use its own economic leverage to convince North Korea to freeze its nuclear and missile programs. We do not believe that an attack on North Korea is imminent. But doing nothing is not an option either. Our base case is that the U.S. military's muscle-flexing is designed to force North Korea to the negotiating table. The fact that China finally appears willing to apply pressure to Pyongyang is good news. Over the next four years, the North might be persuaded to freeze its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the U.S. and a lifting of sanctions. The safe-haven bid in the Treasury market will moderate if Kim Jong-un agrees to negotiations. That said, this is probably North Korea's last chance to show it can be pragmatic. A failure of negotiations would induce a real crisis in which the U.S. contemplates unilateral action. It would be a bad sign if North Korea's long-range missile tests continue, are successful, and show greater distances. Chart I-2Macron Appears Set For Victory Turning to Europe, investors breathed a sigh of relief following the first round of the French Presidential election. The pre-election polls turned out to be correct, and our Geopolitical Team has no reason to doubt the polls regarding the second round (Chart I-2). We expect Macron to sweep to victory on May 7 because Le Pen will struggle to get any voters from the candidates exiting the race. What should investors expect of a Macron presidency? A combination of President Macron and a right-leaning National Assembly should be able to accomplish some reforms. Several prominent center-right figures have already come out in support of Macron, perhaps to throw their name in the ring for the next prime minister. This is positive for the markets as it means that French economic policy will be run by the center-right, with an ultra-Europhile as president. Over in the U.K., the big news in April was Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold a snap election, which reduces the risk of a "hard Brexit". The current slim 12-seat majority that the Conservatives hold in Parliament has made May highly dependent on a small band of hardline Tories who would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. If the Conservatives are able to increase their seats in Parliament - as current opinion polls suggest is likely - May will have greater flexibility in reaching an agreement with Brussels and will face less of a risk that Parliament shoots down the final deal. U.S. Fiscal Policy: Positive For 2017, But Long-Term Negative Chart I-3Long-Term U.S. Budget Pressures The drama will be no less interesting in Washington in the coming weeks. As we go to press, Congress is struggling to pass a bill to keep the U.S. government running through the end of fiscal year 2017 (the deadline is the end of April). We expect a deal will get done, but a partial government shutdown lasting a few weeks could occur. Separately, Congress will need to approve an increase in the debt ceiling by July-September in order for the Treasury to avoid defaulting on payments. Both events could see temporary safe-haven flows into Treasurys. However, markets may have gone too far in pricing-out tax cuts or fiscal stimulus. For example, high tax-rate companies have given back all of their post-election equity gains. Even if Republicans are unable to overhaul the tax code, this will not prevent them from simply cutting corporate and personal taxes. "Dynamic scoring" will be used to support the argument that the tax cuts will self-funding through faster growth. We also expect that Trump will get his way on at least a modest amount of infrastructure spending. The so-called Trump trades may wither again in 2018, but we see a window this year in which the stock-to-bond total return ratio lifts as growth expectations rebound. Looking further ahead, it seems likely that the U.S. budget deficit is headed significantly higher. Health care and pension cost pressures related to population aging are well known (Chart I-3). A recent Special Report by BCA's Martin Barnes highlighted that "it is not reasonable to believe that there can be tax cuts and increases in defense spending and domestic security, while protecting entitlement programs and preventing a massive rise in the budget deficit."1 There is simply not enough non-defense discretionary spending to cut. Larger U.S. Federal budget deficits could lead to a widening fiscal risk premium in Treasury yields, although that may take years to show up. Perhaps more importantly, the U.S. government sector will be a larger drain on the global pool of available savings in the coming years. We highlight in this month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, that there are several key macro inflection points under way that will temper the "global savings glut" and begin to place upward pressure on global bond yields. A Temporary Soft Patch Or Something Worse? The first quarter GDP report for the U.S. is due out as we go to press, and growth is widely expected to be quite weak. The retail sales and PCE consumer spending data have fed concerns that the U.S. economy is running out of gas, despite the surge in the survey data such as the ISM. We believe that growth fears are overdone. Financial markets should be accustomed to weak readings on first quarter GDP. Over the past 22 years, the first quarter has been the weakest of the four on 12 occasions, or 55% of the time. Second quarter GDP growth has been faster than Q1 growth 70% of the time. A large part of the depressed Q1 GDP growth rate and lackluster "hard data" readings likely reflect poor seasonal adjustment and weather distortions. The "soft" survey data are more consistent with the labor market. Aggregate hours worked managed to increase by 1.5% at an annualized rate in Q1. If GDP growth really was barely above zero, this would imply an outright decline in the level of labor productivity. Even in a world where structural productivity growth is lower than it was in the past, this strikes us as rather implausible. The March reading of the Conference Board's Leading Economic Indicator provided no warning that underlying growth is about to trail off, although a couple of the regional Fed surveys have pulled back from their recent highs. With April shaping up to be warmer than usual across the U.S., we expect a bounce back in the weather-impacted "hard" data in May and June. What about the slowdown in commercial and industrial loan growth and corporate bond issuance late in 2016 and into early 2017? This is a worry, but it partly reflects the lagged effects of the contraction in capital spending in the energy patch. C&I loan growth is still responding to the surge in defaults that resulted from the energy sector's 2014 collapse. Now that the defaults have waned, this process will soon go into reverse. Higher profits more recently have permitted these firms to pay back old bank loans, while also enabling them to finance new capital expenditures using internally-generated funds. In addition, the rising appetite for corporate debt has allowed more companies to access the bond market. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged-loan market saw $434 bn in issuance in Q1, the highest level on record (Chart I-4). The rest we chalk up to uncertainty surrounding the U.S. election. The recent spikes in the political uncertainty index correspond with the U.K.'s vote to leave the European Union as well as the U.S. election in November. There has been a close correlation between these spikes and the deceleration in C&I loan growth. CEOs are also holding back on capex in anticipation of new tax breaks from Congress. The good news is that bond issuance has rebounded strongly in January and February of this year (Chart I-5). The soft March U.S. CPI release also appeared to be quirky, showing a rare decline in the core price level in March (Chart I-6). However, the March reading followed two months of extremely strong gains and it still appears as though measures of core inflation put in a cyclical bottom in early 2015. While our CPI diffusion index is still below zero, signaling that inflation is likely to remain soft during the next couple of months, it would be premature to suggest that the gradual uptrend in core inflation has reversed. Chart I-4U.S. Bank Credit Slowdown Is Temporary Chart I-5U.S. Corporate Bond Issuance Is Rebounding Chart I-6U.S. Inflation: Sogginess Won't Last Global Economic Data Still Upbeat For the major industrialized economies as a group, the so-called "hard" data are moving in line with the "soft" survey data for the most part. For example, retail sales growth continues to accelerate, reaching 4½% in February on a year-over-year basis (Chart I-7). This follows the sharp improvement in consumer confidence. Manufacturing production growth is also accelerating to the upside, in line with the PMIs. The global manufacturing sector is rebounding smartly after last year's recession that was driven by the collapse in oil prices and a global inventory correction. Readers may be excused for jumping to the conclusion that the rebound is largely in the energy space, but this is not true. Production growth in the energy sector is close to zero on a year-over-year basis, and is negative on a 3-month rate of change basis (Chart I-8). The growth pickup has been in the other major sectors, including consumer-related goods, capital goods and technology. In the U.S., non-energy production has boomed over the six months to March (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Global Pick-Up On Track Chart I-8Manufacturing Rebound Is Not About Energy Chart I-9U.S.: Non-Energy Production Surging The weak spot on the global data front has been capital goods orders (Chart I-7). We only have data for the big three economies - the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone - but growth is near zero or slightly negative for all three. These data are perplexing because they are at odds with an acceleration in the production of capital goods (noted above) and a pickup in capital goods imports for 20 economies (Chart I-7, third panel). Improving CEO sentiment, accelerating profit growth and activity surveys all suggest that capital goods orders will catch up in the coming months. That said, one risk to our positive capex outlook in the U.S. is that the Republicans fail to deliver on their promises. This is not our base case, but current capex plans could be cancelled or put on indefinite hold were there to be no corporate tax cuts or immediate expensing of capital spending. As for China, the economic data are holding up well and deflationary pressures have eased. Fears of a debt crisis have also ebbed somewhat. That said, fiscal and monetary stimulus is fading and it is a worrying sign that money and credit growth have decelerated because they tend to lead production. Our China experts believe that growth will be solid in the first half of the year, but they would not be surprised to see a deceleration in real GDP growth in the second half that would weigh on commodity prices. Bond Market Vulnerable To Fed Re-Rating A rebound in the U.S. activity data in the coming months should keep the Fed on