Global
Highlights EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, as well as global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodity prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. The odds of a near-term US dollar rebound are rising. This will likely produce a setback in EM currencies, fixed-income markets and equities. However, such a setback will likely prove to be a buying opportunity. Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the asset prices. Feature Chart I-1Unusual Divergences EM risk assets have done well in absolute terms but have underperformed their DM counterparts. This is unusual given the substantial weakness in the US dollar and the rally in commodities prices since April (Chart I-1). Until early this year, many commentators had argued that monetary policies of DM central banks were the principal drivers of EM financial markets. Given the zero interest rates and money printing that is prevalent in DM, the underperformance of EM equities and currencies is especially intriguing. Is this underperformance an aberration or is it fundamentally justified? What really drives EM performance? Back To Basics As we have argued over the years, EM risk assets and currencies are primarily driven by their domestic fundamentals, rather than by the actions and policies of the US Federal Reserve or the ECB. The critical determinant of EM stocks’ absolute as well as relative performance versus DM equities has been corporate profits. Chart I-2 illustrates that relative equity performance and relative EPS between EM and the US move in tandem, both in common and, critically, local currency terms. Similarly, the main reason why EM share prices in absolute terms have failed to deliver positive returns over the past 10 years is that their profits have been stagnant over the same period, even prior to the pandemic (Chart I-3). Interestingly, fluctuations in EM EPS resemble those of Korea’s exports. This reflects the importance of global growth in shaping EM profit trends. Chart I-2Corporate Profits Drive EM Absolute And Relative Performance Chart I-3EM EPS Has Been Flat For 10 Years The key drivers of EM risk assets and currencies have been and remain: 1. EM domestic fundamentals that can be encapsulated by a potential risk-adjusted return on capital. The latter is impacted by both cyclical and structural growth trajectories, as well as by the quality and composition of growth. Risks to growth can be gauged based on factors such as (but not limited to): productivity, wages, inflation, fiscal and balance of payment positions, the global economic and financial environment, and the health of the banking system. In EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan), the fundamentals remain challenging: The business cycle recovery is slower in these economies than it is in China and advanced economies. Fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in many advanced countries, while the pandemic situation has been worse. Their banking systems were already fragile before the pandemic, and have lately been hit by defaults stemming from the unprecedented recession. These governments have less room than in DM and China, to stimulate fiscally and bail out debtors and banks. Banks in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) will continue struggling for some time, and their ability to finance a new expansion cycle will, for now, remain constrained (Chart I-4). A restructuring of non-performing loans and a recapitalization of banks will be required to kick-start a new credit cycle in many of these economies. 2. Global growth, especially relating to China’s business cycle and commodities. The recovery in China since April, along with rising commodities prices have been positive for EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). Given the substantial stimulus injected into the Chinese economy, its recovery will continue well into next year (Chart I-5). As a result, higher commodities prices will benefit resource producing economies by supporting their balance of payments and enhancing income growth. Chart I-4EM ex-China: Limited Bank Support For Growth Chart I-5China's Stimulus Entails More Upside In Commodity Prices 3. Global financial market themes: a search for yield and leadership of new economy stocks. Global investment themes have an important bearing on EM financial markets. For example, in recent years, the increased market cap of new economy and semiconductor stocks – due to an exponential rise in their share prices – has amplified their importance for the aggregate EM equity index. The largest six mega cap stocks in the EM benchmark are new economy and semiconductor companies, and make up about 25% of the EM MSCI market cap. The six FAANGM stocks presently account for about 25% of the S&P 500. Hence, the concentration risk in EM is as high as it is in the US. Consequently, the trajectory of new economy and semiconductor stocks globally will be essential to the performance of the EM equity index. On August 20, we published an in-depth Special Report assessing near-term and structural outlooks for global semiconductor stocks. With new economy and semiconductor share prices going parabolic worldwide, we are witnessing a full-fledged mania, as we discussed in our July 16 report. The equal-weighted US FAANGM stock index has risen by 24-fold in nominal and 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, since January 1, 2010 (Chart I-6). Chart I-6History Of Manias Of Past Decades In brief, with respect to magnitude and duration, the bull market in FAANGM is on par with the bubbles of previous decades (Chart I-6). Those bubbles culminated in bear markets, where prices fell by at least 50% after topping out. Chart I-7EM ex-TMT Stocks: Absolute And Relative Performance We do not know when the FAANGM rally will end. Timing a reversal in a powerful bull market is impossible. Also, we are not certain about the magnitude of such a potential drawdown. Nevertheless, our message is that the risk-reward tradeoff of chasing FAANGM at this stage is very unattractive. Excluding technology, media and telecommunication (TMT) – as most growth stocks are a part of TMT– EM equities remain in a bear market (Chart I-7, top panel). In relative terms, EM ex-TMT stocks have massively underperformed their global peers (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Even with a larger weighting of mega-cap growth TMT stocks than the overall DM equity index, the aggregate EM equity index has underperformed the overall DM index. Bottom Line: EM domestic fundamentals, global trade and commodities prices, and global financial market themes are the main drivers of EM financial assets and currencies. What About The Dollar? The high correlation of the trade-weighted US dollar and EM equities is due to the following: (1) the greenback has been a countercyclical currency; and (2) the US dollar’s exchange rate against EM currencies reflects relative fundamentals in the US versus EM economies. When a global business cycle accelerates, the broad trade-weighted US dollar weakens. If this growth acceleration is led by China and other emerging economies, the greenback depreciates considerably versus EM currencies. The opposite is also true. In other words, the US dollar exchange rate’s strong negative correlation to EM equities is primarily due to the fact that the greenback’s exchange rates against EM currencies reflect both the global business cycle as well as EM growth and fundamentals. Chart I-8Divergence Between DM And EM Currencies In recent months, the greenback has: (1) depreciated due to the global economic recovery; (2) tumbled versus DM currencies due to the still raging pandemic and the socio-political instability in the US as well as the Fed’s commitment to staying behind the inflation curve in the years to come; and (3) not fallen much against EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) currencies because their fundamentals have been poor, as discussed above. Bottom Line: Exchange rates in EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) have failed to appreciate versus the dollar despite the latter’s plunge versus other DM currencies (Chart I-8). The positive effect of improving global growth and rising commodities prices on EM currencies (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has been offset by these countries’ inferior domestic fundamentals. Flows And Cash On The Sidelines Chart I-9Cash On The Sidelines Has Been Produced By The Fed's Debt Monetization What about capital flows? Aren’t they essential in driving EM financial markets? Of course, they are important. However, we view flows as resulting from and determined by fundamentals. Over the medium and long term, we assume that capital flows to regions where the return on capital is high or rising. Thus, we see