track to raise rates at least two more times in 2017. A May rate hike is unlikely, but we would not rule out June. The bond market is vulnerable to a re-rating of the path for the fed funds rate because only 45 basis points of tightening is priced for the next 12 months. This is far too low if growth rebounds as we expect. The FOMC also announced that it intends to start shrinking its balance sheet later this year by ceasing to reinvest both its MBS and Treasury holdings. Our bond strategists do not think this by itself will have much of an impact on Treasurys because yields will continue to be closely tied to realized inflation and the expected number of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart I-10). Fed policymakers are trying to de-emphasize the size of the balance sheet and would rather investors focus on the fed funds rate to assess the stance of monetary policy. It is a different story for mortgage-backed securities, however, where spreads will be pressured wider by the lack of Fed purchases. All four of our main forward-looking global economic indicators appear to have topped out, except the Global Leading Economic Indicator (GLEI), suggesting that the period of maximum growth acceleration has past (Chart I-11). Nonetheless, all four are still consistent with robust growth. They would have to weaken significantly before they warned of a sustained bond bull market. Chart I-10Shrinking Fed Balance Sheet: ##br##Bearish For Bonds? Chart I-11Leading Indicators: ##br##Some Worrying Signs The rapid decline in the diffusion index, based on the 22 countries that comprise our GLEI, is the most concerning at the moment. The LEIs for two major economies and two emerging economies dipped slightly in February, such that roughly half of the country LEIs rose and half fell in the month. While it is too early to hit the panic button, the diffusion index is worth watching closely; a decline below 50 for several months would indicate that a peak in the GLEI is approaching. The bottom line is that global bond yields have overshot on the downside: underlying U.S. growth is not as weak as the Q1 figures suggest; market expectations for the fed funds rate are too benign; the Republicans will push ahead with tax cuts and infrastructure spending; the global economy has healthy momentum, and the majority of the items on our Duration Checklist suggest that the bond bear market will resume; the ECB will announce another tapering of its asset purchase program this autumn, placing upward pressure on the term premium in bond yields across the major markets; and the Treasury and bund markets no longer appear as oversold as they did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. Large short positions have largely unwound. For the U.S., we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.3%-2.6% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.8%-3% area by year-end. We recommend keeping duration short of benchmarks within fixed-income portfolios. One Last Leg In The Dollar Bull Market Chart I-12ECB In No Hurry To Lift Rates While we see upside for the money market curve in the U.S., the same cannot be said in the Eurozone. The economic data have undoubtedly been robust. The composite PMI is booming and capital goods orders are in a clear uptrend. Led by gains in both manufacturing and services, the composite PMI rose from 56.4 in March to 56.7 in April, a six-year high. The current PMI reading is easily consistent with over 2.0% real GDP growth (Chart I-12). This compares favorably to the sub-1% estimates of trend growth in the euro area. Private sector credit growth reached 2½% earlier this year, the fastest pace since July 2009. Despite this good news, the ECB is in no rush to lift interest rates. The central bank will taper its asset purchase program further in 2018, but ECB President Draghi has made it clear that he will not raise the refi rate until well after all asset purchases have been completed, which probably will not be until late 2019 at the earliest (although the ECB could eliminate the negative deposit rate to ease the pressure on banks). Unemployment is still a problem in Spain and Italy, while core CPI inflation fell back to just 0.7% in March. The euro could strengthen further in the near term if Macron wins the second round of the French elections, easing euro break-up fears. Nonetheless, we expect the euro to trend lower on a medium-term horizon versus the dollar as rate expectations move further in favor of the greenback. Some real rate divergence is already priced into money and currency markets, but there is room for forward real spreads to widen further, possibly pushing the euro to parity versus the dollar before this cycle is over. We are also bullish the dollar versus the yen for similar reasons. On a broad trade-weighted basis, we still expect the dollar to rally by another 10%. Positive Signs For U.S. Corporate Pricing Power Chart I-13U.S. Corporations Gaining Pricing Power Turning to the equity market, it is still early days for Q1 U.S. earnings, but the results so far are positive for a pro-risk asset allocation. After a disappointing Q4, positive Q1 earnings surprises for the S&P 500 are on track to match their highest level in two years, with revenue surprises also materially higher than previous quarters. At the industry level, banks and capital goods companies stand out: the former registered an earnings beat of nearly 8%, and it was nearly 12% for the latter. We highlighted the positive 2017 outlook for U.S. corporate profits in our March 2017 Monthly Report. Earnings growth is in a catch-up phase following last year's profit recession, which was related to energy prices and a temporary slowdown in nominal GDP growth relative to aggregate labor costs. Proprietary indicators from our sister publication, the U.S. Equity Sectors Strategy service, confirm our thesis. First, deflation pressures appear to be abating. A modest revival in corporate pricing power is underway according to our Pricing Power Proxy (Chart I-13). It is constructed from proxies for selling prices in almost 50 industries. Importantly, the rise in the Proxy is broadly-based across industries (as shown by the diffusion index in the chart). As a side note, the Profit Proxy provides some evidence that recent softness in core CPI inflation will not last. Second, the upward march of wage growth appears to be taking a breather (Chart I-13). Average hourly earnings growth has softened in recent months. Broader measures, such as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker, tell a similar story. We do not expect wage growth to decelerate much given tightness in the labor market. Nonetheless, the combination of firming pricing power and contained wage growth (for now) suggests that margins will continue to expand modestly in the first half of the year. Our model even suggests that U.S. EPS growth has a very good shot at matching perpetually-optimistic bottom-up estimates for 2017 (Chart I-14). Many companies have supported per share profits in this expansion via share buybacks, often funded through debt issuance. This has generated some angst that companies are sacrificing long-term earnings growth potential for short-term EPS growth. This appeared to be the case early in the expansion, but the story is less compelling today. Chart I-15 compares the cumulative dollar value of equity buybacks and dividends in this expansion with the previous three expansion phases. The cumulative dollar values are divided by cumulative nominal GDP to make the data comparable across cycles. By this metric, capital spending has lagged previous expansion, but not by much. While capital spending growth has been weak, the same is true for GDP. Chart I-14U.S. Profit Model Is Very Upbeat Chart I-15U.S. Corporate Finance Cycle Comparison Dividend payments have been stronger than the three previous expansions. Buyback activity was also more aggressive compared with the 1990s and 2000s, although repurchase activity has been roughly in line with the expansion that ended in 2007. Net equity issuance since 2009, which includes the impact of IPOs, share buybacks and M&A activity, has not been out of line with previous expansions (positive values shown in Chart I-15 represent net equity withdrawals). CFOs have not been radically different in this cycle in terms of apportioning funds between capital spending and returning cash to shareholders. Nonetheless, buybacks have boosted EPS growth by almost 2% over the past year according to our proxy (Chart I-16). We expect this tailwind to continue given the positive reading from our Capital Structure Preference Indicator (third panel). Firms have a financial incentive to issue debt and buy back shares when the indicator is above zero. Stronger global growth should continue to power an acceleration in corporate earnings outside the U.S. over the remainder of the year. Chart I-17 shows that the global earnings revision ratio has turned positive for the first time in six years, implying that analysts have been behind the curve in revising up profit projections. Our profit indicators remain constructive for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Chart I-16Incentive To Buy Back ##br##Stock Remains Strong Chart I-17Global Profit ##br##Growth On The Upswing It is disconcerting that the rally in oil prices has faltered in recent days as investors worry that increased U.S. shale production will thwart OPEC's plans to trim bloated inventories. A breakdown in oil prices could spark a major correction in the broader equity market. Indeed, commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. The aim of last year's agreement between OPEC and Russia to remove some 1.8mn b/d of oil production from the market in 2017 H1 was to get visible inventories down to five-year average levels. They are well short of that goal. Without trimming stockpiles to more normal levels, storage capacity remains too close to topping out, which raises the risk of another price collapse. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like Saudi Arabia, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. This is the reason why our commodity strategists expect the OPEC/Russia production cuts to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25. This will significantly raise the odds that OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. Investment Conclusions Financial markets have returned to 'risk on' in late April, after becoming overly gloomy on the growth, political and policy outlooks in recent months. Admittedly, some of the U.S. data have been disappointing given the extremely upbeat survey numbers. There are also some worrying signs in our global forward-looking growth indicators, and Chinese policy is tightening. Nonetheless, investors read too much into the distorted U.S. economic data in the first quarter. They also went too far in pricing out U.S. fiscal action. As for European political risk, centrist candidate Macron is poised to win the French election and we do not see much risk for markets lurking in the German election. There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the economic and profit outlook in 2018. Nonetheless, we believe that the window for reflation trades will remain open for most of this year because the underlying economic and profit fundamentals are constructive. The passage of market-friendly fiscal policies in the U.S. later in 2017 will be icing on the cake. Perhaps more importantly, we are finally seeing signs that pricing power in the U.S. corporate sector is improving, allowing margins to expand somewhat in the coming quarters. Our profit models remain upbeat for the major advanced economies and for China. It has been frustrating for those investors looking for an equity buying opportunity. Despite the surge in defensive assets such as gold and Treasurys, the major equity bourses did not correct by much. Value remains stretched in all of the risk asset classes. Nonetheless, investors should stay positioned for another upleg in the stock-to-bond total return ratio in the coming months. Perhaps the largest risk lies in the bond market. The rally has depressed yields to a level that makes bonds highly vulnerable to a reversal of the factors that sparked the rally. Within an underweight allocation to fixed-income in balanced portfolios, investors should overweight investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds in the U.S. and U.K. We are more cautious on Eurozone corporates as the ECB's support for that sector will moderate. Looking ahead to next year, our bond strategists foresee a shift to underweight credit given the advanced nature of the releveraging cycle in the U.S. corporate sector. Our other recommendations include: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. in currency-hedged terms. Continue to favor defensive over cyclical equity sectors in the U.S. for now, but a shift may be required later this year. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Stay cautious on EM bonds, stocks and currencies. Overweight small cap stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Recent underperformance is a buying opportunity. Value has improved and cyclical conditions favor small caps. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst April 27, 2017 Next Report: May 25, 2017 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "U.S. Fiscal Policy: Facts, Fallacies and Fantasies," dated April 5, 207, available at bca.bcaresearch.com II. Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds The fundamental drivers of the low rate world are considered by many to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields quite depressed by historical standards for years to come. However, some of the factors behind ultra-low interest rates have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. The age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. Global investment needs will wane along with population aging, but the majority of the effect on equilibrium interest rates is in the past. In contrast, the demographic effects that will depress desired savings are still to come. The net impact will be bond-bearish. Moreover, the massive positive labor supply shock, following the integration of China and Eastern Europe into the world's effective labor force, is over. Indeed, this shock is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power, sparking a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby placing upward pressure on global real bond yields. It is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. This could be inflationary if it disrupts global supply chains. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. As for China, the fundamental drivers of its savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Technological advance will remain a headwind for real wage gains, but at least the transition to a world that is less labor-abundant will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We are not making the case that real global bond yields are going to quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations for bond yields are too low. Investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. In the September 2016 The Bank Credit Analyst, we summarized the key drivers behind the major global macroeconomic disequilibria that have resulted in deflationary pressure, policy extremism, dismal productivity, and the lowest bond yields in recorded history (Chart II-1). The disequilibria include income inequality, the depressed wage share of GDP, lackluster capital spending, and excessive savings. Chart II-1Global Disequilibria The fundamental drivers of the low bond yield world are now well documented and understood by investors. These drivers generally are considered to be structural, and thus likely to keep global equilibrium bond yields and interest rates at historically low levels for years to come according to the consensus. Based on discussions with BCA clients, it appears that many have either "bought into" the secular stagnation thesis or, at a minimum, have adopted the view that growth headwinds preclude any meaningful rise in bond yields. However, bond investors might have been lulled into a false sense of security. Yields will not return to pre-Lehman norms anytime soon, but some of the factors behind the low-yield world have waned, while others have reached an inflection point. Most importantly, the age structure of world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging will begin to drain that pool. We have reached the tipping point. Equilibrium real bond yields will gradually move higher as a result. But before we discuss what is changing, it is important to review the drivers of today's macro disequilibria. Several of them predate the Great Financial Crisis, including demographic trends, technological advances, and the integration of China's massive workforce and excess savings into the global economy. Ultra-Low Rates: How Did We Get Here? (A) Demographics And Global Savings Chart II-2Global Shifts In The Saving ##br##And Investment Curves The so-called Global Savings Glut has been a bullish structural force for bonds for the past couple of decades. We won't go through all of the forces behind the glut, but a key factor is population aging in the advanced economies. Ex-ante desired savings rose as baby boomers entered their high-income years. The Great Financial Crisis only served to reinforce the desire to save, given the setback in the value of boomers' retirement nest eggs.1 The corporate sector also began to save more following the crisis. Even more importantly, the surge in China's trade surplus since the 1990s had to be recycled into the global pool of savings. While China's rate of investment was very high, its propensity to save increased even faster, resulting in a swollen external surplus and a massive net outflow of capital. Other emerging economies also made the adjustment from net importers of capital to net exporters following the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. By leaning into currency appreciation, these countries built up huge foreign exchange reserves that had to be recycled abroad. In theory, savings must equal investment at the global level and real interest rates shift to ensure this equilibrium (Chart II-2). China's excess savings, together with a greater desire to save in the developed countries, represented a shift in the saving schedule to the right. The result was downward pressure on global interest rates. (B) Demographics And Global Capital Spending Demographics and China's integration also affected the investment side of the equation. A slower pace of labor force growth in the developed countries resulted in a permanently lower level of capital spending relative to GDP. Slower consumer spending growth, as a result of a more moderate expansion in the working-age population, meant a reduced appetite for new factories, malls, and apartment buildings. Chart II-3 shows that the growth rate of global capital spending that is required to maintain a given capital-to-output ratio has dropped substantially, due to the dramatic slowdown in the growth of the world's working-age population.2 Keep in mind that this estimate refers only to the demographic component of investment spending. Actual capital expenditure growth will not be as weak as Chart II-3 suggests because firms will want to adopt new technologies for competitive or environmental reasons. Nonetheless, the point is that the structural tailwind for global capex from the post-war baby boom has disappeared. Chart II-3Demographics Are A Structural Headwind For Global Capex (C) Labor Supply Shock And Global Capital Spending While the working-age population ratio peaked in the developed countries years ago, it is a different story at the global level (Chart II-4). The integration of the Chinese and Eastern European workforces into the global labor pool during the 1990s and 2000s resulted in an effective doubling of global labor supply in a short period of time. Relative prices must adjust in the face of such a large boost in the supply of labor relative to capital. The sudden abundance of cheap labor depressed real wages from what they otherwise would have been, thus incentivizing firms to use more labor and less capital at the margin. The combination of slower working-age population growth in the advanced economies and a surge in the global labor force resulted in a decline in desired global capital spending. In terms of Chart II-2, the leftward shift of the investment schedule reinforced the impact of the savings impulse in placing downward pressure on global interest rates. (D) Labor Supply Shock And Income Inequality The wave of cheap labor also aggravated the trend toward greater inequality in the advanced economies and the downward trend in labor's share of the income pie (Chart II-5). In theory, a surge in the supply of labor is a positive "supply shock" that benefits both developed and developing countries. However, a recent report by David Autor and Gordon Hanson3 highlighted that trade agreements in the past were incremental and largely involved countries with similar income levels. The sudden entry of China to the global trade arena, involving a massive addition to the effective global stock of labor, was altogether different. The report does not argue that trade has become a "bad" thing. Rather, it points out that the adjustment costs imposed on the advanced economies were huge and long-lasting, as Chinese firms destroyed entire industries in developed countries. The lingering adjustment phase contributed to greater inequality in the major countries. Management was able to use the threat of outsourcing to gain the upper hand in wage negotiations. The result has been a rise in the share of income going to high-income earners in the Advanced Economies, at the expense of low- and middle-income earners (Chart II-6). The same is true, although to a lesser extent, in the emerging world. Chart II-4Working-Age Population Ratios Have Peaked Chart II-5Labor Share Of Income Has Dropped Chart II-6Hollowing Out Greater inequality, in turn, has weighed on aggregate demand and equilibrium interest rates because a larger share of total income flowed to the "rich" who tend to save more than the low- and middle-income classes. (E) The Dark Side Of