ourselves as responsible for directing investors to those areas that we have identified as providing a high or rising return on capital (and cautioning investors when the opposite is true). The presumption is that beyond short-term volatility, investment flows will gravitate to countries/sectors/asset classes with high or rising returns on capital, just as they will abandon areas of low or falling returns on capital. In brief, fundamentals drive flows and flows determine asset price performance. Isn’t sizable cash on the sidelines a reason to be bullish? Yes, there is substantial cash on the sidelines. Along with zero short-term rates, this has been the potent force leading investors to purchase equities, credit and other risk assets since late March. Below we examine the case of the US, but this has also been true in many markets around the world. The top panel of Chart I-9 demonstrates that US institutional and retail money market funds – a measure of cash on the sidelines - presently stand at $4.2 trillion, having increased by $900 billion since March. Yet, the Fed and US commercial banks have increased their debt securities holdings by $2.9 trillion since March. Furthermore, the Fed and US commercial banks hold $10.6 trillion of debt securities (Chart I-9, middle panel) – amounting to 18% of the aggregate equity and US dollar fixed-income market value (Chart I-9, bottom panel). These securities, held by the Fed and US commercial banks, are not available to non-bank investors. Chart I-10Investors' Cash Holdings Ratio Is Still Elevated Excluding debt securities owned by the Fed and commercial banks, we reckon that cash on the sidelines is equal to 8.4% of the value of equities and US dollar debt securities available to non-bank investors (Chart I-10). This is a relatively high cash ratio. Unprecedented purchases by the Fed and US commercial banks have not only removed a considerable chuck of debt securities from the market; they have also created money “out of thin air”. When central or commercial banks acquire a security from, or lend to, a non-bank entity, they are creating new money “out of thin air”. No one needs to save for the central bank and commercial banks to lend to or purchase a security from a non-bank. In short, savings versus spending decisions by economic agents (non-banks) do not affect the stock of money supply. We have deliberated on these topics at length in past reports. In sum, the Fed’s large purchases of debt securities amount to a de facto monetization of public and private debt. These operations have both reduced the amount of securities available to investors and boosted the latter’s cash balances. Hence, the Fed has boosted asset prices not only indirectly, by lowering short-term interest rates, but also directly, by printing new money and shrinking the amount of securities available to investors. We have in recent months argued that global risk assets are overpriced relative to fundamentals. However, investors have continued to deploy cash in asset markets, pushing prices higher. Given the zero money market interest rates and the still elevated cash balances, one can envision a scenario in which cash continues to be deployed in asset markets, pushing valuations to bubble levels across all risk assets. Pressure on investors to deploy their cash amid rising asset prices implies that only a major negative shock might be able to reverse this rally. There have been plenty of reasons to be cautious, including escalating US-China geopolitical tensions, the increasing odds of a contested US presidential election and, hence, elevated political uncertainty, the possibility of a US fiscal cliff, and a potential second wave of the pandemic. However, investors have so far shrugged off all of these and continue to allocate capital to risk assets. Bottom Line: Increased central bank intervention in asset markets may diminish the importance of fundamentals in determining the price of risk assets. This would also mean that the role of momentum investing and psychology may increase. Investment Strategy Currencies: The US dollar has become oversold and could stage a rebound in the near term. The euro has risen to its technical resistance (Chart I-11). The EM currency index (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan) has failed to break above its 200-day moving average (Chart I-12, top panel). The emerging Asian trade-weighted currency index (ADXY) has rebounded to the upper boundary of its falling channel (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Chart I-11A Short-Term Resistance For Euro/USD Chart I-12EM Currencies Have Not Entered A Bull Market Such technical profiles suggest that EM currencies have not yet entered a bull market despite the greenback’s considerable depreciation against DM currencies. This is a reflection of the poor fundamentals of EM (ex-China, Korea and Taiwan). In short, the odds of a US dollar rebound are rising. This could dent commodities prices and weigh on EM currencies. We continue recommending shorting a basket of EM currencies versus the euro, CHF and JPY. The downside in these DM currencies versus the greenback is limited. The euro could drop to 1.15, but not much below that level. Our basket of EM currencies to short includes: BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, PHP, KRW and IDR. Chart I-13EM Local Currency Bonds: Looking For A Better Entry Point Fixed-Income Markets: We have been neutral on EM local currency bonds and EM credit markets (USD bonds) since April 23 and June 4, respectively. The strategy is to wait for a correction in these markets before going long. The rebound in the US dollar and correction in commodities will provide a better entry point for these fixed-income markets (Chart I-13). Equities: On July 30, we recommended shifting the EM equity allocation within a global equity portfolio from underweight to neutral. In the near term, EM share prices will likely continue underperforming their DM counterparts. A bounce in the US dollar, rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, as well as the continuation of a FAANGM-driven mania in US equities will result in EM equity underperformance versus DM. However, in the medium- to long-term, the balance of risks no longer justifies an underweight allocation. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
The month of August continued to deliver outsized returns for global equities. US stocks remained among the best performing markets globally. That being said, while Japanese equities underperformed US stocks, they generated greater abnormal returns than the…
Recommended Allocation Chart 1Only Internet Stocks Have Kept On Rising It has been a very strange bull market. Although global equities are up 52% since their bottom on March 23rd, the rally has been limited largely to internet-related stocks. Excluding the three sectors (IT, Consumer Discretionary, and Communications) which house the internet names, equities have moved only sideways since May (Chart 1). Moreover, the rally comes amid sporadic serious new outbreaks of COVID-19 cases, most recently in Europe (Chart 2). Fears of the pandemic and much-reduced business activity in leisure-related industries have caused consumer confidence to diverge from the stock market in an unprecedented way (Chart 3). Chart 2New Outbreaks Of COVID-19 In Europe Chart 3Why Are Stocks Rising When Consumers Are So Wary? The only explanation for these phenomena is the unprecedented amount of monetary stimulus, which is causing excess liquidity to flow into risk assets. Since March, the balance-sheets of major central banks have increased by $7 trillion (Chart 4), and M2 money supply growth has soared (Chart 5). Chart 4Central Banks Have Grown Their Balance-Sheets... Chart 5...Leading To A Big Rise in Money Growth Moreover, the Fed’s new strategic framework announced in late August represents a commitment to keep monetary policy loose even when the economy begins to overheat. The Fed will (1) target 2% inflation on average over time which means that, after a period of low inflation, it will “aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time”; and (2) treat its employment mandate as asymmetrical, so that when employment is below potential the Fed will be accommodative, but that a rise in employment above its “maximum level” will not necessarily trigger tightening. Historically the Fed has raised rates when unemployment approached its natural rate (Chart 6). The new policy implies it will no longer do so. The aim of the policy is to raise inflation expectations which have become unanchored, with headline PCE inflation above the Fed’s 2% target for only 14 out of 102 months since the target was introduced in February 2012 (Chart 6, panel 3). Chart 6The Fed's Behavior Will Be Different In Future Chart 7More Permanent Job Losses To Come This