Technology Advances in technology also contributed to rising inequality. In theory, new technologies hurt some workers in the short term, but benefit most workers in the long run because they raise national income. However, there is evidence that past major technological shocks were associated with a "hollowing out" or U-shaped pattern of employment. Low- and high-skilled employment increased, but the proportion of mid-skilled workers tended to shrink. Wages for both low- and mid-skilled labor did not keep up with those that were highly-skilled, leading to wider income disparity. Today, technology appears to be resulting in faster, wider and deeper degrees of hollowing-out than in previous periods of massive technological change. This may be because machines are not just replacing manual human tasks, but cognitive ones too. A recent IMF report made the case that technology and global integration played a dominant role in labor's declining fortunes. Technology alone explains about half of the drop in the labor share of income in the developed countries since 1980.4 Falling prices for capital goods, information and communications technology in particular, have facilitated the expansion of global value chains as firms unbundled production into many tasks that were distributed around the world in a way that minimized production costs. Chart II-7 highlights that the falling price of capital goods in the advanced economies went hand-in-hand with rising participation in global supply chains since 1990. Falling capital goods prices also accelerated the automation of routine tasks, contributing especially to job destruction in the developed (high-wage) economies. In other words, firms in the developed world either replaced workers with machinery in areas where technology permitted, or outsourced jobs to lower-wage countries in areas that remained labor-intensive. Both trends undermined labor's bargaining power, depressed labor's share of income, and contributed to inequality. The effects of technology, global integration, population aging and China's economic integration are demonstrated in Chart II-8. The world working-age-to-total population ratio rose sharply beginning in the late 1990s. This resulted in an upward trend in China's investment/GDP ratio, and a downward trend in the G7. The upward trend in the G7 capital stock-per-capita ratio began to slow as a result, before experiencing an unprecedented contraction after the Great Recession and Financial Crisis. Chart II-7Economic Integration And ##br##Falling Capital Goods Prices Chart II-8Macro Impact Of ##br##Labor Supply Shock The result has been a deflationary global backdrop characterized by demand deficiency and poor potential real GDP growth, both of which have depressed equilibrium global interest rates over the past 20 to 25 years. Transition Phase Chart II-9Working-Age Population ##br##To Shrink In G7 And China It would appear easy to conclude that these trends will be with us for another few decades because the demographic trends will not change anytime soon. Nonetheless, on closer inspection the global economy is transitioning from a period when cyclical economic pressures and all of the structural trends were pushing equilibrium interest rates in the same direction, to a period in which the economic cycle is becoming less bond-friendly and some of the secular drivers of low interest rates are gradually changing direction. First, the massive labor supply shock of the past few decades is over. The world working-age population ratio has peaked according to United Nations estimates. This ratio is already declining in the major advanced economies and is in the process of topping out in China. The absolute number of working-age people will shrink in China and the G7 countries over the next five years, although it will continue to grow at a low rate for the world as a whole (Chart II-9). Unions are unlikely to make a major comeback, but a backdrop that is less labor-abundant should gradually restore some worker bargaining power, especially as economies regain full employment. The resulting upward pressure on real wages will support capital spending as firms substitute toward capital and away from (increasingly expensive) labor. Consumer demand will also receive a boost if inequality moderates and the labor share of income begins to rise. Globalization On The Back Foot Chart II-10Globalization Peaking? Second, it is too early to declare globalization dead, but the neo-liberal trading world order that has been in place for decades is under attack. Global exports appear to have peaked relative to GDP and average tariffs have ticked higher (Chart II-10). The World Trade Organization has announced that the number of new trade restrictions or impediments outweighed the number of trade liberalizing initiatives in 2016. The U.K. appears willing to sacrifice trade for limits to the free movement of people. The new U.S. Administration has ditched the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is threatening to impose punitive tariffs on some trading partners. Anti-globalization policies could paradoxically be positive for capital spending, at least for a few years. If the U.S. were to impose high tariffs on China, for example, it would make a part of the Chinese capital stock redundant overnight. In order for the global economy to produce the same amount of goods and services as before, the U.S. and other countries would need to invest more. Any unwinding of globalization would also be inflationary as it would disrupt international supply chains. Demographics And Saving: From Tailwind To Headwind... Third, the impact of savings in the major advanced economies and China on global interest rates will change direction as well. In the developed world, aggregate household savings will come under downward pressure as boomers increasingly shift into retirement. Economists are fond of employing the so-called life-cycle theory of consumer spending. According to this theory, consumers tend to smooth out lifetime spending by accumulating assets during the working years in order to maintain a certain living standard after retirement. The U.N. National Transfer Accounts Project has gathered data on spending and labor income by age cohort at a point in time. Chart II-11 presents the data for China and three of the major advanced economies. Chart II-11Income And Consumption By Age Cohort The data for the advanced economies suggest that spending tends to rise sharply from a low level between birth and about 15 years of age. It continues to rise, albeit at a more modest pace, through the working years. Other studies have found that consumer spending falls during retirement. Nonetheless, these studies generally include only private spending and therefore do not include health care that is provided by the government. The data presented in Chart II-11 show that, if government-provided health care is included, personal spending rises sharply toward the end of life. The profile is somewhat different in China. Spending rises quickly from birth to about 20 years of age, and is roughly flat thereafter. Indeed, consumption edges lower after 75-80 years of age. These data allow us to project the impact of changing demographics on the average household saving rate in the coming years, assuming that the income and spending profiles shown in Chart II-11 are unchanged. We start by calculating the average saving rate across age cohorts given today's age structure. We then recalculate the average saving rate each year moving forward in time. The resulting saving rate changes along with the age structure of the population. The results are shown in Chart II-12. The saving rates for all four economies have been indexed at zero in 2016 for comparison purposes. The aggregate saving rate declines in all cases, falling between 4 and 8 percentage points between 2016 and 2030. Germany sees the largest drop of the four countries. Chart II-12Aging Will Undermine Aggregate Saving The simulations are meant to be suggestive, rather than a precise forecast, because the savings profile across age cohorts will adjust over time. Moreover, governments will no doubt raise taxes to cover the rising cost of health care, providing a partial offset in terms of the national saving rate.5 Nonetheless, the simulations highlight that the major economies are past the point where the baby boom generation is adding to the global savings pool at a faster pace than retirees are drawing from it. The age structure in the major advanced economies is far enough advanced that the rapid increase in the retirement rate will place substantial downward pressure on aggregate household savings in the coming years. It is well known that population aging will also undermine government budgets. Rising health care costs are already captured in our household saving rate projection because the data for household spending includes health care even if it is provided by the public sector. However, public pension schemes will also be a problem. To the extent that politicians are slow to trim pension benefits and/or raise taxes, public pension plans will be a growing drain on national savings. Could younger, less developed economies offset some of the demographic trends in China and the Advanced Economies? Numerically speaking, a more effective use of underutilized populations in Africa and India could go a long way. Nevertheless, deep-seated structural problems would have to be addressed and, even then, it is difficult to see either of these regions turning into the next "China story" given the current backlash against globalization and immigration. ...And The Capex Story Is Largely Behind Us Demographic trends also imply less capital spending relative to GDP, as discussed above. In terms of the impact on global equilibrium interest rates, it then becomes a race between falling saving and investment rates. Chart II-13Demographics And Capex Requirements Some analysts point to the Japanese experience because it is the leading edge in terms of global aging. Bond yields have been extremely low for many years even as the household saving rate collapsed, suggesting that ex-ante investment spending shifted by more than ex-ante savings. Nonetheless, Japan may not be a good example because the deterioration in the country's demographics coincided with burst bubbles in both real estate and stocks that hamstrung Japanese banks for decades. A series of policy mistakes made things worse. Economic theory is not clear on the net effect of demographics on savings and investment. The academic empirical evidence is inconclusive as well. However, a detailed IMF study of 30 OECD countries analyzed the demographic impact on a number of macroeconomic variables, including savings and investment.6 They estimated separate demographic effects for the old-age dependency ratio and the working-age population ratio. Applying the IMF's estimated model coefficients to projected changes in both of these ratios over the next decade suggests that the decline in ex-ante savings will exceed the ex-ante drop in capex requirements by about 1 percentage point of GDP. This is a non-trivial shift. Moreover, our simulations highlight that timing is important. The outlook for the household saving rate depends on the changing age structure of the population and the distribution of saving rates across age cohorts. Thus, the average saving rate will trend down as populations continue to age over the coming decades. In contrast, the impact of demographics on capital spending requirements is related to the change in the growth rate of the working-age population. Chart II-13 once again presents our estimates for the demographic component of capital spending. The top panel presents the world capex/GDP ratio that is necessary to maintain a constant capital/output ratio, and the bottom panel shows the change in that ratio. The important point is that the downward adjustment in world capex/GDP related to aging is now largely behind us because most of the deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population is done. This is in contrast to the household saving rate adjustment where all of the adjustment is still to come. China Is Transitioning Too Chart II-14China's Savings Rates Have Peaked... China must be treated separately from the developed countries because of its unique structural issues. As discussed above, household savings increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s (Chart II-14). This trend reflected a number of factors, including: the rising share of the working-age population; a drop in the fertility rate, following the introduction of the one-child policy in the late 1970s that allowed households to spend less on raising children and save more for retirement; health care reform in the early 1990s required households to bear a larger share of health care spending; and job security was also undermined by reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the late 1990s, leading to increased precautionary savings to cover possible bouts of unemployment. These savings tailwinds have turned around in recent years and the household saving rate appears to have peaked. China's contribution to the global pool of savings has already moderated significantly, as measured by the current account surplus. The surplus has withered from about 9% in 2008 to 2½% in 2016. A recent IMF study makes the case that China's national saving rate will continue to decline. The IMF estimates that for every one percentage-point rise in the old-age dependency ratio, the aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.4-1 percentage points. In addition, the need for precautionary savings is expected to ease along with improvements in the social safety net, achieved through higher government spending on health care. The household saving rate will fall by three percentage points by 2021 according to the IMF (Chart II-15). Competitive pressure and an aging population will also reduce the saving rates of the corporate and government sectors. Chart II-15...Suggesting That External Surplus Will Shrink Of course, investment as a share of GDP is projected to moderate too, reflecting a rebalancing of the economy away from exports and capital spending toward household consumption. The IMF expects that savings will moderate slightly faster than investment, leading to a narrowing in the current account surplus to almost zero by 2021. A lot of assumptions go into this type of forecast such that we must take it with a large grain of salt. Nonetheless, the fundamental drivers of China's savings capacity appear to rule out a return to the days when the country was generating a substantial amount of excess savings. Moreover, a return to large current account surpluses would likely require significant currency depreciation, which is a political non-starter given U.S. angst over trade. The risk is that China's excess savings will be less, not more, in five year's time. Tech Is A Wildcard It is extremely difficult to forecast the impact of technological advancement on the global economy. We cannot say with any conviction that the tech-related effects of "hollowing out", "winner-take-all" and the "skills premium" will moderate in the coming years. Nonetheless, these effects have occurred alongside a surge in the world's labor force and rapid globalization of supply chains, both of which reinforced the erosion of employee bargaining power. Looking ahead, technology will still be a headwind for some employees, but at least the transition from a world of excess labor to one that is more labor-scarce will boost workers' ability to negotiate a larger share of the income pie. We will explore the impact of technology on productivity, inflation, growth, and bond yields in a companion report to be published in the next issue. Conclusion: The main points we made in this report are summarized in Table II-1. All of the structural factors driving real bond yields were working in the same (bullish) direction over the past 30-40 years. Looking ahead, it is uncertain how technological improvement will affect bond prices, but we expect that the others will shift (or have already shifted) to either neutral or outright bond-bearish. Table II-1Key Secular Drivers No doubt, our views that globalization and inequality have peaked, and that the labor share of income has bottomed, are speculative. These factors may not place much upward pressure on equilibrium yields. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the demographic effect that has depressed capital spending demand is well advanced. We see it shifting from a positive factor for bond prices to a neutral factor in the coming years. It is also clear that the massive positive labor supply shock is over, and is heading into reverse as the global working-age population ratio falls. This may improve labor's bargaining power and the resulting boost consumer spending will be negative for bonds. This may also spark a shift toward using more capital in the production process and thereby place additional upward pressure on global real bond yields. Admittedly, however, this last point requires more research because theory and empirical evidence on it are not clear. Perhaps most importantly, the aging of the population in the advanced economies has reached a tipping point; retirees will drain more from the pool of savings than the working-age population will add to it in the coming years. We have concentrated on real equilibrium bond yields in this report because it is the part of nominal yields that is the most depressed relative to historical norms. The inflation component is only a little below a level that is consistent with central banks meeting their 2% inflation targets in the medium term. There is a risk that inflation will overshoot these targets, leading to a possible surge in long-term inflation expectations that turbocharges the bond bear market. This is certainly possible, as highlighted by a recent Global Investment Strategy Quarterly Strategy Outlook.7 Pain in bond markets would be magnified in this case, especially if central banks are forced to aggressively defend their targets. Please note that we are not making the case that real global bond yields will quickly revert to pre-Lehman averages. It will take time for the bond-bullish structural factors to unwind. It will also take time for inflation to gain any momentum, even in the United States. Global yields could even drop back to previous lows in the event of another recession. Nonetheless, from a long-term perspective, current market expectations suggest that investors have adopted an overly benign view on the outlook for yields. For example, implied real short-term rates remain negative until 2021 in the U.S. and 2026 in the Eurozone, while they stay negative out to 2030 in the U.K. (Chart II-16). We doubt that short-term rates will be negative for that long, given the structural factors discussed above. Chart II-16Market Expects Negative Short-Term Rates For A Long Time Another way of looking at this is presented in Chart II-17. The market expects the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years to be only slightly above today's spot yield, which itself is not far above the lowest levels ever recorded. Market expectations are equally depressed for the 5-year forward rate for the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart II-17Forward Rates Very Low Vs. History The implication is that investors should have a bond-bearish bias on a medium- and long-term horizon. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 It is true that observed household savings rates fell in some of the advanced economies, such as the United States, at a time when aging should have boosted savings from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. This argues against a strong demographic effect on savings. However, keep in mind that we are discussing desired (or ex-ante) savings. Ex-post, savings can go in the opposite direction because of other influencing factors. As discussed below, global savings must equal investment, which means that shifts in desired capital spending demand matter for the ex-post level of savings. 2 Arithmetically, if world trend GDP growth slows by one percentage point, then investment spending would need to drop by about 3½ percentage points of GDP to keep the capital/output ratio stable. 3 David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 205-240 (October 2016). 4 Please see "Understanding The Downward Trend In Labor Income Shares," Chapter 3 in the IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2017). 5 In other words, while the household savings rate, as defined here to include health care spending by governments on behalf of households, will decline, any associated tax increases will blunt the impact on national savings (i.e. savings across the household, government and business sectors). 6 Jong-Won Yoon, Jinill Kim, and Jungjin Lee, "Impact Of Demographic Changes On Inflation And The Macroeconomy," IMF Working Paper no. 14/210 (November 2014). 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook: Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The modest correction in April did not improve equity valuation by much in any of the major markets. Our U.S. valuation metric is still hovering just below the +1 sigma mark, above which would signal extreme overvaluation. Measures such as the Shiller P/E ratio are flashing red on valuation, but our indicator takes into consideration 11 different valuation measures. Technically, the U.S. equity market still has upward momentum, while our Monetary indicator is neutral for stocks. The Speculation index indicates some froth, although our Composite Sentiment indicator has cooled off, suggesting that fewer investors are bullish. The U.S. net revisions ratio is hovering near zero, but it is bullish that the earnings surprise index jumped over the past month. First-quarter earnings season in the U.S. has got off to a good start, while the global earnings revisions ratio has moved into positive territory for the first time in six years (see the Overview section). Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little 'dry power' left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. In contrast to the U.S., the WTP indicators for both the Eurozone and Japan are rising from a low level. This suggests that a rotation into these equity markets is underway and has some ways to go. We remain overweight both the Eurozone and Japanese markets relative to the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. April's rally in the U.S. bond market dragged valuation close to neutral. However, we believe that the market is underestimating the amount of Fed rate hikes that are likely over the next year. Now that oversold technical conditions have been absorbed, this opens the door the next upleg in yields. Bonds typically move into 'inexpensive' territory before the monetary cycle is over. The trade-weighted dollar remains quite overvalued on a PPP basis, although less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year to meet support at the 200-day moving average and overbought conditions have largely, but not totally, been worked off. We still believe there is more upside for the dollar, despite lofty valuation readings, due to macro divergences. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen TechnicalsChart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro TechnicalsChart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China