commitment to easier monetary policy for longer will certainly help risk assets. But will it be enough? The global economic environment remains weak. Permanent job losses continue to increase, as workers initially put on furlough or dismissed temporarily, are fired (Chart 7). A second wave of COVID-19 cases in the Northern Hemisphere winter would worsen the situation. While central banks everywhere remain committed to aggressive policy, fiscal policy decision-makers are getting cold feet, with the UK’s wage-replacement scheme due to end in October, and government support in the US set to decline absent a big new fiscal package agreed by Congress (Chart 8). Credit risks are beginning to emerge, with bankruptcies surging (Chart 9), and mortgage delinquencies starting to rise (Chart 10). As a result, banks are becoming significantly more reluctant to lend (Chart 11). Chart 8Fiscal Support Is Starting To Slide Chart 9Bankruptcies Are Surging… Chart 10...Along With Mortgage Delinquencies Chart 11Banks Turning Increasingly Cautious To those concerns, we should add political risk ahead of the US presidential election. President Trump is probably not as far behind as the 7-percentage point gap in opinion polls suggests: After the Republican National Convention, online betting sites give him a 46% probability of being reelected (Chart 12). Over the next two months, he could be aggressive in foreign policy, particularly towards China. A disputed election is not unlikely. Investors might be wise to hedge against that possibility: BCA Research’s Geopolitical service recommends buying December VIX futures, which are still cheaply priced, and selling January VIX futures (Chart 13). 1 Chart 12Trump Could Still Pull It Off Chart 13Hedge Against A Disputed Election Result Given the power of monetary stimulus, we are reluctant to bet against equities – not least since the yield on fixed-incomes assets is so low. Nonetheless, we see the risk of a sharp correction over the coming six months, driven by a second pandemic wave, a renewed downturn in the global economy, or political events. We continue to recommend, therefore, only a neutral position on global equities. We would hold a large overweight in cash, to keep powder dry for when a better buying opportunity for risk assets arises. But a warning: The long-run return from all asset classes will be poor. The global bond index is unlikely to produce a nominal return much above zero over the coming decade. While equities look more attractive, our valuation indicator points to a nominal annual return of only around 3% (Chart 14). For the US, valuation suggests a return of zero. Investors will need to become more realistic about their return assumptions. The 7% annual return still assumed by the average US pension fund might have made sense when the yield on BBB-rated corporate bonds was 8%, but it no longer does when it has fallen to 2.3% (Chart 15). Chart 14Long-Term Equity Returns Will Be Poor Chart 15Investors' Return Assumptions Are Unrealistic Chart 16Value Sectors' Profits Have Been Terrible Equities: The most vigorous debate among BCA Research strategists currently is over whether growth stocks will continue to outperform, or whether value will take over leadership. The Global Asset Allocation service is on the side of growth. The poor performance of value stocks (concentrated in Financials, Energy, and Materials) is explained by the structural decline in their profits for the past 12 years (Chart 16). With the yield curve unlikely to steepen and non-performing loans set to rise, we do not see Financials’ earnings recovering. China’s economic shifts represent a long-term headwind for Materials. Internet stocks are expensively valued, but we do not see them underperforming until (1) their earnings’ growth slows sharply, (2) regulation on them is significantly tightened, or (3) long-term bond yields rise, lowering the NPV of their future earnings. This view drives our Overweight on US equities versus Europe and Japan. US stocks have continued to outperform even in the risk-on rally since March (Chart 17). We are a little more enthusiastic (with a Neutral recommendation) about Emerging Market stocks, which are very cheaply valued (Chart 18). Chart 17US Stocks Have Outperformed Even In A Risk-On Market Chart 18EM Stocks Are Cheap Chart 19Short USD Is Now A Consensus Trade Currencies: The US dollar has depreciated by 10% since mid-March. Over the next 12 months, the trend for the USD is likely to continue to be down. The new Fed policy emphasizes that real rates will stay low, and US inflation will probably be higher than in other developed economies. Nonetheless, short-USD/long-euro positions have become consensus (Chart 19) and, given the safe-haven nature of the dollar, a period of risk-off could push the dollar back up temporarily. Chart 20IG Spreads Are No Longer Attractive Fixed Income: We don’t expect to see a sustained rise in nominal US Treasury yields, despite the Fed’s new monetary policy framework. The Fed has an implicit yield curve control policy, and would react if yields showed signs of rising significantly. TIPS breakevens should eventually rise further to reflect the likelihood of higher inflation in the longer term, though the recent sharp rise in inflation (core CPI rose by 0.6% month-on-month in July, the largest increase since 1991) will likely subside and so the upside for breakeven yields might be limited over the next six months. We are becoming a little more cautious on credit. Investment-grade spreads are now close to historic lows and so returns are likely to be limited (Chart 20). We lower our recommendation to Neutral. Ba-rated bonds still offer attractive yields and are supported by Fed purchases. But we would not go further down the credit curve, and so stay Neutral on high yield. This by definition means that we must also be Neutral within fixed income on government bonds, which is compatible with our view that rates will not rise much. Note, though, that we remain Underweight the fixed-income asset class overall, but no longer have a preference for spread product within it. One exception is EM dollar-denominated debt, both sovereign and corporate, which offers spreads that are attractive in a world of low returns from fixed income. Chart 21Crude Prices Can Rise Further As Demand Recovers Commodities: Industrial metals prices have further to run up, as China continues its credit stimulus, which should lead to a rise in infrastructure investment and increased imports of commodities. The outlook for crude oil will be dominated by the demand side: OPEC forecasts demand destruction this year of 9 million barrels per day (compared to consensus expectations of 8 million) and so will be cautious about loosening its supply constraints. Demand should be boosted by increased driving, as people avoid using public transport for commuting and airlines for vacations. Based on a robust demand forecast (Chart 21), BCA Research’s energy strategists see Brent crude stable at around current levels through to the end of 2020 but averaging $65 a barrel next year. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “What Is The Risk Of A Contested US Election?” dated July 27, 2020. GAA Asset Allocation
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 31, 2020. The country allocation model still favors the US as its largest overweight. Despite Japan’s outstanding performance in August, the model still maintains its large underweight in Japanese equities, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model slightly underperformed the MSCI World benchmark by 7 bps in August. The Level 1 model outperformed by 19 bps because of the overweight in the US, while the Level 2 model underperformed its benchmark by 104 bps partly because of its large underweight in Japan. August was a very strange month in the sense that only the US and Japan outperformed while the rest underperformed the MSCI World benchmark. As such, except for the US and Japan bets, all other six underweight choices made positive contributions to the overall performance of the model, while all other four overweight bets made negative contributions. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its MSCI World benchmark by 404 bps, with 604 bps of outperformance from the Level 2 model, and 111 bps of outperformance from the Level 1 model. Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD %) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA US Vs. Non US Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non US Model (Level 2)For more on historical performance, please refer to our website https://www.bcaresearch.com/site/trades/allocation_performance/latest/G…. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, “Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model,” dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered as well when making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 31, 2020. Chart 4Overall Model Performance The model continues to maintain its pro-cyclical stance driven by an improvement in its global growth proxy, and remains exposed to cyclical sectors. Over the past month, the model outperformed its benchmark by 58 basis points. Year-to-date, the model has outperformed its benchmark by 212 basis points, and 227 basis points since going live. The model’s global growth proxy continues to signal a bullish stance – driven by its three components: Appreciating EM currencies, rising metal prices, and an improvement in broad business climate. The model therefore continues to remain positive on cyclical sectors. Global monetary easing for the coming years and low rates should keep the liquidity component favoring a mixed bag of cyclical and defensive sectors. The valuation component remains muted across all sectors except Energy. However, several sectors continue to be near the expensive and cheap zones – mainly Info Tech and Consumer Discretionary (expensive), and Real Estate and Consumer Staples (cheap). The model awaits confirming momentum signals to change recommendations for those sectors. The model upgraded Industrials this month based on an improvement in its momentum component. Table 3Overall Model Performance Table 4Current Model Allocations The model is now overweight five cyclical sectors in total. These are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, Communication Services, Materials, and Industrials. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report “Introducing the GAA Equity Sector Selection Model”, dated July 27, 2016, as well as the Sector Selection Model section in the Special Alert “GAA Quant Model Updates”, dated March 1, 2019 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Amr Hanafy Senior Analyst amrh@bcaresearch.com
Highlights The leading providers of fundamental oil data differ sharply in their estimates of demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This will keep uncertainty over the trajectory of prices elevated this year. Our forecast of demand destruction and those of the US EIA and the IEA are clustered around 8mm b/d for 2020, while OPEC’s most recent estimate exceeds 9mm b/d. The rebound in actual demand, which is apparent in the data, a weakening USD and strengthening of global trade in the wake of global fiscal and monetary stimulus support our expectation of lower demand destruction. As mentioned last month, we believe the odds of a COVID-19 vaccine are high by year-end or early 2021 (Chart of the Week). Against this, bloated floating storage levels – and their attendant port congestion – threaten to slow crude-oil demand growth in Asia into 4Q20, particularly if China follows through on putting 19 very large crude carriers (VLCCs) filled with oil from the US on the water over the coming months. We continue to see the balance of risk favoring the upside for prices. We are raising our 2H20 Brent forecast $2/bbl to $46/bbl, and keeping our 2021 expectation at $65/bbl. WTI will trade ~ $3/bbl below those levels. Feature OPEC continues to see a higher level of demand destruction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic than BCA, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). OPEC continues to see a higher level of demand destruction in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic than BCA, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). The cartel’s economists are estimating global oil-demand destruction would be ~ 9mm b/d year-on-year (y/y) in 2020. In their August projections, the EIA’s and IEA’s expectations for demand destruction are closer to ours at ~ 8mm b/d for this year. In the past, we focused more on OPEC’s output estimates for members of the cartel, particularly for its leader and top producer, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In this month’s report, and in subsequent reports, we are incorporating OPEC’s demand estimates as a direct input to our price-forecasting models. For 2020, we are giving it an equal weight to the apparent consensus we share with the EIA and IEA. Chart of the WeekActual Oil Demand Continues Strong Recovery The immediate effect of this will be to temper the effect of the stronger demand growth expectations we share with the EIA and IEA in this year’s price forecast, which will put us at $46/bbl on average for 2H20.1 The improvement in actual demand is apparent in our base case model up to July, as seen in the Chart of the Week. Much of this recovery is the result of the massive fiscal and monetary stimulus deployed globally by governments and central banks, which will continue to support the demand this year and next.2 This stimulus also is visible in global trade data – particularly in EM imports, which we follow closely, given their high sensitivity to changes in income (GDP). Our modeling indicates this recovery will continue to year-end (Chart 2). Chart 2EM Imports Recovery Likely Continues Weaker USD Will Support Oil-Demand Recovery Speculators have crowded into the short-dollar trade, which augurs for a near-term correction in the USD DXY futures. We expect the USD to continue to weaken on the back of the Fed’s aggressive monetary accommodation, in line with our Global Investment and FX strategists.3 This will support the continued rally in crude oil prices we expect for the balance of this year and next. There are a number of short-term risks to our bearish USD view, however. These are mainly due to the marginal improvement of the US economy vis-à-vis Europe, which is evident in the manufacturing and services PMIs (Chart 3). Improving mobility data, which is coincident with the decline in its number of COVID-19 cases vs Europe, also is supportive of the USD (Chart 4). In the trading markets, speculators have crowded into the short-dollar trade, which augurs for a near-term correction in the USD DXY futures. Close to 60% of the DXY index is accounted for by the Euro (Chart 5). Lastly, while global economic policy uncertainty has fallen from its recent peak, taking the USD lower with it, it still is elevated and continues to represent a risk to the USD bear market (Chart 6). Chart 3USD Bear Market Could Stall All else equal, a weakening USD will continue to support Brent prices, and with that the rest of the global oil complex. As long as EM growth continues to improve, these short-term USD effects discussed above will affect the DXY more than the broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) for the USD, which has a Euro weight of 18% and is a more representative gauge of USD strength vis-à-vis trade. Chart 4DXY Could Rally Briefly As US Recovers Chart 5Specs Have Crowded Into The Short USD Trade Chart 6A Weaker USD Will Boost Oil Prices OPEC 2.0 Discipline, Capital Markets Will Restrain Supply While we expect some of this US production to come back on line as prices improve, overall output in the shales likely will continue to fall until 2H21. OPEC 2.0 production discipline largely is responsible for the 6.1mm b/d y/y decline in global oil production we estimate. The producer coalition’s putative leaders – KSA and Russia – continue to lead by example, having removed 460k b/d and 900k b/d y/y, respectively, from the market (Chart 7, top panel). We expect this to continue into next year (Table 1). Outside OPEC 2.0, US oil production is estimated to have fallen ~ 2mm b/d from its peak of 12.9mm b/d in 4Q19, in line with our expectation. This is largely the result of significantly reduced shale-oil output (Chart 7, bottom panel). While we expect some of this US production to come back on line as prices improve, overall output in the shales likely will continue to fall until 2H21. Chart 7OPEC 2.0, US Shales Output Will Remain Constrained Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) We continue to expect the combination of sustained demand growth and constrained supply to tighten balances globally, producing a physical deficit this year and next (Chart 8). As before, we expect this physical deficit to translate into lower inventories in the OECD, as refiners are forced to draw down stocks to meet demand (Chart 9). Chart 8Supply-Demand Balances Continue To Tighten Chart 9Expect OECD Inventories To Draw Asia’s Floating Storage Set To Increase Additional imports of US crude by China threaten to increase floating storage levels in Asia, which likely will reduce Chinese demand for light-sweet barrels sourced ex-US, and reverse the tightening in Brent and WTI forward curves. The inventory draw in the US – the largest component of OECD crude inventories – could accelerate if China follows through on its planned increase in imports of US crude oil, consistent with reports oil companies there recently chartered 19 VLCCs.4 This apparently was done to comply with the Phase 1 trade deal China and the US negotiated earlier this year. While these imports of US crude into China will lower US inventories – most of the tankers are shipping from the US Gulf – they could add to the swollen floating storage levels currently clogging Chinese harbors, and reduce demand for additional crude until these stocks are absorbed either by refinery demand or strategic reserves (Chart 10). In this context, we also are watching the evolution of forward curves, particularly for Brent, as this surge in Chinese imports could back out other light-sweet crudes similar to those produced in the US – and similar to Brent, for that matter – leaving them distressed on the water looking for a home. There already is early evidence the Brent forward curve’s flattening and expected return to backwardation has stalled (Chart 11). Given this pause in the tightening of the forward curve over the next year, we are closing our 4Q20 backwardation trades at tonight’s close. Chart 10China’s US Crude Imports Will Swell Asia’s Floating Storage Chart 11Brent Forward Curves Weaken Over the Next 12 Months Bottom Line: Global crude oil markets continue to tighten, as demand recovers, and supply discipline remains intact. However, additional imports of US crude by China threaten to increase floating storage levels in Asia, which likely will reduce Chinese demand for light-sweet barrels sourced ex-US, and reverse the tightening in Brent and WTI forward curves. This is prompting us to exit our 4Q20 backwardation trades at tonight’s close. The balance of price risks continues to favor the upside, in our estimation. We are raising our 2H20 Brent forecast slightly by $2/bbl to $46/bbl, and keeping our 2021 expectation at $65/bbl. WTI will trade ~ $3/bbl below those levels (Chart 12). Chart 12BCA Oil Price Trajectory Unchanged Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight US natgas prices were up this week as Hurricane Marco and Laura approached the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). Oil and gas producers evacuated part of their offshore facilities and shut 61% of their natural gas production from the region. Cheniere reported it suspended operation at its Sabine Pass LNG export terminal located in the GoM. Still, abundant oil and gas storage in the US limits the price increase. Separately, the latest estimate of US LNG cargo cancellations for October delivery – down to only 10 cancelled vessels – confirms natgas price spreads relative to Asia have reached levels sufficient to incentivize additional exports of US gas, supporting Henry Hub prices (Chart 13). Base Metals: Neutral Copper theft is rising in Chile and Africa, boosting LME copper prices and pushing treatment and refining charges lower. In Chile, “About 40 incidents were reported in the first half of this year, up from six in 2014,” according to mining-journal.com. Falling spot supplies in the wake of COVID-19 mining restrictions likely explain the thefts and increases in the cash-to-three-month copper spread on the LME to $17.25/MT earlier this week. Precious Metals: Neutral We closed our long gold recommendation for a 20% profit after reaching our $1,950/oz stop loss on August 11. We remain positive on gold strategically based on our view the dollar will continue depreciating and the Fed will keep rates low even as inflation and inflation expectations move up. As we go to press, markets await Jerome Powell’s speech at the annual Jackson Hole summit, where he is expected to discuss the Fed’s strategic review of its monetary policy strategy. This could push inflation breakevens slightly higher, and real yields lower. We are recommending a buy order at $1,875/oz as spec positioning remains stretch (Chart 14). Ags/Softs: Underweight The USDA reported 69% of the US soybean crop was rated in good to excellent condition this week, up sharply from last year’s level of 55%. However, this was down from last week’s level of 72%, which was supportive of prices. Separately, the Sino-US Phase 1 trade deal is back in the news this week, with reports the two countries agreed to resume shipments of soybeans on a record scale – in the range of 40mm tons for 2020, which would be 10% above record purchases by China set in 2016, according to bloomberg.com. China had turned to Brazil earlier in the year as the trade deal became mired in tit-for-tat tariff spats. Chart 13Natgas Prices Supported By Hurricane Laura Chart 14Gold Vs. USD Spec Positioning Stretched Footnotes 1 We also reduced the pass-through of the supply-demand difference into the oil price forecast in this month’s report, based on recent research we’ve completed, which also tempers the impact of the stronger growth expectations we share with the EIA and IEA. 2 Please see Low Vol, High Uncertainty Keeps Oil-Price Rally On Tenterhooks published June 18, 2020, for additional discussion of global fiscal and monetary stimulus vis-à-vis oil markets. 3 Please see The Dollar And The Budget Deficit: From Theory To Practice, a Special Report published by BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy on August 14, 2020. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 In July and August, China imported ~ 17mm barrels of US crude, according to S&P Global Platts. Please see Crude moves higher amid China's US import boost ahead of key OPEC meet published by Platts August 17, 2020. China reportedly charted 19 VLCCs to import ~ 37mm barrels of US crude beginning in August, according to worldoil.com. Please see China charters 19 tankers for record U.S. crude oil shipment published August 21, 2020. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades
Highlights Negative Rates: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. UK vs. New Zealand: Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. Go long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts (currency-hedged into GBP) on tactical (0-6 months) basis. Feature Policymakers around the world are, once again, under increasing pressure to contemplate new responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to rage through much of the US and emerging world and is flaring up again across Europe. Additional fiscal policy measures will likely be necessary, but it is increasingly politically difficult in many countries to ramp up government support measures – or even extend existing programs - after the massive increase in deficits and debt undertaken this past spring. Chart of the WeekA Bull Market In Negative-Yielding Debt An inadequate fiscal response will put even more pressure on monetary policy to give a boost to virus-stricken economies. Yet fresh options there are even more limited. Policy rates are already near 0% in all developed nations, with central banks promising to keep them there for at least the next couple of years. Central banks are also rapidly expanding their balance sheets to buy up assets via quantitative easing programs. A move to sub-0% policy rates may be the next option for central banks not already there like the ECB and the Bank of Japan. Although it remains questionable how much more stimulus monetary policy could hope to deliver. Government bond yields are at or near historic lows in most countries, while equity and credit markets continue to enjoy a spectacular recovery from the rout in February and March. The stock of global negative-yielding debt has risen to $16 trillion, according to Bloomberg, which remains close to the highs seen over the past few years (Chart of the Week). So who will be the next central bank to cross that bridge into negative rate territory? US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, Bank of Canada Governor Tiff Macklem and Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe have all publicly dismissed the need for negative rates in their economies. Recent comments from Bank of England (BoE) Governor Andrew Bailey and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Governor Adrian Orr, however, have suggested that negative rates could be a future policy choice, if needed. New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. Markets are increasingly discounting those outcomes. The UK Gilt yield curve is trading below 0% out to the 6-year maturity, while New Zealand nominal government bond yields are trading at or below a mere 0.3% out to 7-years (and where real yields on inflation-linked bonds have recently turned negative). Of the two, New Zealand looks like the more likely candidate to go to negative rates sometime in the next 3-6 months. A Negative Rates Checklist For The UK & New Zealand In a Special Report we published back in May, we looked back at the decisions that drove the move to negative policy rates by the ECB, Bank of Japan, Swiss National Bank and the Riksbank, with a goal of determining if such an outcome could happen elsewhere.1 We were motivated