Highlights Markets will survive late spring and summer unscathed; Macron will win the French election; Trump's agenda is not going down in flames; U.K. snap polls support our sanguine view on Brexit; Fade the rally in Treasuries and bet against unwinding of Trump reflation; Stay tactically long EUR/USD, long the pound, and long French industrials vs. German. Feature One of the oldest adages of Wall Street is to "sell in May and go away." Data reinforce the conventional wisdom, with a strategy of staying on the sidelines during the summer months clearly outperforming the alternative of staying long every month (Chart 1). Chart 1Sell In May And Go Away Should investors adopt the same approach in 2017? Certainly the risks are skewed to the downside due to investor complacency and a busy political schedule: Complacency: Investor complacency has been spectacularly elevated ahead of Q2 this year. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, who has been flagging warning signs since early February, lists four measures of complacency that peaked in April (Chart 2).1 The SKEW index, controlled for by the VIX, rose above 12 early in April, warning that at least a tactical pullback is at hand. The Yale U.S. one year institutional confidence index hit an all-time high of 98.68% in February. Similarly, the Minneapolis Fed's market-based probability of a 20%+ correction in the S&P 500 dropped to below 10%, a level last seen during the peak of the previous bull market in 2007 (bottom panel).2 Political Schedule: April and May have an unusually high number of high-profile deadlines, meetings, and elections packed into a tight space: April 26: U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to announce key details of his long-awaited tax reform plan; April 28: The U.S. government's stopgap funding measure, the continuing resolution, will expire - leading to a government shutdown if no replacement is passed; April 29: The EU Council will hold its "Brexit Summit" to either approve, amend, or reject Council President Donald Tusk's proposed negotiation guidelines;3 May 7: The second round of the French presidential election will be held; May 9: An extraordinary presidential election will take place in South Korea; Mid-May: U.S. President Donald Trump will present his full budget proposal, including tax plans, spending cuts, and growth projections; May 19: Iran holds its presidential election; May 25: The OPEC meeting in Vienna will determine whether to extend the current production-cut agreement. In this Weekly Report, we focus on the three most immediate risks to the markets: the second-round of French presidential election, U.S. domestic politics, and the upcoming election in the U.K. We will also address downside risk to oil prices in an upcoming joint report, to publish tomorrow, with BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy. Our conclusion is that while risks are indeed skewed to the downside by the mere combination of investor complacency and volume of potential tail-risks, the market will likely emerge from the summer doldrums unscathed. As such, any market downturns are an opportunity to buy on dips. As we recently warned, however, the real risks will emerge in 2018.4 France: Fin? Centrist Emmanuel Macron has won the first round of the French presidential election with a narrow victory over nationalist Marine Le Pen (Table 1). As expected, the two will now contest the second round on May 7. France will subsequently hold a two-round legislative election on June 11 and 18. Chart 2Complacency At A Peak Table 1France: First-Round Election Results Investors learned three things from the first round of the French presidential election: Polls are right: Repeat after us: polls are not wrong, pundits are.5 Neither the Brexit referendum nor the U.S. presidential election came as a huge surprise to those who read polls objectively. In both cases, the outcome was inside the margin of error. Hopefully, the first round of the French presidential election will set aside the notion that all polls are useless and therefore investors are better off interpreting chicken entrails for election forecasting. In fact, polls in France have not significantly underestimated Marine Le Pen's nationalist party - Front National - since the 2002 election (Chart 3). Le Pen has no momentum: Le Pen consistently polled in the high 20s throughout late 2016 and 2017, but ended with only 21.43% of the vote on April 23 (Chart 4). In fact, she only narrowly improved on her 2012 performance of 17.9%, which is astounding considering everything that has happened in France since then (terrorist attacks in particular). Macron has meanwhile nearly doubled his polling from late 2016. French voters are angry: Protest and anti-establishment candidates came away with 49.62% of the vote (Chart 5). Chart 3FN Rarely Outperforms Its Polling Chart 4Le Pen's Momentum Is Gone Chart 5French Voters Are Angry... What to make of these three lessons? First, if lessons A and B are correct, then Le Pen is toast on May 7 (Chart 6).6 According to a poll conducted from April 17 to 21, Le Pen will struggle to get any voters from Mélenchon and Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon (Chart 7). This should not be surprising to anyone who knows France and its history: the left and the right just do not get along. We construct a "Le Pen best case scenario" out of the data by giving her all the voters who said they would abstain in the second round. Let's say that they were lying and are secret Le Pen supporters. She still loses (Chart 8)! Chart 6...But Not That Angry Chart 7Most Voters Will Swing To Macron Chart 8The No-Shows Can't Win It For Le Pen But surely a major terrorist attack could turn it around for Le Pen, right? Wrong. Macron is not pro-terrorist. Why would the French turn to a Russian-financed nationalist with no clear plan on how to prevent terrorism or stop refugee flows into Europe other than to close French borders?7 (And that description is not fake news!)8 They wouldn't. And there is empirical evidence to prove that French voters see through Le Pen's empty rhetoric. We highly recommend our clients read our February report titled "The French Revolution" where we conducted a careful study of the 2015 December regional elections.9 These elections occurred only 23 days following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and at the height of that year's migration crisis. It was as if the fates conspired with Le Pen's Front National (FN) to create a perfect storm. And yet the election was a crushing loss for the nationalists who came away with nothing in the second round. Chart 9French Public Supports The EU And Euro But hold on a minute. Are the French really about to elect a former investment banker for president even though 50% of them are "angry," as suggested by our lesson C? Well, yes. The "anger" is complicated. Mélenchon received a lot of the disgruntled Socialist Party voters who jumped the Hamon ship after it sunk during the latter's woefully uninspiring debate performances. These are not hard-core Euroskeptic voters. In fact, both Mélenchon and Le Pen moderated their Euroskepticism in the run up to this election to broaden their base of support. Le Pen promised that she would abide by the results of a referendum on the EU even if it went against her will, as polls currently suggest it would (Chart 9). And Mélenchon suggested that exiting the EU would only be his "Plan B," in case his plan to renegotiate the Treaty of the EU failed. What should investors expect of a Macron presidency? While the "French Thatcherite" François Fillon may have been more welcome to the markets than Macron, we think that a combination of President Macron and right-leaning National Assembly could accomplish some reforms. Polling for the legislative elections in June is scarce, but Le Pen's party is highly unlikely to outperform Le Pen herself. Judging by the December 2015 regional elections and Fillon's pre-scandal polling, the center-right Les Républicains are likely to win at least a plurality of seats in the legislative elections. Several prominent center right figures have already come out in support of Macron, perhaps to throw their name in the ring for the next prime minister.10 This is highly positive for the markets as it means that French economic policy will be run by the center right, with an ultra-Europhile as president. Bottom Line: Nothing is over until it is over. Le Pen obviously still has a chance to win given that she is one of the two people running in the French election. However, given current polling, Macron is highly likely to become the next president of France. Hold tactical long EUR/USD and strategic long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities. But start thinking about closing long euro positions. The U.S.: From Math To Magic There are three reasons for global investors to worry about U.S. politics at the moment: Government shutdown: The U.S. government will face a shutdown on April 28 if the continuing resolution (CR) is not extended (via another CR) or if an omnibus funding bill is not passed. The risk for investors is that Senate Democrats could filibuster an omnibus bill that contains a conservative "poison pill" such as funding the wall on the border with Mexico or defunding Planned Parenthood. This would result in a partial government shutdown. Our view is that there is no time to find a long-term solution and the Republicans will have to extend current spending levels via short-term CRs, possibly until the end of the fiscal year on October 1. Given that the government has already been funded for half of the current fiscal year via short-term CRs, it may be the only way that Republicans can avoid a showdown with Democrats in the Senate. Obamacare repeal and replacement: The Senate and the House passed a budget resolution on January 13 that included "reconciliation instructions" allowing for the repeal of Obamacare in an eventual reconciliation bill.11 The reconciliation procedure