by the growing market chatter suggesting that the Fed would eventually be forced to cut the fed funds rate to sub-0% territory to fight the deep COVID-19 recession. Chart 2The Fundamental Case For Negative Rates We concluded in that report that such a move was unlikely, but could occur if there was a contraction in US credit growth and/or a spike in the US dollar to new cyclical highs, both outcomes that would result in a major drop in US inflation expectations. Such moves preceded the shift to negative rates in those other countries during 2014-16, as a way to lower borrowing costs and weaken currencies. Since that May report, the US dollar has depreciated and US credit growth has continued to expand amid very stimulative financial conditions, thus the odds of the Fed having to cut the funds rate below 0% are very low. The Fed is far more likely to dovishly alter its forward guidance, or even institute yield curve control to cap US Treasury yields, to deliver additional monetary easing, if necessary. (NOTE: next week, we will be discussing the Fed’s next possible policy moves, and the potential impact on financial markets, in a Special Report jointly published with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy). The pressure to consider negative interest rates in the non-negative rate developed market countries remains strong, however, after the major increase in unemployment rates and sharp falls in inflation seen earlier this year (Chart 2). Putting current levels of both into a simple Taylor Rule formula suggests that the “appropriate” level of nominal policy rates is currently negative in the US and Canada, mainly because of the double-digit unemployment rates in those countries. Taylor Rules for the UK and New Zealand remain slightly positive, however, at 0.2% and 0.9%, respectively. Yet the forecasts for inflation and unemployment from the BoE and RBNZ suggest a diverging dynamic between the two over the next couple of years. The BoE is forecasting a very sharp recovery from the 2020 recession, with the UK unemployment rate projected to fall back to 4.7% by 2022 from the surge to 7.5% this year. At the same time, the RBNZ’s forecasts are more cautious, with the New Zealand unemployment rate expected to fall to only 6.1% in 2022 from the projected 8.1% peak at the end of this year. Thus, the implied Taylor Rules using those forecasts suggest a need for negative rates in New Zealand, but a rising path for UK policy rates over the next two years (Chart 3). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Despite the diverging trajectory in policy rates implied by the two central banks’ forecasts, markets are pricing in a more similar path for rates. Forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates are discounting slightly negative rates in the UK and New Zealand to the end of 2022 (Chart 4). Clearly, markets are taking the RBNZ’s open talk about negative interest rates to heart, while remaining skeptical that the BoE’s optimistic path for the post-virus UK economy will come to fruition. Chart 3Mapping Central Bank Projections Into The Taylor Rule Chart 4Markets Pricing Slightly Negative Rates In The UK & NZ The individual cases of the UK and New Zealand as current candidates for negative interest rates can help derive a list of factors to monitor to determine if negative rates would be a more likely policy outcome for any central bank. Based on our read of recent comments from BoE and RBNZ officials, combined with our assessment of what took place in other countries that moved to negative rates in the past, we would include the following in any Negative Rates Checklist: Policymaker perceptions on the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates For central bankers, the ELB (or “reversal rate”) is defined as the policy rate below which additional rate cuts are deemed counterproductive to stimulating the economy. For example, cutting rates too low could limit the ability of the banking system to earn interest income, thus hindering banks’ appetite to make new loans. Chart 5Could The Effective Lower Bound Be Negative In the UK & NZ? For most central banks, the belief is that the ELB is at or just above 0%. It is possible that because of a structural shift, a central bank could deem the ELB to be negative in that particular economy. That could be because of a sharp deterioration in trend economic growth or a rapid rise in debt or a belief that the banking system was strong enough to handle the income shock of negative rates. Currently, potential GDP growth rate estimates have been marked down in both the UK and New Zealand because of the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 5). In New Zealand, taking the average of the RBNZ’s real GDP growth forecasts for the next three years as a proxy for trend growth suggests that trend growth is now around 1.2%, similar to the reduced estimates of UK potential GDP growth. In terms of debt levels, the ratio of total public and private non-financial debt to GDP is close to 400% in the UK, which is far greater than the 126% level of that same ratio in New Zealand. In terms of banking system health, banks in both countries are well capitalized. The Tier 1 capital ratio of the major UK banks is 14.5%, while the similar figure in New Zealand is 13.5%; both figures are provided by the BoE and RBNZ, respectively. Stress tests run by the central banks in recent months indicate that capital levels will remain adequate even after the likely hit from loan losses due to the severity of the 2020 economic downturn. Our assessment is that both the BoE and RBNZ can claim that the ELB is in fact below zero, based on the slow pace of trend economic growth in both. In the case of the UK, high debt levels also suggest that policy rates may have to go below 0% to generate any stimulus to growth via new borrowing activity. In both countries, the central banks can claim that the banking system can handle a period of negative rates, if policymakers go down that road to boost economic growth. Economic confidence is depressed An extended period of weak economic activity and depressed confidence can trigger a need to move to negative policy rates if rates were already at 0%. Currently, UK economic confidence is in tatters after the -20% decline in real GDP seen in the second quarter of 2020. The GfK consumer confidence index remains at recessionary low levels, while the BoE Agents’ survey of UK firms shows a collapse in plans for investment and hiring over the next year (Chart 6). Chart 6A Severe Hit To UK Growth & Confidence New Zealand, the economy contracted -1.6% in the first quarter of the year with consensus forecasts calling for a -20% collapse in the second quarter. Yet economic confidence is surprisingly resilient. The Westpac survey of consumer confidence is falling, but the July reading was still above typical recessionary lows (Chart 7). The ANZ survey of business investing and hiring intentions has been surprisingly upbeat of late, rebounding from the April trough but still below pre-virus levels. Our assessment here is that the BoE has a stronger case for moving to negative rates, based on the deeper collapse in confidence in the UK compared to New Zealand. Inflation expectations are too low If inflation expectations remain too low once rates have hit 0%, then inflation-targeting central banks must consider more extraordinary options to revive inflation expectations. That could take the form of extended forward guidance on future interest rate moves, expanding the size and scope of quantitative easing programs, or cutting policy rates into negative territory. Currently, inflation expectations remain elevated in the UK. 5-year CPI swaps, 5-years forward, are now at 3.6%, while the Citigroup/YouGov survey of household inflation expectations 5-10 years out sits at 3.3% (Chart 8). In New Zealand, the RBNZ inflation survey shows inflation expectations have fallen into the bottom half of the central bank’s 1-3% target band. Chart 7Only A Very Modest Downturn In NZ Chart 8Inflation Expectations Are Much Lower In NZ Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue for a move to negative rates because of weak inflation expectations. Financial conditions turning more restrictive Chart 9The News Is Mixed On UK & NZ Financial Conditions Another reason why a central bank could try negative rates is if asset prices were trading at depressed levels even after policy rates were at 0%. The current signals on financial conditions in the UK and New Zealand are generally stimulative, but more so in the latter. Currently, the MSCI equity index for New Zealand is nearing the all-time high reached in 1987, while the equivalent UK equity index is languishing near the lows of the past decade (Chart 9). The New Zealand dollar and British pound have both bounced off the cyclical