allows measures that impact government spending and revenue - budgetary matters - to pass through Congress with a simple majority, i.e. without the need for 60 votes to defeat a filibuster in the Senate.12 These instructions are believed to "expire" at the end of May or thereabouts, giving Republicans one more month to replace Obamacare without causing greater traffic jams down the road.13 There are two hurdles to this process. First, the Tea Party-linked "Freedom Caucus" opposed the original Obamacare proposal and needs to be placated with provisions that may put off centrist Republicans in the Senate. Second, both the original Paul Ryan plan and the soon-to-be-revealed alternative are likely to be challenged by the Democrats under the reconciliation rules.14 Trump at first appeared willing to walk away from repealing Obamacare - which seemed to make sense given that the bill he endorsed imposes a roughly $700 billion burden on U.S. households (Chart 10). However, he has since decided that he needs the bill's roughly $320 billion in savings over ten years in order to pay for the "hyuge" tax cuts he has promised.15 Tax reform: Also coming into focus in April and May is tax reform. The White House is set to release key tax-reform details as we go to publication. Further, Trump has to deliver his full FY2018 budget in mid-May. Unlike the budget Trump released in mid-March, the May edition will include the tax proposals, measures on "mandatory" or entitlement spending, and growth projections. Concurrently, Congress has to start working on its budget resolution for FY2018, which, as mentioned, will enable using reconciliation to pass the tax bill with a mere 51 votes in the Senate. Again, the Freedom Caucus is a potential hurdle. Investors fear they will demand that any tax bill be strictly revenue neutral and thus foul up the legislative process. Chart 10Obamacare Repeal Hits Households Confused yet? You are not alone! We have noticed from client meetings and the financial media a growing obsession with details of upcoming reforms and the arcane congressional rules that will govern the legislative process. This is a mistake. Investors should step back and focus on the big picture: Trump is an economic populist who wants to see a higher rate of nominal GDP growth; Republicans are a party that favors tax cuts; Legislative rules are meant to be broken. As such, the key question is whether President Trump can bend the will of the Freedom Caucus, which plays the role of the antagonist in his efforts to clear all three hurdles listed above. We have no reason to believe that he cannot. In fact, all signs are pointing to the Freedom Caucus playing ball with the White House: Rhetoric has changed: Mark Meadows (R- North Carolina), Chairman of the Freedom Caucus, has confirmed that he is not demanding revenue-neutral tax reform plan and that he is open to a compromise on Obamacare. The Freedom Caucus is reportedly getting closer to accepting a health-care bill that passes the deadly issues to the states, allowing state legislatures to make their own decision on whether to remove the most popular regulatory requirements of Obamacare. Politically, this is a brilliant move. It allows both the Tea Party and moderate Republicans to declare victory by claiming that they upheld "state rights" - a core conservative principle - while giving conservative governors and state legislatures the option of eroding Obamacare at a state level. Moderates in the Senate, the theory goes, will not have to shoot down the new health bill for fear of a popular backlash since they presumably reside in states that will opt to keep the Obamacare measures in question (essential health benefits, community ratings, etc). The bill is by no means guaranteed to pass, but the point is that the Freedom Caucus has changed its tune after having been blamed for failing to repeal Obamacare, when repeal was one of the main reasons they were elected in the first place. Trump retains political capital: President Trump's polling with Republican voters has improved since the strike against Syria (Chart 11). He retains political capital with GOP voters and is therefore still a threat to the Freedom Caucus if he should campaign against them in the 2018 midterm primaries. The electoral threat is real: The Tea Party-favored candidate in Georgia's special election on June 20, Bob Gray, came in third place with just over 10% of the vote.16 Notably, a Trump-linked super PAC fielded campaign ads against Gray, helping propel the moderate candidate - Karen Handel - to the run-off against the Democratic challenger. While the media has obsessed about the surprise performance by Jon Ossoff, the first Democrat to make the district competitive since 1978, we are certain that House Freedom Caucus members have taken notice of Gray's fate. The message from the White House is clear: don't mess with Donald Trump. Trump will use carrots as well as sticks with the Freedom Caucus. To that end, we wish to remind our clients of "dynamic scoring," the macroeconomic modeling tool based on the work of economist Arthur Laffer (of the "Laffer curve" fame). The idea is that the headline government revenue loss of tax cuts fails to take into account the growth-generating consequences ("macroeconomic feedback") of the cuts, consequences that actually add to revenues. In other words, "tax cuts pay for themselves." Republican legislators have been using dynamic scoring to justify deficit-busting tax cuts for decades. And there is some truth to their claim that tax cuts generate revenue. For instance, while it is true that President Bush's White house vastly overestimated the U.S.'s long-term revenue when it oversaw major cuts in 2001-3, nevertheless revenues did ultimately go up over the ten-year period - contrary to the Congressional Budget Office's estimates at the time (Chart 12). Various studies suggest that Republicans could use a variety of growth models to write off about 10% of the cost of their tax cuts (Chart 13). And we are being conservative in those numbers. Chart 11Trump In Line With##br## GOP Predecessors Chart 12Bush Was Right,##br## CBO Was Wrong! Chart 13Dynamic Scoring Will Offset About 10% ##br##Of Revenues Lost To Tax Cuts Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin was anything but conservative when he explicitly told investors to expect a tax reform plan paid for largely by dynamic scoring. Speaking on the sidelines of the IMF and World Bank spring meetings in Washington, Mnuchin said, Some of the lowering in (tax) rates is going to be offset by less deductions and simpler taxes, but the majority of it will be made up by what we believe is fundamentally growth and dynamic scoring. We have been arguing since November that investors should expect tax cuts that rely on dynamic scoring to justify their deficit-busting effects.17 Mnuchin's comments, after several hints from other legislators, confirm that this is indeed the plan. For the Freedom Caucus, dynamic scoring provides a defense against the accusation that their tax cuts increase the budget deficit. That said, data clearly shows that voters care less about deficits - their concerns have subsided with the deficits themselves (Chart 14).18 It remains to be seen whether Trump's team expects for dynamic scoring to do all the heavy lifting in justifying tax cuts or whether real tax reforms are still on the agenda. Even assuming Trump rejects the House GOP's border adjustment tax (which is apparently hanging onto life by a thread), he can offset revenue losses by repatriating companies' foreign earnings, moderating tax cuts for high-income earners, and closing loopholes. These offsets would add to whatever he saves from repealing Obamacare and cutting regulations.19 Chart 14Americans Not So Worried About Deficits Now Chart 15Trump Lags Average Predecessor Ultimately, Republicans of all stripes know that if they fail to produce some legislative "wins" then they will be left with nothing to campaign on in the midterm elections except for their affiliation with President Trump's very poor nationwide approval rating (Chart 15). The current polling foreshadows a 36-seat slaughter in the upcoming midterm elections for the Republicans in the House (Chart 16). This would give Democrats a majority. Several clients have asked us if this makes tax reform less likely. We do not think so. It simply means that Republicans have 18 months to pass their most treasured policies - and much less time if they want the economic growth spurt to help them get reelected. They may not have an opportunity like this for decades. Bottom Line: Investors should step back and focus on the big picture: Trump remains popular with GOP voters, the Freedom Caucus understands this threat, and - to quote Pink Floyd - magic makes the world go round. Investors should fade the rally in Treasurys, as our colleague Peter Berezin of BCA's Global Investment Strategy recently recommended. We are sticking with our "Trump reflation" 2-year/30-year Treasury curve steepener and initiating a recommendation that clients go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract (Chart 17).20 Chart 16Republicans Heading For Huge Defeat In 2018 Chart 17Short Jan '18 Fed Funds Futures Brexit: Early Elections Reinforce Our GBP Call British Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold early elections vindicates our view that the political risks of Brexit peaked - and GBP bottomed - in mid-January when May declared that her country would leave the EU's common market (Chart 18).21 At that time, May frontloaded the worst expectations of negotiations while simultaneously removing the most contentious issue: common market access. With the U.K. decisively "out," i.e. not trying to take the EU's market while rejecting its people, the EU had less of a reason to make an example of the U.K. to other countries whose Euroskeptics might think they could pick and choose what they want from the bloc. Now May and the Tories are on track for a big electoral win that will not only confirm her government's strategy but also give her more maneuverability to handle the negotiations: May's Personal Mandate: May is a "takeover" prime minister - she emerged as leader in the party reshuffle after her predecessor David Cameron's resignation following the "Leave" outcome of the referendum. Takeover prime ministers are historically weaker than "elected" prime ministers and do not last as long in office - on average they rule for 3.3 years, as opposed to six for their elected peers (Chart 19). In other words, May's position was tenuous. This was especially likely to be the case as the country entered the rocky period of formal exit in 2019 and general elections in 2020. Her struggles in turn could have threatened the Brexit deal or her party's control. At the same time, May has received a bigger "bounce" in popular opinion after assuming office than other takeover prime ministers have done (Chart 20), partly as a result of the rally-around-the-flag effect after the referendum shock. Thus, it was eminently sensible to seek public approval of her leadership at this time. Chart 18GBP Bottomed When U.K. ##br##Forswore Common Market Chart 