lows seen earlier this year (more on that later). The annual growth rates of nominal house prices have started to pick up in both countries, but with a faster pace in New Zealand. Finally, corporate credit spreads have narrowed sharply since the end of the first quarter in both countries, with New Zealand spreads actually falling below the pre-virus levels seen this year. Our assessment here is that financial conditions in both countries remain generally stimulative, but more so in New Zealand. Neither central bank can point to restrictive financial conditions as a reason to move to negative rates. Signs of impairment of the transmission of policy interest rates to actual borrowing costs If bank lending growth was weakening and/or borrowing rates remained high relative to policy rates, this could be a sign that negative policy rates are necessary to induce greater loan demand by lowering borrowing costs. Chart 10NZ Lenders Are Not Passing On RBNZ Rate Cuts Currently, the annual growth rate of bank lending is slowing in New Zealand, but remains positive at 4.5% (Chart 10). Loan growth in the UK is now a much more robust 7.4%, but some of that growth is due to UK companies drawing down lines of credit with their banks to survive during the COVID-19 lockdowns. A bigger issue is the lack of the full pass-through of the RBNZ’s recent cuts into borrowing rates, especially for home loans. The spread between 5-year fixed mortgage rates and the RBNZ cash rate is now an elevated 387bps, while the equivalent spread in the UK is much lower at 160bps. Our assessment here is that only the RBNZ can argue that an impaired transmission of policy rate cuts to actual borrowing rates could justify a move to negative rates. Scope For Currency Depreciation For any central bank, a benefit of a negative interest rate policy is that it can trigger more stimulus via a weaker currency. This can help boost economic growth by making exports more competitive, while also helping lift inflation by raising the cost of imports. On the growth side, a weaker currency would be somewhat more helpful for New Zealand where exports are 19% of GDP, compared to 16% in the UK. (Chart 11). That is an important distinction, as there is greater scope for the New Zealand dollar (NZD) to depreciate if the RBNZ went to negative rates than for the British pound (GBP) to weaken if the BoE did the same. Chart 11A New Experiment? Negative Rates With A Current Account Deficit Chart 12BoE Does Not Need To Go Negative To Weaken The Pound Perhaps the most interesting feature of this entire negative rates discussion is that, for the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. For the first time in the “negative rates era”, central banks of countries with current account deficits are considering pushing policy rates below 0%. The UK and New Zealand both have similarly sized current account deficits, equal to -3.3% and -2.7% of GDP, respectively (middle panel). At the same time, both countries have net foreign direct investment surpluses roughly equal to those current account deficits, leaving their basic balances around 0 (bottom panel). In other words, both countries currently attract enough long-term foreign direct investment inflows to “fund” their current account deficits. Foreign investors may be less willing to continue buying as many New Zealand or UK financial assets if either country went to a negative interest rate to intentionally weaken the currency, as the RBNZ has publicly stated would be a desired outcome of such a move. Chart 13RBNZ Could Go Negative To Weaken The Kiwi Our colleagues at BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy estimate that, on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, the GBP/USD exchange rate is now -20% below its long-run fair value (Chart 12). The level of the currency is also broadly in line with the current level of interest rate differentials between the UK and the US (bottom panel). In other words, the GBP is already cheap and additional rate cuts would have limited impact in driving the currency lower. It is a different story for NZD/USD, which is fairly valued on a PPP basis but remains elevated relative to New Zealand-US interest rate differentials (Chart 13). Therefore, our assessment is that only the RBNZ can credibly generate meaningful currency weakness from a move to negative rates. Summing it all up Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. In the UK, there is less evidence pointing to a significantly impaired credit channel that could be remedied by negative rates, inflation expectations are elevated, and the pound is already at undervalued levels. In New Zealand, previous RBNZ rate cuts have not fully flowed through into bank lending rates, inflation expectations are low, and the New Zealand dollar is at fair value (and, therefore, has room to become cheaper via negative rates). Based on the elements of our Negative Rates Checklist, we deem it more likely for the RBNZ to go negative than the BoE. Bottom Line: The persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic is intensifying pressure on policymakers in many countries to provide more stimulus. The odds that a new central bank will join the negative policy interest rate club are increasing. Recent comments from Bank of England and Reserve Bank of New Zealand officials have hinted at the possibility of a shift to negative policy rates, should conditions warrant. The odds are greater for such a move in New Zealand. A Negative Rates Trade Idea: Go Long New Zealand Government Bonds Vs. UK Gilts Chart 14Go Long 10yr NZ Govt. Bonds Vs 10yr UK Gilts Based on our analysis above, we are adding a new cross-country spread trade to our Tactical Overlay Trades list on page 18: going long 10-year New Zealand government bonds versus 10-year UK Gilts on a currency-hedged basis (i.e. hedging the NZD exposure into GBP). The trade is to be implemented using on-the-run cash bonds. The current unhedged NZ-UK 10-year yield spread is +36bps, but even on a hedged basis (using 3-month currency forwards) the yield differential is still positive at +23bps (Chart 14). We are targeting zero for the unhedged spread, to be realized sometime within the six months. We like this trade because it can win not only from a decline in New Zealand bond yields if the RBNZ goes to negative rates (as we think is increasingly likely), but also from a potential rise in Gilt yields if the BoE defies market pricing and does not go to negative rates. If both countries keep rates on hold, then the trade will earn a small positive spread over the current meagre level of Gilt yields. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Negative Rates: Coming Soon To A Bond Market Near You?", dated May 20, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Dear clients, China Investment Strategy will take a summer break next week. We will resume our publication on September 9th. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist Highlights The threat of US sanctions has sparked fears of disconnecting Chinese financial institutions from US dollar access, driving urgency to accelerate the RMB internationalization process. China’s RMB internationalization process suffered from a sizable setback in 2016, but the trend has reversed in 2018. Since then China has shifted the strategy to broaden and enhance the RMB’s market demand and functions, as well as to establish systems to facilitate the strategy. In the foreseeable future, the RMB’s role in the global economy is far from challenging the US dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency; China's near-term goal to promote the use of the RMB beyond its borders is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities threatened by US financial sanctions. Feature Since 2018 and in the wake of intensifying confrontations between the US and China, the Chinese government has shifted its strategy in promoting the internationalization of the RMB. Authorities have moved from a symbolic international recognition of the RMB to a more pragmatic approach of creating real market demand for the currency. Chart 1China Has Been Shedding USD Assets It is not our baseline view that the US will take extreme measures and entirely cut off Chinese banks’ access to the US Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). However, Beijing’s decoupling from the US dollar (USD) has been in process, diversifying its forex reserves away from the US dollar (USD) and increasing the use of the RMB in cross-border trade and investment (Chart 1). In the foreseeable future, it is neither possible nor is Chinese policymakers’ intention for the RMB to challenge the USD as the world's dominant reserve currency. Rather, we think that under the threat of US sanctions, the near-term goal is to minimize disruptions to China’s trade and investment activities. At