19Theresa May Faced##br## A Short Tenure Chart 20May Received ##br##A Brexit Boost A Thin Majority: The Conservative Party has also rallied post-referendum, especially in contrast with the divided Labour Party, under Jeremy Corbyn, that will hit its lowest point since 1918 if it performs according to current polling (Chart 21). Yet the government has a thin majority in parliament of only 17 seats, among the thinnest majorities in recent decades (Chart 22). This is a liability heading into the parliamentary vote on the final exit deal with the EU in 2019, raising the menace of a "Brexit cliff" in which the U.K.'s two-year negotiating period could expire without any EU deal at all. That would be an unmitigated disaster. With a greater majority, May will be able to cow the other parties further and whip her own party's backbenchers into shape. There was also a festering scandal about the Conservative Party's 2015 fundraising that could trigger a number of by-elections jeopardizing the thin majority.22 2022 is better than 2020: The Tories also faced the prospect of running for re-election in 2020, one year after Brexit actually occurs. By that time negative economic effects (not to mention any cyclical downturn) are more likely to be felt by the public than today. The Tories would also have to face the public immediately after any embarrassing compromises in the EU negotiations. Although Labour is currently in free fall - as illustrated by the astounding loss to the Tories in the by-election in Copeland in February23 - the next two years provide opportunities for revival. The negotiations may be messy, the economy will suffer as reality sets in,24 and the union itself may come under threat from a second Scottish referendum.25 Hence the new election timeline will suit the Tories better than the old, giving them till 2022 to cement Brexit itself and address some of the effects of the aftermath before facing voters. Chart 21Labour In The Doldrums Chart 22Tories Want A Bigger Majority To Manage Brexit Few doubt that May's timing is impeccable. There can be backlash from election opportunism and voter fatigue, but May's popular approval and the national atmosphere do not suggest it will be significant. Pollsters project from current opinion polls that she will secure a 100-seat majority or greater, and since 1997 party-preference polling has become more, not less, predictive of parliamentary seats after elections. Moreover our extremely conservative estimate based exclusively on opportunities that the Tories have to snatch seats from rivals at odds with the Brexit referendum suggests that they cannot do worse than to add 11 seats to their majority (Table 2). Table 2Minimal Scenario Gives Tories 11 New Seats For Their Majority In turn, a bigger majority more securely linked to Theresa May's leadership will bring greater maneuverability in the EU talks and assurance that she can get her final deal through parliament - even if it is an ugly one. How do the elections affect the EU? Contrary to the posturing on both sides, the early election will send a further electoral confirmation to the EU that the U.K. is dead-set on leaving and that the EU cannot deliberately negotiate a bad deal in hopes that the U.K. will change its mind. It could hardly hope to overturn domestic politics and elicit a reversal on Brexit after a third national electoral outcome in favor of leaving the union. Yet the EU saw the writing on the wall already. EU Council President Tusk's negotiating guidelines are not vindictive.26 The EU is opening the possibility of a multi-year transition period after the formal 2019 exit date and acknowledging the need under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to take account of the future relationship, i.e. to provide a framework for a trade deal. The City of London stands to lose the most, but the guidelines are so far fairly tame outside of the financial sector. Moreover, we do not expect a harder line to emerge from the EU Council meeting on April 29. Already the Dutch, Irish, and Danish have called for negotiations on a trade agreement to begin promptly, essentially agreeing with Britain's urgent timeline.27 True, the probability that Macron will be the next French president - along with a likely shift toward a more outspoken Europhile stance in Germany after elections in September - presents the prospect of a "clash" with May's triumphant Tories. Macron has called for a "strict approach" to negotiations, has threatened to model his pro-market reforms in France in such a way as to steal "banks, talents, researchers, academics" from the U.K., and has suggested that the U.K. can at best hope for a deal comparable to Canada's Free Trade Agreement with the EU. That would set a low bar for the U.K.'s all-important services exports (Chart 23). However, Macron is an establishment player who will not significantly change France's position in the negotiations from what it would have been otherwise. (A Le Pen presidency obviously would mark a change by throwing the EU into chaos, but it is highly unlikely.) France is going to demand with the rest of the EU that the U.K. pay its dues (namely a 60 billion-euro budget contribution), but it is not in the interest of France or the EU to impose, effectively, a British recession - not while they seek to cultivate their own economic recoveries. Moreover, wreaking vengeance would not necessarily discourage Euroskeptics on the continent. With Le Pen mortally wounded, the significant Euroskeptic threat lies in Italy, where an imperious approach to Brexit from Germany and France may not be well received (Chart 24). Chart 23Services Are Key For The U.K. Chart 24Punishing The U.K. May Not Dissuade Italy Bottom Line: May's early election helps remove additional political risk by giving her party more maneuverability in negotiations and a greater ability to "make do" with what the Europeans give. Though this is highly unlikely to lead to a "soft Brexit" (common market access, customs union membership, subordination to the European Court of Justice), it is much more likely to prevent Britain from sailing off into a "no deal" abyss. To be clear, we can still see scenarios in which a reversal of Brexit is possible, as discussed previously,28 but they are very low probability. The snap election enables May's government to be flexible in the negotiations and accept some difficult truths in the final deal, which will reinforce the existing tendency of the EU to avoid causing a destabilizing "punitive" break. Both sides of the Channel are positioning for a relatively market-friendly outcome. We maintain our view that the pound has bottomed. Our short USD/GBP recommendation is up 2.85% since March 29 and short EUR/GBP is up 0.14% since January 25. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Eerie Calm," dated February 10, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Caveat Emptor," dated March 24, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 French toast in fact... we'll be here all night folks! 7 The reason this plan does not make sense is because most perpetrators of terrorist attacks in France have been French or European citizens. Le Pen's plan amounts to closing the barn door after the horse has bolted. 8 Please see Bloomberg, "Le Pen Struggling to Fund French Race as Russian Bank Fails," dated December 22, 2016, available at bloomberg.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Former conservative prime ministers Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Alain Juppé, as well as other prominent members of Les Républicains have already announced that they would support Macron in the second round. 11 Please see "S. Con. Res. 3 - A concurrent resolution setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for fiscal year 2017," United States Congress, available at www.congress.gov. 12 For a great summary of the arcane procedure, please see "Introduction to Budget 'Reconciliation,'" dated November 9, 2016, available at cbpp.org. 13 If Republicans choose to delay beyond May, they will have to delay producing the fiscal year 2018 budget resolution. This is possible but introduces problems for next year's budget appropriations and the tax reform measures which will depend on the yet-to-be-written FY2018 budget resolution's reconciliation instructions. "The reconciliation legislation that the GOP is using to partially repeal and replace the ACA has a half-life. It will expire when Congress begins drafting the fiscal 2018 budget blueprint, which will likely be sometime in May. So if Republicans want to resurrect the AHCA and avoid the need for bipartisan votes in the Senate, they will have to vote on the bill within the next several weeks." Please see Baker and Hostetler LLP, "GOP Struggles To Revive Health Bill," Lexology, April 7, 2017, available at www.lexology.com. 14 In short, reconciliation can only be used to pass bills that impact spending and revenue. As such, any changes to Obamacare that do not impact fiscal matters could be found inadmissible by the Senate parliamentarian and thus could defeat the entire bill. There is of course always the "nuclear option" of simply ignoring the ruling of the Senate parliamentarian, but it is not clear whether the Senate GOP would want to go "Kim Jong-Un" twice in the same year! 15 Please see Congressional Budget Office, "American Health Care Act," March 13, 2017, available at www.cbo.gov. 16 Georgia's sixth congressional district is holding this special election to fill the seat left vacant by Tom Price, the new Secretary of Health and Human Services, as appointed by Trump. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Wouldn't dynamic scoring fail to pass the "smell test" with the CBO? Yes, it would. The CBO will likely ignore Republican "magic" and apply actual "math" to the tax proposal. However, this is not an impediment to passing tax reform as the reconciliation rules can still be used as long as the legislation expires after ten years. This is how President George W. Bush passed tax cuts in 2001. 19 A study by the conservative American Action Forum suggests that Trump's regulatory cuts may save $260 billion over ten years. This is a likely source of savings to justify tax cuts, and Trump is only getting warmed up when it comes to deregulation! For the study, please see Sam Batkins, "Fiscal Benefits Of The CRA, Regulatory Reform," April 20, 2017, available at www.americanactionforum.org. 20 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Rally In Treasurys," dated April 21, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see "Conservatives fined £70,000 over expenses by election watchdog," Channel 4 News, March 16, 2017, available at www.channel4.com. 23 The Conservatives won the Copeland seat for the first time since 1982 after the Labour MP Jamie Reed's resignation there. 24 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Scotland Scotch Brexit?" dated March 29, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see "Brexit Shouldn't Delay Trade Talks Too Long, Say Leaders," Bloomberg, April 21, 2017, available at www.bloomberg.com. 28 See note 26 above. 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