the same time, the approach will make China “too big, too connected to fail” in the medium-to-long run and, therefore, minimize the potential for future threats of financial sanctions. China’s new approach to internationalize the RMB involves enhancing the currency’s three functions in the global market, and establishing and strengthening domestic systems to facilitate the enhancements: The RMB as an international settlement currency; The RMB as a commodity pricing currency; and The RMB as an international reserve currency. Most of these strategies still have a long way to go before having significant global market implications. However, these developments bear structural importance and investors should closely monitor them. RMB - An International Settlement Currency Chart 2Cross-Border RMB Settlement Is Picking Up The RMB’s role in cross-border trade settlement suffered a major setback in 2016 when investor confidence plummeted following a rapid devaluation in China’s currency and equities. The trend has reversed since 2018, partially due to the vigorous promotion of China’s domestic cross-border interbank settlement system (CIPS) (Chart 2). China established CIPS in 2015 after the US proposed to disconnect Russia from the SWIFT payment system.1 As of July 2020, the CIPS system had a total of 33 direct participants and 951 indirect participants, a 35% increase from 2018 with more than half of the participants outside China.2 According to the recently released PBoC RMB internationalization report, the CIPS system processed a total of 34 trillion yuan worth of cross-border RMB transactions in 2019, a 28% improvement from 2018 (Chart 3). Chart 3CIPS Has Been Steadily Expanding Nevertheless, the RMB’s share of international payments remains far behind the USD, euro and yen, and the RMB's role in cross-border settlement is well below its 2016 peak (Chart 4A and 4B). The dollar's dominant status is not only supported by the US’ strong and open economy, but also by its deep, liquid and highly efficient financial markets, which are impossible for any currencies or payment systems to replicate in the near future. However, establishing domestic financial payment and information exchange systems will likely be a main countermeasure countries will rush to take, if the US launches sanctions to cut off large economies like Russia and China from the USD and/or global financial system. Chart 4AThe RMB’s Share Of International Payments Has Been Disproportional Compared To Its Share In Global Trade… Chart 4B...And Well Below Its 2016 Peak Chart 5Russia Has Largely Replaced USD Treasury Holdings With Gold Russia is by far the largest and most globally integrated country that came close to being cut off from SWIFT, and Beijing has clearly learned from Russia’s experience and countermeasure strategies. The proposal to disconnect Russia from SWIFT following the 2014 Crimea crisis never materialized, but in light of the threats and US financial sanctions, Russia established the SPFS, a domestic financial information exchange system to facilitate bank payments. The SPFS is far from the complete emancipation of SWIFT and payments through the SPFS are mostly intra-Russian settlements. However, this active counter-sanction measure, coupled with the Russian central bank’s aggressive reduction of USD-denominated assets in its forex reserves, seems to have achieved positive results (Chart 5). Three years after the establishment of SPFS, the US and Europe no longer target Russian bank payment functions in their further financial sanctions against Russia.3 In response to a US threat to impose economic sanctions against companies and banks dealing with Iran, Europe created a special financial settlement platform called Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in 2019. Although none of the alternative systems can challenge the role of the US CHIPS or SWIFT systems, the trend of establishing and accelerating alternatives will incrementally diminish the effectiveness of such harsh financial actions by the US. RMB - An International Commodity Pricing Currency Table 1China Dominates Global Demand For Many Commodities We believe that the most important breakthrough in the RMB internationalization process in the past five years has been the strategic shift to promote the RMB’s pricing function. China is the largest trading partner of a growing number of countries with tightly linked supply chains. This generates a natural demand for RMB settlement in bilateral trade. More importantly, China’s dominance in global demand for bulk commodities gives the country an advantage in pricing power (Table 1). In March 2018, China established a RMB-denominated crude oil futures market in Shanghai, which has grown into the third-largest oil exchange market after WTI and Brent. Its cumulative turnover in two years reached nearly 30 trillion yuan with overseas customers in 19 countries and regions.4 Given the success of the Shanghai crude oil futures market, the Chinese government has been vigorously promoting the expansion of the RMB pricing function from crude oil to natural gas, iron ore, soybeans, corn and other bulk commodities. Going forward, we expect the RMB internationalization process to continue to develop through pricing and trading bulk commodities in Chinese currency. This will lead to a higher correlation between the RMB and the currencies of some of China's Asian neighbors and commodity trade partners, and thus expand and strengthen the "RMB currency bloc" (Chart 6A and 6B). Chart 6AThe RMB Currency Bloc May Expand From Manufacturing Ecosystem... Chart 6B...To Commodity Supply Chain RMB - An International Reserve Currency The role of the RMB among official reserve managers, although still dismal compared to the USD and Euro, has accelerated since 2018. Its global share has doubled from Q4 2016 when the IMF began to include holdings of RMB in its currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) (Chart 7). Shares of the USD- and Euro-denominated reserves have remained unchanged or declined during the same period. Among private investors, foreign investment in RMB-denominated assets has been the main source of China’s financial account surplus (Chart 8). China has hastened the opening of its onshore financial market to foreign institutional investors. In the past two years, major global stock and bond indexers –including MSCI, the S&P Dow Jones Indices, the FTSE Russell, and the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index – have added A-shares and onshore bonds to their flagship benchmarks. This means that foreign institutional investors have significantly boosted their allocation of RMB-denominated stocks and bonds (Chart 8, bottom panel). Financial assets, such as domestic RMB stocks, bonds, and loans and deposits held by foreign entities, climbed by 26.7% in 2019 over 2018. At the same time, China's domestic financial markets have gradually liberalized and even removed investment quotas for overseas institutional investors. Foreign investors currently account for 5.5% and 2.6% of the market value in Chinese equities and bonds, up from 3% and 2% in 2018, respectively. Chart 7The RMB Share In Global Reserves Remains Dismal, But Has Nearly Doubled Since 2016 Chart 8China Has Been Rapidly Expanding The Scope Of Foreign Participants In Its Onshore Financial Markets Bottom Line: The internationalization of the RMB will likely continue to accelerate in the face of decoupling from the US. It is a long process, but China will take advantage of its dominance in global demand to foster the RMB's role in both pricing and settlement in cross-border commodity trade. At the same time, China is rapidly expanding the scope of foreign participants in the country's onshore financial markets, by allowing more foreign banks and financial institutions to enter the market, and broadening the channels for the RMB’s international circulation. Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1SWIFT is a system that provides information on international payments and calculations. The system unites more than 11,000 banking and financial institutions in 210 countries and the bank card payment function supported by the SWIFT system reflects a country's financial security. 2China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System release, July 31st, 2020. 3Xu Wenhong, The SWIFT System: A Focus on the U.S.–Russia Financial Confrontation, Russian International Affairs Council, February 3, 2020. 4Based on data from Shanghai International Energy Exchange. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
BCA Research's Global Fixed Income Strategy service argues that the persistence of the COVID-19 pandemic intensifies pressure on policymakers around the world to provide more economic stimulus. The odds that more central banks will join the negative policy…

